
The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro Secessionism



Samuel K. Tan

Mindanao Studies Reports

1995 / No. 1

University of the Philippines
Institute for Integrative and Development Studies

Bella R. Lucas
11/19/95

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Published by
The University of the Philippines Press
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
and
The Center for Integrative and Development Studies
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

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ISBN No. 971-8797-56-4
January 1995

Cover Design: Michael Arciga, Bella Lucas and Stretch Payawal
Report Design and Layout: Michael Arciga, Bella Lucas and Stretch Payawal

Text composed in Galliard BT
Typeset using Aldus Pagemaker 5.0®

Printed in the Philippines by
University of the Philippines Printery
UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City

FOREWORD

The University of the Philippines-Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS) instituted the Mindanao Studies Program (MSP) in late 1994 to address the research needs emanating from the rapid developments in the region. The Program aims to undertake multidisciplinary research in collaboration with academic, government and nongovernment institutions in Mindanao. Apart from research, MSP also aims to foster linkages with various sectors and disseminate its findings to key actors in the region through workshops, conferences and publications.

In line with its dissemination efforts, the MSP is launching the *Mindanao Studies Reports* Series with Dr. Samuel K. Tan's **The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro Secessionism** as the first report. The paper is a concise historical account of the social and economic factors behind the continuing problem of separatism and discord in Mindanao. It is an excellent background material for those planning a development process for the region which will avoid the pitfalls of marginalizing ethnic and religious groups.

Dr. Tan is the Convenor of the UP-CIDS MSP. An earlier book on the *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* was published by the UP-CIDS and the UP Press in 1993. The Center acknowledges the editorial assistance of Ms. Jocelyn de Jesus. Bella Lucas and Joy Aparis saw the Report through its publication with the assistance of Michael Patrick Arciga.

As in all our other publications, the views expressed in the Report are those of the author whose academic freedom is upheld by the University.

Maria Cynthia Rose Banzon Bautista
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
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THE SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSION OF MORO SECESSIONISM*

I. *Introduction*

The Muslims or Moros in the Philippines are involved in the struggle for either autonomy or independence. Conservative estimates place them as comprising about 15 percent of the national population, and about 25 percent of the Mindanao population. Together with the Lumadnons, the other non-Christian tribes, the non-Christians represent about 35 percent of the Mindanao population. In the 1980 national census, the Muslims numbered 2,504,232 out of a Mindanao population of 10,905,243, or about 23 percent; the Lumadnons, 1,269,660 or about 12 percent. But the Bangsamoro estimate of their population and that of the Lumadnons, according to the 1988 issue of *Mahardika* (March-April 1988) was eight million and four million, respectively. The Christian population was estimated at about 5.1 million, or 30 percent of the total Mindanao population.

For more than 300 years, the Spanish colonial government had to fight the Moros on land and sea using both the sword and the cross. But the Moros refused to accept Spanish sovereignty despite their eventual loss of power and resources by the middle of the 19th century. The same situation prevailed during the period of American rule (1898-1946), except that the subtle American approach succeeded, at least, in dividing the Moros and neutralizing their resistance. The Filipino government after 1946 confronted a divided Moro leadership and struggle and for more than two decades succeeded in keeping the Moros subdued by concession to Moro leadership until 1968, when events led to the rise of secessionist agitations, first, under Datu Udtog Matalam of Pagalungan, Cotabato and later, under Nur Misuari of Sulu.

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* Paper originally presented in 1989 at the International Center for Ethnic Studies in Kandy, Sri Lanka and slightly revised for more contemporary use.

From 1968 up to the present, the Bangsamoro, as the Muslims now call themselves and those non-Muslims who consider Southern Philippines their homeland, has intensified their secessionist movement. This led to a compromise agreement based on autonomy known as the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 which was signed by then Deputy Minister of National Defense Carmelo Barbero for the Philippines, Chairman Nur Misuari for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Dr. Ali Abdusaalam Treki of Libya, and Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Since 1976 the agreement had remained the only common denominator for all Moro factional demands until the Aquino government adopted a stand to use the 1987 Constitution as a basis of negotiations and settlement, with the Tripoli Agreement serving only as a secondary point of reference. This had been the major source of theoretical differences between the Bangsamoro and the government until recent moves to soften their respective positions. To understand Moro secessionism, not only the political and cultural aspects of the struggle must be examined, but also the socio-economic dimensions in historical and contemporary perspective.

The relation between economic factors and conflict has been more or less established. What is important is how this relationship is expressed in conflict situations in specific areas of the world where a great diversity of cultures exist. The following essay is an attempt to analyze the economic issues of secessionism up to the end of the Marcos era in 1986 in Moroland, that southernmost part of the Philippine archipelago that has been historically regarded as the homeland of the Filipino Muslims.

II. Demographic Profile

Demography contributed to ethnic complexity. When Governor Udtog Matalam launched the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968 in Pagalungan, Cotabato, the socioeconomic imbalance in Moroland provided a stimulus to ethnic changes. This could somehow be attributed to the movement of the people to or within Moroland as well as to the distribution of economic resources and opportunities.

Although colonial policies encouraged population movement from Christian to non-Christian areas, particularly during the last half of the American regime, it would not be until the postcolonial period that demographic

mobility and changes affected the fragile balance between Muslim, *Lumad*[1] and Christian populations in Mindanao. The region had been claimed by the Moros as their historic homeland, but the Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas had regarded it as a "land of promise," similar in significance to the American movement westward in the 19th century in search of land and gold. Propagated by colonial policies and programs, the slogan proved to be a powerful stimulus to land-hungry farmers and prospectors who found their way to the rich valleys and coasts of Mindanao as individuals or syndicated groups with material assistance from the government. After 1946, the Philippine government, now under Filipino leadership, carried on the colonial inertia and demographic changes showed the unmistakable trends toward the drastic reversal of population ratio. From the census of 1918 to that of 1970, the changes can be seen in the following table:[2]

Mindanao Population Profile
1918-1980
(Based on Official Data)

Sector	1918	%	1970	%	1980	%
Christians	159,132	22%	6,119,026	75.12%	7,131,351	65%
Muslims (Moros)	358,968	49%	1,583,043	19.43%	2,504,232	23%
Lumads (other non-Christian ethnic tribes)	205,555	29%	1,269,660	5.45%	1,269,660	12%
Total	723,625	100%	8,146,652	100%	10,905,243	100%

It is clear that after about 50 years of internal and external migrations, and the natural growth of population through births, the total population of Mindanao increased 11 times, the growth being quite dramatic in the Christian sector. The Christian population outnumbered the combined non-Christian population by about 75 percent in 1970 two years before Martial Law was declared in 1972, and four years before the bloody battles erupted in 1974 in Jolo where the MNLF had established its base under Misuari. In

effect, by 1970, the demographic and social profile of the region had been drastically changed in favor of the Christian sector. After a decade, the 1980 population had reached 10,905,006, with the non-Christian population rate up by about 35 percent and that of the Christian reduced by about 65 percent.

Province-wise, the Muslim majority had been reduced to only five of the provinces. In percentage, the Muslim majority was 64.11 percent (283,687) in Maguindanao; 91.39 percent (416,269) in Lanao del Sur; 94.98 percent (299,602) in Sulu; 95.63 percent (105,382) in Tawi-Tawi; and 61.9 percent (89,127) in Basilan. In all the rest of the provinces, the percentage ratio of Muslims to Christians and others ranged from .05 percent in Agusan del Norte, to 23.11 percent in Sultan Kudarat which had been a Muslim - dominated region before the 1960s.

As mentioned earlier, since colonial times, state policies and programs tended to favor and develop the Christian sector.Obviously, the realization of colonial aims, whether economic, social or political, critically depended on the support of the Christianized natives. Thus even the division of provinces for administrative or political purposes would be governed by the Christian - non-Christian dichotomy. Particularly important was the political participation of sectors in the government, especially in the legislative branch, which was based on population ratios. With only a negligible exception, the division of certain provinces into several units followed the dichotomy. Lanao del Norte was Christian and Lanao del Sur was Muslim. Except for Maguindanao which was Muslim, the provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat were Christian, formed out of the once Muslim-dominated Cotabato. Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur were both Christian, with small Muslim minorities. The political division increased the political advantage in legislative representation. In fact, the leverage could be applied to the other branches of the government. Only the formation of Tawi-Tawi as a separate province from Sulu was motivated not by sectoral dichotomy. The reason was ethnic. The Sama people, although Muslims, had been wanting to free themselves from Tausug political domination since the sultanate era.[3]

III. Distribution of Resources

That colonialism and demography had been directly related to the critical issues of distribution of resources are no longer debatable as far as the Mindanao problem is concerned. It is still valid today as it was yesterday. The resources then and now might be different in some measure, but the difference lies only in the nature and extent of such resources that can be categorized conveniently into land, investment, and social services. What has been consistent as far as distribution of resources is concerned is the influence of the colonial dichotomy which has been favorable to the Christianized sector of society. There was only a shift from ethnic to religious focus because of the colonial powers' almost obsessive efforts to develop a truly colonial society.

A. Land Distribution

In no other aspect of the economy was the imbalance between Christian and non-Christian interests more obvious and glaring than in the distribution of land. To be sure, the movement of settlers from Visayas and Luzon to Mindanao had to do with the desire for lands. As an agricultural society, about 70 percent of the national population had depended directly on land cultivation for income. It was even truer in the colonial society that had not seen a real shift to nonagricultural alternatives until the 19th century.[4]

So that, side by side with demographic changes was the acquisition of land in Mindanao. State policies were promulgated to encourage settlement in Southern Philippines, particularly during the American regime during which there had been liberal laws and incentives, including financial or material assistance. For instance, land ownership through legal instruments became the underlying concept of land distribution. This was clearly contradictory to the traditional concept observed in Muslim as well as *lumad* societies in Mindanao. The traditional concept emphasized not individual but collective ownership, and therefore, land use was the basis of individual rights to economic benefits and resources. Modern laws enacted by colonial rule clearly tended to favor the Christian settlers. Thus Muslims and other non-Christians, who were either ignorant of the laws or could not use the legal processes because of cost or cultural constraints, were gradually and eventually deprived of the areas that they regarded as ancestral lands.

From local ethnic usage, whether Muslim or *lumad*, ancestral lands referred to territorial areas, including the rivers and waters thereon, which had been generally recognized as the home of ethnic groups. Although the boundaries were not definable in exact scientific and technical terms, the ancestral domains were the areas where hunting, fishing, collecting, and cultivation had been done by members of the ethnic group. So that it was not difficult for the local communities outside the Christian sector to identify certain parts of Mindanao or Southern Philippines as homeland: The eastern littorals of Davao was generally Mandaya country, in the same way that Bukidnon was home of the ethnic group bearing its name. Agusan was Butuanon and Manuvu country. The latter, which was supposed to be the earliest and largest of the *lumad*, spilled over to a large portion of Cotabato. The Maranaws considered the lands around Lake Lanao as their ancestral domain, and the Maguindanaos claimed almost the whole of Cotabato as their own. The Subanon country was represented by the Zamboanga provinces including Misamis. Sulu was Tausug country just as Tawi-Tawi was Sama homeland. If one, therefore, looks at the central location of every ethnic group in the area and plots the latitude and longitude of traditional ethnic activities, it is not unreasonable for the non-Christians to claim the entire Mindanao and the islands around as ancestral lands. But demography and law have challenged this concept and have consequently created the serious issue of historic and legal rights.

Because of powerlessness of the non-Christian groups against the colonial processes, their responses, except for those of the Muslims, were limited to strategic withdrawals into hinterlands or inaccessible areas of their homelands. At least, this kind of reaction ensured protection for their cultural traditions which represented the only meaningful remains of their heritage and the basis of their identity and strength. Thus the more organized colonial campaigns led to the alienation of the non-Christians from their lands. This could be seen from the land laws passed since October 7, 1903, when Act 926 issued by the Philippine Commission classified public lands in order to grant free patents, homestead and/or purchase. The law allowed individuals 16 hectares.

On November 29, 1919, Act 2874 repealed Act 926 and increased homestead limit from 16 to 24 hectares, and purchase to 100 hectares. It also

restricted land acquisition to natives and subjects of the United States, thus allowing even nonnatives to acquire lands considered public. Those that were guaranteed to Spanish citizens by the Treaty of Paris in 1898 were not included in alienable lands despite the Philippine Revolution's demand for the return of all friar lands.

On January 12, 1924, Act 3164 allowed individuals to get more than one free patent and Act 3219 of January 19, 1925, increased the hectarage that could be bought to 144. Subsequent laws from Act 3346 of February 10, 1927, to Commonwealth Act 456 of June 8, 1939, helped facilitate the acquisition of land and its ownership as it rationalized acquisitions to only one homestead.

Undoubtedly, the land laws enacted up to the end of colonial rule in 1946 were at the expense of the non-Christian inhabitants.[5] They would one day realize that the lands they have been assuming as theirs by historic rights had been alienated and owned by outsiders, some of whom had not even seen the land before. Conversely, what the land laws gave the non-Christians before 1935 was 10 hectares. Then Commonwealth Act 141 reduced this hectarage to only four. Considering the difficulties of using the legal processes, it was no wonder that the system of land distribution was creating more problems for the cultural communities than expected. For obvious reasons of convenience and expediency as well as ignorance, the non-Christian leadership helped in facilitating what later proved to be the cause of their own economic tragedy and political destruction.

As a result of the land policies and laws, Southern Philippines, particularly Mindanao, was opened to Christian settlers as well as to American interests with resources to develop the potential of the area.[6] Within two decades (1900-1920), 46 pioneer American firms were established in the Zamboanga-Sulu districts. In addition to these business ventures, the special issue of the *Mindanao Herald* in 1908 listed 25 American planters pioneering the agricultural development process in Mindanao. Thomas Schneider worked his 50 hectares in Lanipao, Malita. Edward E. Christensen founded the Christensen Plantation in Hagonoy, Davao, with 936 hectares. Hardin Monroe Joyce developed his 1,000 hectares in Culaman, Davao. Several others had done similar work in acquired lands, largely in Davao.[7]

By 1930 agricultural colonies had been established in Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, Agusan and Lanao. In fact, a Jewish mission looked into the possibilities of bringing in Jewish colonists to Lanao, but the plan did not materialize because of local opposition.[8] Big American capitalists had also indicated to Governor-General Henry L. Stimson their willingness to risk investment if the government would allow them to acquire at least between 5,000 and 20,000 hectares. Stimson's insistence on a reasonable landholding policy prevented the massive alienation of land in Mindanao which had become the focus of American interest.

Then, on February 12, 1935, the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act brought more Christian settlers to Mindanao. The Commonwealth Act 4412 in 1939 created the National Land Settlement Administration which opened Koronadal and Allah valleys in Cotabato to an influx of settlers. Agencies like the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA), Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO), and National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) pursued land resettlement projects that brought in some 9,800 families in Tacurong, Isulan, Bagumbayan, Buluan, Sultan Sa Barongis and Ampatuan before 1934. Until 1956 another 18,616 families were resettled. In 1963 the Land Authority replaced NARRA, and, by 1971, 2,499 families were settled in Mindanao. In September 1971, the Land Authority was abolished and in its stead President Ferdinand E. Marcos created the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The new agency was apparently created to handle the growing problems of land conflict not only in Mindanao, but also in other parts of the country.[9]

The DAR carried on settlement programs until the Aquino administration ushered in another approach. But then as now, the land problem in Mindanao is linked directly to the legal but unjust alienation of non-Christian lands. In 1963 the Manahan Committee's Senate report referred to this problem simply as "landgrabbing."[10] The Aquino government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which had gone through the travails of congressional debates, offered no relief to the cultural communities in their effort to recover their ancestral lands. The new agrarian approach, whether according to the Senate or House of Representatives, dealt with the breakup of big landed estates into small units of seven to 15 hectares depending on whether the land was planted to corn, rice, coconut, sugar, *etc.* As far as the cultural

communities were concerned, Senate Bill No. 73 was filed to determine what could be set aside as reservations for the minorities and to give the bonafide members a five-hectare-limit to land ownership.[11] In effect, the bill legalized the Moro or *lumad* claims to ancestral lands on the basis of historic rights. In a sense, it legitimized the unjust alienation of minorities domain.

It is clear, therefore, that as far as land distribution was concerned, the laws of the State since colonial times had been directly responsible for the drastic alteration of the sociodemographic equilibrium which was vital to peace and national integration. In effect, the perception of non-Christians was that they were not only being alienated from their traditional homeland, but also subtly coerced to embrace the Christian faith which was the only way to neutralize the adverse social processes against their interests. Thus the economic threats to their well-being had been augmented by the prospect of even losing their own identity and destiny. This was the consciousness that emerged in postwar period and contributed to the subsequent crystallization of non-Christian, especially Muslim, resistance and struggle into the secessionist movement.

B. Investment Pattern

In the area of investments for Mindanao's economic development, systematic resettlement as well as favorable government policies had brought about the socioeconomic dominance in Southern Philippines of external interests directly connected with foreign interests. By the 1970s the lands acquired or alienated by external interests in Mindanao involved 2,170,435 hectares of the regions richest portions such as valleys and plains; and coastal, riverine and lacustrine areas. Of the total area, 26,537.5 hectares were for corporate farms; 4,620 for ponds and fisheries; 74,628 for sugar production; 92,293.4 for pastures; 20,900 for pineapple; 21,238 for bananas; and 1,930,209 for logging. The families associated with big business in Mindanao, besides well-known American and foreign firms since the 1920s, were Aboitiz, Alcantara, Almendras, Ayala-Zobel, Barcelon, Sarmiento, Siguion Reyna, Soriano, Sycip, Cabarus, Ortigas, Trinidad, Benitez, Tuason, Quimson, Guevarra, Benedicto, Consunji, Yuchengco, Zalamea, Floro, Elizalde, Tantoco, Cojuangco, Cuenca, Espaldon, Cajelo, Menzi, Ozaeta, Floirendo, Puyat, Magsaysay and Enrile.

The old native families of Mindanao tribal groups include the Dimaporos and kinsmen, the Pendatuns, Sinsuats, Loongs, Abubakars, *etc.*, that appear to have some national connections with foreign interests. Of course, the small businesses are in the hands of foreigners and nationals—largely Christians in the region—except small retail outlets run by natives.

By 1985 big business interests had been firmly established in various parts of Southern Philippines.[12] The 80 logging concessions were largely based in Surigao and Agusan. In Region 12 there were also wood processing ventures, 20 coconut businesses, 28 food corporations and 30 corporate farms. They were all engaged in extensive land cultivation, food processing, manufacturing and technical services. In addition, 10 foreign banks were directly and indirectly servicing the business needs and interests in Mindanao, which were largely, if not mainly owned by foreigners and foreign firms including Japanese, Chinese, Europeans, and Americans.

Even the hundreds of businesses owned by Filipinos were linked to the foreign sectors, thus virtually putting the entire non-Christian and the Christian sectors under the dominant control of foreign nationals. In 1985 and 1986 new investments in Mindanao stood at 86.6 million pesos and 114.3 million pesos, respectively, compared to Luzon's 3.9 billion pesos and 3.8 billion pesos for the same period. Distribution of national funds from 1978 to 1983 was 16.5 billion pesos for Mindanao (21.6 percent); 43.95 billion pesos for Luzon (57.6 percent); and 15.8 billion pesos for Visayas (20.8 percent). But in 1985 Mindanao contributed 11.6 million metric tons (42.9 percent) of the country's food-crop production of 27 million metric tons: 70.99 percent of fruit harvest, 67.40 percent of cacao, 63.77 percent of corn, 63.77 percent of coffee, 100 percent of rubber and ramie, 78 percent of castor, 78.55 percent of cotton, 53.64 percent of coconut, and 34 percent of abaca.

In effect, whatever share of economic resources and benefits due the Mindanao people, Christian and non-Christian, from their participation in economic development had been limited to the compensation for labor or management. The incomes from profits were, therefore, largely enjoyed by the capitalists based outside the region. The critics were probably right in saying that only 15 percent of what had been taken from Mindanao and Sulu

was plowed back to the region for development purposes. The rest was siphoned off to the capital region, home of the capitalist banks. In fact, in national terms, Mindanao provided some 50 percent of the national resources from exports. Fourteen of the country's 20 dollar-earning exports came from Mindanao. In addition, taxes that should have gone to Mindanao were detoured to the national treasury. The national government was clearly benefitting greatly from Mindanao taxation.

In fact, besides big-business taxes, the Bureau of Internal Revenue had collected a lot from Mindanao: about 759 million pesos in 1983, 826 million pesos in 1984, and one billion pesos in 1985. What the business and tax-income profile of Mindanao suggests is the long and unjust exploitation of the wealth of the region for the benefits of the national government and foreign interests.

In terms of sectoral benefits from whatever development growth had been achieved in Southern Philippines, the Muslim areas or the non-Christian communities were the most neglected. From records of the Bureau of Investments for the decade 1970-1980, 630 new firms were registered under Republic Act 6315. Of this number, 450 or 71.4 percent were in Metro Manila and 49 or 7.7 percent in Mindanao. But in the Muslim areas only 12, or two percent, were noted, the capital control of which was in outside hands. It is therefore not difficult to comprehend why secessionism had become a logical alternative to meager government subsidies and projects. It is especially an imperative to the Moro struggle, whose rationale lies in the history of government neglect of the cultural communities.

IV. State Initiatives and Local Potentials

The Philippine government had taken measures to deal with the problems involving the disadvantaged sectors. In the case of the cultural communities in general, or Mindanao in particular, the responses of the State to issues of injustices were governed in the colonial past by the aims usually associated with colonization, and conquest and in the postcolonial period with the continuing influences of former colonial powers.

Looking at the state development projects in the more recent past in Mindanao, there was a surge of optimism that the socioeconomic life of the region would somehow surmount the processes that had alienated the people in the region from the national community. For instance, the records on regional development initiatives show quite an impressive plan for 1978-1987, a decade that Mindanao could look forward to in terms of progress. Following is a reconstruction of such a profile for the four regions of Mindanao.

For Region 9,[13] composed of the provinces of Zamboanga Del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, the objective, as outlined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), was to overcome its "depressed state" by increasing regional per capita income from 60 percent to 90 percent of the national average. The gross national product was projected to grow annually by 7.5 percent reaching 2.69 billion pesos in 1978 from 2.07 billion pesos in 1975. Then from 1978 to 1982, the projection was 4.6 percent, annually sufficient to take care of a 3.3 percent population increase in the region. The expected shift from agricultural to industrial development was expected to increase labor productivity by 4.6 percent in 1978-1982 and 4.0 percent in 1982-1987. Twenty-seven major programs and projects were in the blueprint. These included Masagana 99 crop production, fish ports, cooperatives, refrigeration, fish farms and nurseries, dairy industries, processing plants, rural health services, sanitation and disease control, electrification, infrastructure and socialized housing.

For Region 10,[14] consisting of Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon, Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Camiguin and Surigao del Norte, the development thrust was to harness the rich variety of agricultural crops and mineral resources such as manganese, iron, silica, nonmetallic minerals, chromite, gold, copper, pyrite, aluminum, talc, lime, silver, serpentive, and nickel. The aim was to sustain a growth rate of 10.6 percent for 1978-1982 and 10.1 percent for 1983-1987. Agriculture was expected to gradually give way to industries by 48 percent in 1978, 46 percent in 1982, and 30 percent in 1987. Contribution of agriculture to regional growth was expected to increase from 22 percent in 1978 to 26 percent in 1982, and 32 percent in 1987. Through industrialization, labor productivity was expected to improve monthly income from 6,180 pesos in 1968 to 7,850 pesos by

1982, and 11,100 pesos by 1987. Social services and growth, as in the other regions, were assumed to follow economic changes. To realize all these, NEDA developed 28 programs and projects on agriculture, fisheries, markets, natural resources, mills, schools, crafts, infrastructure, communication and transportation, and irrigation.

Region 11,[15] composed of Surigao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Davao and General Santos cities, has about 543,808 hectares of rich potential. Its resources included abundant varieties of forest products and minerals. The NEDA developed 13 integrated projects and programs for development. These were in agricultural research, livestock disease control, fisheries, forest production, industrial estates, manpower and skill training, housing, ports, airports, and highways. The objectives were to develop agrobased industries over a five-year period at the rate of 5.8 percent annually until 1987. Industrialization was expected to take a growth rate of 15.1 percent, reducing the agricultural ratio from 46.6 percent in 1978 to 34.6 percent in 1987. Labor-wise, agriculture would absorb 58.6 percent, industries 12 percent, and services 31.6 percent by 1987.

Region 12,[16] composed of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat, boasted rich agricultural resources as well as minerals. Development objectives were higher per capita income and equitable sharing of income and opportunities. Gross domestic product was expected to grow at 8.6 percent annually, from 2,425 million pesos in 1978 to 3,377 million pesos in 1982. Per capita income was projected to increase by five percent annually at 1,138.9 pesos by 1982. The labor force was expected to make up 73.2 percent in agriculture, 12 percent in industries, and 14.8 percent in the service area. NEDA blueprinted 24 development plans involving Masagana 99 crop-processing plants, refractories, manpower and skills, day-care centers and infrastructure.

It is clear that based on state projections, a decade of development (1978-1987) was designed to bring about a socioeconomic transformation of Mindanao that would preempt the trends toward secessionism. This expectation had been constantly expressed by President Marcos before he was ousted from power in 1986. It has been reiterated in different styles by government since the "Yellow Revolution." But the more important ques-

tion is: Were the impressive development plans for Mindanao really carried out and realized? If they were, why has the Mindanao problem worsened and Moro secessionism strengthened?

The answers to these questions require the examination of implementing mechanisms. This is somewhat difficult considering the implications such an examination has on the issue of graft and corruption generally regarded as the root cause of development failure in the region. For instance, the Southern Philippine Development Authority (SPDA) was one agency that had been expected to carry out development plans for Mindanao in addition to the line departments in each region of Mindanao. But political problems had been created in the efforts to get the SPDA evaluated. In fact, only the replacement of old employees and officials was effected by the Aquino government and the same charges of mismanagement and irregularities had been hurled against the new management. Consequently, the Senate took a serious note of the problem in the light of the need to reorganize the entire government. One such effort was the bill filed by Senator Mamintal Tamano to create a new Department of Integration to take care of all matters pertaining to the cultural communities.[17] The SPDA would be absorbed by the new mechanism.

Generally, projects that had been duly approved by the NEDA and allocated the corresponding appropriations in the national budget were implementable. But how much of the allocation really went into making good these development plans had remained the most important issue of historical investigation as far as the Mindanao economy was concerned. From the state of the projects — completed, partly completed, or not completed at all — what was obvious, as in the case of Region 9, was that the funds had been released as budgeted. But as in previous administrations, including the last one, graft and corruption in the government had diverted part of the funds elsewhere. National and local officials, Christians as well as non-Christians, were involved in the system of irregularities that had become endemic in Philippine society and whose roots have been traceable to colonial institutions. In effect, the intended benefits of development had not been seen by the people in concrete terms. They had been largely confined to plans and official reports.

The failure of development could partly be related to the process of budgetary preparation and releases. The Philippine government operated by law under a highly centralized budgetary system. The procedure began from the *barangay*, the last unit of government, submitting a budget to the municipality of which it was a part. The municipal budget reflected the *barangay* requirements in addition to other needs of the municipality. Then the provincial government rationalized the budget in a larger financial blueprint before the regional autonomous government prepared the regional budget. But in the process, the autonomous governments of Region 9 and Region 12 merely had a monitoring function as far as the budget was concerned. The provincial government exercised local authority over the budget. The final evaluation was done by the Ministry of the Budget which prepared the entire national budget of the government according to the three branches of government and specialized units. The resulting budget was presented to the president for approval in the case of the Marcos regime, and to the Congress in the case of the Aquino administration. It was the budget approved by Congress in an appropriation act initiated by the House of Representatives that became the real basis of all government expenditures. It was in the long process of getting the budget finally operational by law that politics sneaked in and biases played an important role. Since budgetary allocations to regional and local units was done by line ministries (now departments), implementation of projects was contingent on the department ministers, deputy ministers, or other later designations.

But for the local governments, it was not so much getting the local budget into the appropriation act that created problems. It was the system of budget releases that constituted the main obstacle to the meaningful implementation of development plans. In other words, what was legally allocated to municipalities and provinces or regions had to be officially released by the Department of Budget and the various departments concerned. The system, therefore, gave too much power to national authorities and encouraged a lot of politicking and lobbying, which were the usual avenues for compromises and corruption. Consequently, percentages of releases were manipulated. The amount released on record did not represent the actual amount received by the local units. Such a system encouraged local officials to manipulate contractual dispensations for projects, especially public works, to absorb what they had to give to national levels. The ultimate result, as far as the development plans were concerned, was either nonimplementation, partial imple-

mentation or poor-quality implementation of projects. This in turn affected the local government's income-generating capacity.

Therefore, because of the absence or lack of qualitative or real development and growth, especially in the socioeconomic aspect, the generation of local or regional revenues became a nagging problem. Actual income from local financial resources was negligible so that local governments had become critically dependent on the national government. In fact, the law granted municipalities a certain percentage of internal revenues and national taxes they collected for the national treasury.[18] It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the local officials and people became inevitably subservient to national authorities and lost their social status vis-à-vis the more developed areas like the capital region, the seat of national power. The implications of such a distribution of resources, power and status on secessionism was obvious.

V. Ethnicity, Religion, and Class

Within the Bangsamoro homeland (Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan), there were numerous ethnolinguistic groups that had generally maintained their distinctiveness and relative isolation despite modernization. All the major Christian ethnic groups were represented, except that the most dominant were Visayans, Ilonggos and Ilocanos in Regions 10, 11 and 12. Of the non-Christians, the Lumadnons were found mainly in Regions 10, 11, and 12, with the Manuvus and related groups constituting the majority. The other non-Christians were the Moros who were predominant in Regions 9 and 12: the Maranaws in the Lanao provinces, the Maguindanaos in the Cotabato provinces, the Tausugs in Sulu and Basilan, and the Sama in Tawi-Tawi.

Undoubtedly, ethnicity or ethnonationalism had remained a factor in development as well as in the secessionist movement. A clear concession to ethnonationalism and regional autonomy was the subdivision of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities, created under the Marcos regime, into three separate offices: Office for Muslim Affairs (OMA), Office for the Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC), and Office for the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC). The OMA handled all Muslim pro-

grams, projects and problems. The ONCC took care of all tribal matters in Luzon. The OSCC dealt with all Lumadnon affairs in Southern Philippines and the Visayas.

The adaption of government structures along ethnic lines was reinforced by a similar pattern of population organization. The Mindanao Highlanders Association (Mindahila) was composed of all tribal ethnic groups headed by the late Datu Joseph Sibug, a leader of Manuvu-Ilocano ancestry from Kidapawan, Cotabato, and later a sectoral representative in Congress. He had consistently identified the group as a separate community with aspirations of their own, different from those of the Muslims and Christians.

But it is apparent that the extent of ethnic identification had been affected by certain practical considerations as follows: the fact that aspirations and goals could not be realized by every individual tribe or ethnic groups because of numerical weakness in a democratic system; and the fact that the trends were consolidations of groups along regional and/or religious criteria. This was particularly true of the Christians and Muslims.

The emergence of the religious factor in the national process was seen from the theoretical directions of the two major religious traditions in the country. The Christian community, through its spokesman, Jaime Cardinal Sin and the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, launched the slogan: "one bread, one body, one people." This was clearly eucharistic in symbolism and meaning. It had the effect of even bringing the Protestant sector into a movement for national unity along purely Christian criteria despite any difference in theory or practice that the 16th century Lutheran reformation had brought to Christendom. The religious line of national consolidation created a contrary process in the Muslim community in terms of the call for a fundamentalist approach to the Moro struggle. The same may be said of the Lumadnon whose adherence to the ancient religion, which antedated Islam and Christianity, had been revived. On the part of the Muslims the demand for such things as a *Shariah* court system, a *Madrassah* educational system, and an increasing identification with the Muslim world, even in symbols and rituals, was an unmistakable evidence of religious awakening. In fact, in the Muslim areas, men and women were beginning to sport Middle Eastern Arab costumes especially those who had gone to the Arab world on a *haj* (pilgrimage) or on business, if not as overseas contract workers.

There were three effects of this religious polarization on nationalism. First was the unfortunate division of the Filipino nation along strong religious orientation into Christian and Muslim. Second was the consolidation, however loose, of all other ethnic groups along a common adherence to the ancient religious traditions. In effect, a three-community pattern continued to shape the framework of the national fabric demanding equality in national attention and commitment. In brief, the Philippines, despite the promotion of Filipinism, had not departed from the trichotomy of colonial times, and, therefore, from the problems that accompanied such a pattern of development.

But in relation to the Moro secessionist movement, the religious line of development had created a dilemma and problem. A dilemma, because the islamization of the struggle drove the Mindanao Christians into the Christian process despite the need for regional autonomy in which they shared something in common with the Muslims. This was what the Christian-dominated national leadership welcomed in Mindanao and what the Moro struggle sought to neutralize. But the underplaying of the Islamic factor in the Moro struggle would certainly erode external support from the Muslim world whose interest in the Bangsamoro cause was to see the strengthening of Islam in the Philippines. There was every reason to believe that the extent to which the Muslim world would commit its vast investment of development petro-dollars in Southern Philippines or elsewhere depended on the strength of Islamic influence in the country. This became quite clear in the resolutions of the Organization of Islamic Conference beginning with the Amman declaration, Jordan, in March 1988, which deplored the failure of the Aquino government to carry out the Tripoli Agreement and pledging support to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), politically or otherwise, in its struggle for self-determination and Islam.

It was in the light of Muslim efforts to get out of the dilemma that the Bangsamoro ideology had emerged with a definite aim of harmonizing the various aspirations of groups in Southern Philippines. The ideology was a secular concept based on the total reality in the Bangsamoro homeland which included, under the concept, the Christian areas. Consequently, religion was only one ingredient and was not the basis of unity in the struggle against national domination. If at all, Islam was only to be regarded as the basis of unity of predominantly Muslim areas, but even in these areas, free-

dom of religion was the underlying concept of social life. In effect, "Bangsamoro" became a term of compromise, by way of accommodating all Muslims, Christians and Lumadnon who considered Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan and Basilan their "historic homeland." They were, therefore, bound together by a territoriality and a common cause to recover the independence and identity of the homeland.

The development of a secular ideology for Moro secessionism had opened it to a possible Marxist-Leninist influence. Not only was the leadership susceptible to radical penetration, but also, the socioeconomic conditions were favorable to radical propaganda the thrust of which was anticolonial and antifeudal. In fact, it was common knowledge in Southern Philippines that Marxist-Leninist fronts such as the National Democratic Front (NDF), New People's Army (NPA), and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) had gained foothold in Mindanao. It was only in the Muslim - dominated areas like Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi where their presence had not been felt. That there was some mutual understanding, not necessarily alliance, between the Bangsamoro and the radical elements, along tactical and logistical lines, was recognized by even the inadequately informed.

But whether the Bangsamoro struggle had taken the "class conflict" nature, typical of all Marxist liberation fronts, was not obvious from the struggle's various components. There were explanations for this. First, the Moro struggle was generally a reaction to the long domination of Southern Philippines by external interests and influences, including the national government, which were portrayed as colonial mechanisms. Second, the antifeudal character of Marxist-Leninist movements was not perceived in the Bangsamoro struggle since the various social classes were involved in what they believed was one of self-determination. Social division was vertical, not horizontal. If internal conflicts had been noted in the struggle, they were directly related to either ethnonationalism or personality conflicts. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under Ustadz Hashim Salamat was largely Maguindanao. The MNLF under Nur Misuari was Tausug-Sama. The MNLF Reformists under Dimasangkay Pundato was Maranaw. Also, the differences between rebel returnees or *balikbayans* and the three Moro factions were due to personality styles, not class distinctions. In a sense, a lot of feudal values still governed Moro secessionism. The reported show of unified efforts by the MNLF and the Sultanate was an indication of the vertical mobility in the

struggle which ultimately depended on the integration of traditional (feudal) and radical leadership if it was to work out.

One convenient ideological model that fitted into the Bangsamoro effort to achieve broad unity was Libyan socialism as elaborated theoretically in Muammar Ghadaffi's *Green Book*. The book rationalized the political, economic and social bases of society in which the desirable features of capitalism and socialism were blended in the *Jamahiriya* model. In effect, Moro secessionism found no conflict between socialism and Islam. The socialist ideals fitted into the communalism of ancient times where there was a vital place for religion in the political, social and economic systems of the communities. In communism, essentially associated with the idea of a Utopian society, God, as embodied in Islam or world religions, was a basic contradiction. In short, religion and socialism were harmonized in Islam. Hence, the Bangsamoro secessionist struggle sought ultimate liberation from colonialism and feudalism without sacrificing Islam.

VI. Prospect for Moro Economic Role

The socioeconomic dimension of Bangsamoro aspirations seeks to achieve liberation from foreign and national dominance in the economy of the Bangsamoro homeland. The means to this end is independence which logically involves the transfer of all authority and power to the Bangsamoro. In effect, all foreign or neocolonial interests in an independent Bangsamoro state will be subject to the new State power and will have to deal only with the Bangsamoro leadership.

Undoubtedly, the Moro experience in the development of Mindanao and thereabout for over four centuries has not been encouraging and rewarding. It has, indeed, been the main economic motivation for secessionism. As of today, Moro involvement in national and local economy is largely in agriculture, small business, fishing and limited social services. Corporate or big business is in the hands of outside capitalists, principally the multinationals, including Chinese and Japanese. Only a few rich Muslim families are involved in certain corporate business. But the concentration of Muslim capital is in the regional buy-and-sell small business, especially in the "barter trade" which had been rationalized by the Marcos government to accommo-

date substantial Muslim involvement in the regional economy. This was a special privilege granted as an exception to the antismuggling law. Under the "barter trade system" any Muslim trader could bring in foreign goods worth not more than 5,000 pesos without paying duties, but they were to be sold in certain barter trade zones: Jolo and Zamboanga. But since the fall of Marcos the barter trade has become a multimillion smuggling operation by Manila capitalists, especially Chinese, who have established outlets in Metro Manila. In fact, the entire system is allegedly run by close relatives of people in power.

Then, in the banking and finance corporate business, the only meaningful Muslim involvement is the Amana Bank which had been established by Marcos in deference to Muslim clamor. The bank operates under an Islamic concept of "no-interest" system. The initial capitalization came from the government with the expectation that Muslim and Arab capitalists would come in. The bank is the only prominent corporate institution managed by Muslims. But at the start, the Muslims involved in management were not trained along the vital lines of financial-banking practices. The head of the board was Dr. Cesar Majul, a political scientist and university scholar, who had no economic background. The same was true of Dr. Mamitua Saber, a sociologist from Mindanao State University who became vice-president. The rest of the Muslim employees were mostly political appointees. Consequently, actual financial and banking expertise was provided by non-Muslim specialists. The management has since changed, but the fundamental problems persist.

Thus the only area of economic activity where Muslims have enjoyed some leverage is recruitment of Middle East business. The Arab world has given priority in job placement to the Muslims. But in this area, the Christian Filipinos are not that far behind because of the special skills they possess. Indeed, the prospect of Muslim role in both national and local economy appears uncertain and bleak, unless the Philippine national structure is radically changed, or unless the Bangsamoro struggle achieves the goal of independence or acceptable autonomy. But there have been certain changes in national policies that may yet help the Muslims attain their aims without substantially changing the status quo.

VII. Implications

The implications of the inequitable distribution of resources and benefits on peace, unity and integration are clear. Unless the entire concept of distribution is radically altered, the threat of a secessionist war in Southern Philippines will always be there. The urgent measures that can be taken to neutralize and, finally, eliminate the preconditions and precipitants to conflict are hard and costly, but they are certainly preferable to bloody confrontations from which any victory will be pyrrhic and meaningless. The following can be considered.

A. Decentralization

As an approach it applies to the problem of economic resources as it does to the issue of political power in Mindanao. In the past and, to a large extent, even in the present, decentralization has been mainly concerned with responsibility, not authority. Power has remained the near monopoly of the central government in Manila with the regional and local levels virtually serving only as "conduits of national will" and as implementors of national policies and decisions not necessarily beneficial or acceptable to local interests. The distribution of benefits, services, and resources has been directly affected by the overconcentration of power in the national authorities. But whether decentralization is achieved through autonomy, federalism or secession has become the only relevant issue that interests people in Southern Philippines. This is a reality that the national government must accept without reservation or condition. What it should concern itself with is how the transition can be done smoothly and quickly, since time is of the essence.

B. Decolonization

As a solution, decolonization offers a fundamental breakthrough in the search for peace and stability in the country, particularly in Mindanao. There is thus a need to seriously look beyond the legal dimensions of treaties, agreements and negotiations into the psychohistorical and psychosocial forces that have converged on the consciousness of the parties in conflict. There is a wall of mistrust, suspicions, anxieties, prejudice and even hatred that has to be broken down before any meaningful distribution of resources can be real-

ized. Undoubtedly, the decentralization of authority, which is crucial to distribution, can still be plagued by colonial values that are detrimental or counterproductive to the cultural communities. In effect, no meaningful distribution of resources can be done without decentralization and/or decolonization. Consequently, the educational system, which is the logical means of achieving this aim, must be able to deal with the issue of how it can best perform this role.

C. Distribution

As a necessary complement to peace efforts, the distribution of well-being, material or otherwise, while governed by the concepts of decentralization and decolonization, must proceed along equitable lines. That is, there are certain realities within the Mindanao ecumene that are relevant to the sharing of resources. One of these realities is **ethnic pluralism**. Ethnic identities have survived remarkably despite modernization. They refuse to die and in fact are being strengthened. There are several ethnolinguistic groups in Southern Philippines. In the Muslim group, there are four major ones: Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs, and Sama. In addition, there are minor groups: the Yakans, Sangils, and Kalibugans. Unless ethnicity is given appropriate recognition in the distribution process, problems between ethnic groups could arise within the region in the same manner that they had plagued the Christian-non-Christian relations on the national level.

Another internal reality, which is also relevant to distribution, is the population ratio. Demographic changes have constantly affected the majority-minority profile in the region. It has in fact substantially changed the administrative face of Mindanao and has become the main basis of what the government and the Christian majority consider as the democratic solution to the Mindanao problem. The importance of material resources is often gauged by their impact on individuals rather than groups. Therefore, the more people benefit from the distribution process, the more the process appears to be just and democratic. Consequently, the Christian majority (70 to 75 percent in the region expects to be given more of the benefits of development from any political struggle in the region. How will this prospect be viewed by the minorities who expect to benefit from any arrangement on the basis of historic rights?

D. Integration

As a whole, the MNLF strategy to achieve its goals is to bring the people of Southern Philippines behind it. One of the imperatives of such strategy is the emancipation of the movement from religious color that has been given it by State propaganda and Muslim fundamentalism, which both have the effect of alienating non-Muslim support in Mindanao. That is why the political and socioeconomic dimensions of MNLF concessions to non-Muslim aspirations have become increasingly emphasized. Two members of the MNLF core group in the country are Reverend Absalom Cerveza and Father Florio Falcon. Rev. Cerveza is an ordained minister of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, a dominant Protestant fundamentalist denomination in Mindanao with extensive missionary work among the Lumadnon. Father Falcon is a known Catholic priest in Mindanao.

Under the Bangsamoro ideology, Christians and Lumadnon will be accorded rights, privileges and freedom to structure and manage their own affairs to enable them to benefit from their own resources and potentials. Only in the largely Muslim-dominated areas do the Muslims expect to exercise a more or less Islamic approach to development goals without necessarily establishing an Islamic state religion. Because of this progressive change in Moro secessionist ideology, Christians and Lumadnon have publicly supported the independence or autonomy movements in Mindanao. Reuben Canoy and Homobono Adaza, recognized political leaders in Mindanao, consistently advocated not only decentralization and autonomy, but also, subsequently, independence. The same was true of the Mindahila of Sibug and lawyer Joseph Banghulot who had expressed support for decentralization of national power and resource. In fact, the publicly organized *Unlad Bayan*, an organization of prominent oppositionists led by well-known multimillionaire and business tycoon, Enrique Zobel, advocated a federal system for the Philippines to resolve the country's political problems. The idea had received favorable endorsement from all the Moro movements including the MNLF. In effect, federalism was viewed by certain sectors including some in the government, as the best compromise between secessionist demands and national sovereignty. This was perceived as the only logical alternative to the dismemberment of the Republic. But the irony of it is: the national leadership, represented by a few, has resisted such a promising basis for peace.

Finally, there is the reality of development potential that has ultimate bearing on the future progress of Mindanao. Each region or unit in the area has been endowed by nature with natural resources. One need only observe the order of priority in development as related to the overall blueprint for progress. Giving more emphasis on the best income potential is a practical approach to development plans. Thus the probable thrusts are: marine industries in Tawi-Tawi, agro-industries in Cotabato, mineral and industrial projects in Davao, Surigao, *etc.* But the incomes derived from all potentials must be subject to equitable distribution for the mutual benefits and well-being of all in the area regardless of ethnic or population factors. In effect, development and resource distribution must ultimately bring unity of purpose and mutual sharing of power and responsibility in the region. Otherwise the problems that have been plaguing national unity would also emerge in the local or regional level.

NOTES

1. The term "*lumad*" is used in Mindanao when referring to the various ethnolinguistic groups which have not been Islamized or Christianized. The Spaniards called them in colonial times as the "*infieles*" which the Americans later adopted under the term "pagan." Subsequently, the Filipinos continued the use of the colonial terms until more recently when efforts to decolonize perceptions led to the use of such terms as *"lumad"* or *"lumadnons."*

2. The population table is constructed from census volumes concerned as well as secondary sources such as the compilation of Mindanao data by social scientists of Mindanao State University and presented during the Mt. Makiling conference on Muslim autonomy at Los Baños in September 1986.

3. "Editorial," *Tawi-Tawi Tribune*, July 1986.

4. The period from 1815 to 1872 is sometimes referred to as the decades of "transformation." *Tadhana,* Vol. II, Part IV, elaborates this thesis. This includes the fact that barter was still the exchange system in rural Philippines until the late 19th century when the city monetary system began to influence rural economy

5. *Tribal Forum*, an Episcopal publication, in its March-April 1987 issue, Volume VIII, No. 2, lists the laws that have governed agrarian relations with the various non-Christian groups.

6. Father Pedro Salgado, OP, *The Rape of Mindanao*, an ECFI Research Series, Volume I, No. 1 (Third Quarter), published by the Episcopalian Commission on Tribal Filipinos. This publication lists the foreign and capitalist businesses in Mindanao.

7. Ernesto Corcino, "Pioneer American Entrepreneurs in Mindanao" in Samuel K. Tan and Cesar Hidalgo, editors, *Mindanao Journal,* Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-4 (July 1981-June 1982), pp. 97-130. Corcino enumerates and describes briefly the early Americans, between 1899 and 1920, who started business in Mindanao, particularly in Davao. The same information is also carried in Douglas T. K. Hartley's "A Preliminary Study of the Pioneer American Entrepreneurs in Mindanao and Sulu.", *ibid.*, pp. 213-224.

8. Samuel K. Tan, *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972* (Filipinas Foundation, Inc., 1978), p. 94.

9. The general information on the land distribution and the various problems accompanying such distribution is summarized in a report, "On Defining the Territorial Coverage of the Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao and the Disposition of Ancestral Lands in the Same Area," prepared by the Historial Commission of Mindanao State University for the First Scientific Workshop Conference on Muslim Autonomy at Los Baños, Laguna on January 14-18, 1986.

10. *Report on the Progress of the Philippine Cultural Minorities* (Manila: Philippine Senate, 1963).

11. Senate Bill No. 73 was introduced by Senator Mamintal Tamano, a Muslim from Lanao, to grant "a new period to perfect title lands occupied by the members of the national cultural communities," amending for the purpose Section Eight of Presidential Decree No. 410. Two other bills were filed in the Senate: Senate Bill No. 86 by Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Senate Bill No. 152 by Senator Santanina T. Rasul, which deals with the issue of "ancestral lands." The Tamano and Guingona bills are based on the Regalian Doctrine adopted since colonial times, whereas the Rasul bills proceed from the recognition of indigenous concepts.

12. Salgado, *op. cit., p.*10

13. *Haylaya*, a Regional History of Western Mindanao (Region 9), published by the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines, Manila, 1980.

14. *Linibung*, a Regional History of Northern Mindanao (Region 10), published by the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines, Manila, 1980.

15. *Bagani*, a Regional History of Southern Mindanao (Region 11), published by the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines, Manila, 1980.

16. *Darangen*, a Regional History of Central Mindanao (Region 12), published by the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation and Development of Southern Philippines, Manila, 1980.

17. Senate Bill No. 86, filed by Senator Tamano, elaborates on the process of consolidating all agencies and offices dealing with the cultural communities. But this has been generally opposed because it is perceived to be contrary to autonomy which is the principal demand of the national minorities.

18. Presidential Decree No. 144 guides the assistance to local government units. Under this law, 20 percent is allotted from national revenues collected from the local government in addition to other budgetary helps pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 436.

About the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies

The University of the Philippines-Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS) was established in September 1985 to promote interdisciplinary studies on critical topics that influence development policies and issues.

The UP-CIDS initiates and supports research involving innovative methodological approaches and multidisciplinary collaboration. While public policy questions are the primary concern of UP-CIDS, it also encourages basic research that is needed for informed formulation of policy.

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Mindanao Studies Program at UP (MSP-UP)

The Mindanao Studies Program which the UP-CIDS is seeding began from the need for a meaningful presence of the University in Mindanao. This need has been increasingly felt because of the major changes generated in the region by development processes and the continuing problems of separatism and insurgency. The Program represents a more organized effort by the University to contribute its intellectual, academic, and professional expertise and resources towards enhancing the understanding of government, the private sector, and media of the development of regional potentials for political, economic, social, and cultural progress.

As the premier state university in the country, the University of the Philippines is expected to contribute substantially, not only to the intellectual growth of the nation in general, but also to the region in particular.

The Mindanao Studies Program is the University's modest response to the challenge of Mindanao. The MSP-UP seeks to explore areas of cooperation and collaboration with existing institutions and agencies involved in the development of Mindanao.

In addition, the Program aims to help in the systematic documentation, organization, preservation, and dissemination of knowledge and information on Mindanao through research, studies, seminars, and workshops. At the same time, the Program hopes to contribute meaningfully towards state policy formulation and public information service in relation to Mindanao. MSP-UP's ultimate goal is to institutionalize the Program in a sustainable and responsive manner.