




STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 2020

PROCEEDINGS FROM THE
4TH KATIPUNAN CONFERENCE

The Philippine Strategic Outlook 2020:
Strategic Transformations and
Responses in the Asia Pacific





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Introduction

Aries A. Arugay, Ph.D.

Co-convenor, Strategic Studies Program (SSP)

University of the Philippines

Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS)

I am pleased to present this publication that contains the proceedings of the 4th Katipunan Conference organized by the Strategic Studies Program (SSP) of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) from 15 to 16 August 2019. In attendance was more than 260 participants comprised of academics, students, researchers, military officials, bureaucrats, policymakers, and members of the diplomatic corps. For its fourth year, the 2019 Katipunan Conference centered on the specific transformations in the country's domestic and external security environment. More emphasis was placed on critical strategic issues such as maritime security, political economy and foreign relations, internal conflict, strategic applications of science and technology, and critical military industries. The conference also highlighted a policy speech delivered by a high-ranking official of the Department of National Defense, as well as special panels on future regional strategic and political trends and Philippines-China relations. All these issues are at the forefront of the Duterte administration's National Security Policy and its subsequent National Security Strategy.


The Katipunan Conference serves as a platform for discussing current and emerging issues that impact Philippine foreign policy and undertakes an environmental scan from multiple perspectives to produce practical and informed policy options for government agencies. The conference encourages participation from young

scholars and mid-career security practitioners who represent the next generation of strategic experts in the country.

This set of proceedings captures the essence of the discussions in the Katipunan Conference. I hope this can serve as the SSP's contribution in fostering substantive discourse on pressing strategic matters facing the Philippines and the Indo-Pacific region. The Katipunan Conference continues to serve as SSP's flagship program and hopefully can increase awareness on strategic issues facing the Philippines. SSP plans to convert some of the best papers in the conference into an edited volume that highlights how strategic policy-making in the Philippines can be further enhanced.

The 4th Katipunan Conference will not have been possible without the support of UP CIDS, the Office of the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, and the Office for International Linkages of the University of the Philippines System. Special thanks also to the Office of the Secretary of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. This conference will not be possible without the participation of the paper presenters, session chairs, and discussants. I would also like to thank the assistance provided by SSP research staff, namely, Marvin Hamor Bernardo, Maria Nikka U. Garriga, and Ramon D. Bandong, Jr.

The SSP of UP CIDS remains committed in building a solid network of security scholars and practitioners in the country as well as in sustaining productive engagement with policymakers and other security stakeholders in the country and abroad. Its future activities will continue to help in connecting the academe and the policy community, fostering a dialogue between theory and practice, and linking scholarship and decision-making.



Opening Remarks

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, Ph.D.

Executive Director

University of the Philippines


Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS)

Dr. Encarnacion Tadem welcomed the audience and participants and acknowledged the foreign dignitaries and other distinguished delegates present in the event. As the current UP CIDS Executive Director, Dr. Encarnacion Tadem traced the history of the institution and narrated the Center's brief history. According to her, CIDS was established in the early 1980s by then UP President Edgardo Angara, spanning various perspectives and methodologies in its conduct of basic and policy-oriented research. Dr. Encarnacion Tadem emphasized that the objective of CIDS is to contribute to national development and knowledge creation. It also aims to contribute to national development by way of implementing its vision into lectures, workshops and conferences, as well as a wide range of publications, from discussion papers to policy briefs, monographs, and the *Philippine Journal of Public Policy*.

Dr. Encarnacion Tadem also elaborated on all the research programs of UP CIDS which are grouped into four clusters: (1) Education and Capacity Building Cluster, (2) Development Cluster, (3) Social, Political, and Cultural Studies Cluster, and (4) the Local-Regional Studies Network. She further highlighted that of all the research programs at UP CIDS, the SSP is the program that aims to promote interest, discourse, and significant changes in the Philippine foreign policy and capacity building for strategic studies. As a precursor to the SSP, the 2015–2016 China/Strategic Studies Program

laid the groundwork for initiatives directed at capability building in strategic studies in the University.

According to Dr. Encarnacion Tadem, part of the capacity-building efforts of SSP is the Program's engagement in relevant venues to discuss pressing issues. The 4th Katipunan Conference provides the platform for discussions on maritime security, political-economic development, development in science and technology, conflict and security, and military industries. The main objective of the 4th Katipunan Conference is to bring to light current and emerging issues that impact Philippine foreign policy. Dr. Encarnacion Tadem concluded by acknowledging the role of both the local and foreign scholars and practitioners in the event in facilitating a meaningful dialogue on issues facing the country. The UP CIDS Executive Director ended her remarks by saying, "No doubt that this conference will elicit interesting and relevant conversation to thresh these all out and [I am] looking forward to a fruitful exchange of ideas."



Opening Remarks

Maria Cynthia Rose B. Bautista, Ph.D.

Vice President for Academic Affairs

University of the Philippines System


Dr. Bautista's opening statement was a reminder of how timely and urgent it is to conduct a strategic scan of our international environment in order to enlighten public opinion and develop policy recommendations to the government. She mentioned that Filipinos are generally not known for strategic thinking, but emphasized that even if this is the case, the country has enough expertise to plan and analyze the strategic affairs of the country. However, because Filipinos are not keen on strategic implementation, this inadequacy should be addressed immediately.

Dr. Bautista stated, "Strategic plans may be very strategic, but unless we are implementing, we'll never be able to refine the plans." According to her, strategic scanning, planning, and implementation must be done with urgency for the sake of the next generation. In relation to this, Dr. Bautista added that thoughtful discussions are prerequisites for evidence-based policymaking.

Dr. Bautista also thanked the UP CIDS, particularly the Strategic Studies Program, for enabling such a platform to discuss current and emerging issues that impact Philippine foreign policy and to undertake a strategic scan of the international environment from multiple perspectives. This would lead to a more enlightened policymaking.

She mentioned two conferences which she attended in Singapore and in Japan that highlighted the need to develop technology hubs. For Dr. Bautista, it is important to make the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a technology hub in order to bypass the geopolitics and major power rivalries in the region. Dr. Bautista stated, "There are discussions on moving more strategically to where countries should go." According to her, security is much broader than military concerns or the geopolitical situation. Therefore, other areas of concern should also be emphasized.

Dr. Bautista concluded with thought-provoking questions to ponder such as "What are our strategic plans? How do our strategic plans come together to chart where this country should be going? What would take for us to get there? Who will carry the plans and agenda to their implementation to its assessments and their revisions so that we continuously to grow our strategic plans?" Dr. Bautista stated that these questions deserve to be reviewed from time to time in order for us to move forward. Lastly, she emphasized that all good plans are practical and must "grow with the changing times." To conclude, the UP Vice President for Academic Affairs wished for a very productive and stimulating 4th Katipunan Conference.



Keynote Address

Hon. Delfin N. Lorenzana

Secretary

Department of National Defense

Delivered by

Hon. Teodoro Cirilo T. Torralba III

Assistant Secretary, Assessment and International Affairs

Department of National Defense

On behalf of Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana, Defense Assistant Secretary Teodoro Cirilo T. Torralba delivered the event's keynote address. Asec. Torralba discussed valuable insights on the Philippine security landscape in relation to the country's position in the Asia-Pacific Region. Asec. Torralba further emphasized that the Katipunan Conference, which is grounded on the very essence of "Katipunan" that led to the revolution of 1896, impels everyone to take cue from the historic movement's value of patriotism. He also added that the conference may serve as a reminder for everybody to take the future of the country into their own hands.

Asec. Torralba began his keynote address by situating the Philippines in the bigger sphere of the security environment. He noted that there were global shifts in the power dynamics and distribution among countries, which have shaken the international order in the Asia-Pacific region. While traditional superpowers, like the United States, have maintained their power and influence, it cannot be overlooked that many countries in Asia have solidified their position as well, according to Asec. Torralba. He gave emphasis on the US-China rivalry and stated that the two countries are competing for

greater influence in the region, as both have become more assertive militarily, economically, and politically. Asec. Torralba noted that other countries in the region, particularly India and Japan, also hold substantial influence in the region. According to him, the instability arises from the fact that the US and China are advancing completely polar interests. While the US has always espoused international rules and standards for regional security and prosperity, while advancing its own interests, China is seen to have boldly challenged the rules-based international order in pursuit of its own benefit. For Asec. Torralba, this results in the US being challenged in its position in the region as China continues to grow more powerful and assertive.

Asec. Torralba's keynote address also tackled other concerns, such as the dispute in the West Philippine Sea, terrorism, and the defense legislative agenda. He elaborated in his speech how the geostrategic rivalry between the US and China complicates the Philippines' position in the West Philippine Sea. He also highlighted the need to find the perfect balance in responding to both US and China. On one hand, the Philippines supports the role of the US in the security of the Indo-Asia-Pacific as a stabilizing factor in the regional balance of power. On the other hand, Manila should be cognizant of its geographical proximity to China, and must work closely with Beijing in managing tensions in the West Philippine Sea. For Asec. Torralba, finding the balance between the two powers while advancing the country's interests is still the key in finding our position in the region.

He emphasized that the Philippines maintains its possession over islands in the West Philippine Sea despite the illegal activities of Chinese vessels near and around the area. Asec. Torralba underscored the fact that, more than the issue of exclusive ownership over maritime features in the West Philippine Sea, the real and more pressing danger arises from the militarization of the area through China's artificial islands. He stated that, "We must view these actions not only as an attempt to strengthen its claim over islands in the South China Sea, but to flex its military power even beyond the area, lest we forget that the radius of China's bombers in the West

Philippine Sea covers almost the entire Philippine Archipelago and other countries in the Southeast Asia.”

Another issue that was raised in Asec. Torralba’s speech was the planned Chinese acquisition of three Philippine islands. He explained again the warning of the expected Chinese investments in three strategic islands in the Philippines, namely, the Fuga Island in Cagayan and the Chiquita and Grande Islands in Subic. According to Asec. Torralba, the government should be deliberate and careful in allowing Chinese presence in these islands for obvious implications to internal security.

Alongside the issue in the West Philippine Sea, the threat of terrorism, which has become transnational in nature in the past decades, was also discussed. Asec. Torralba advised that countries in Southeast Asia should prepare and anticipate the more aggressive attempts from foreign terrorist groups to penetrate Philippine borders, including cyberspace. Asec. Torralba mentioned the 8th Report of the Secretary General prepared by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). According to this report, the threat posed by ISIS is more imminent in the Philippines, since the country is one of the choice destinations of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in Southeast Asia. Due to the fact that this security concern is not unique to the Philippines, it is imperative that countries tackle this resolutely, especially in terms of funding. According to Asec. Torralba, it is crucial to debilitate operations of terror groups once all sources and channels of their funds are obliterated. He also stated that lobbying for the easing of the bank secrecy law could assist in preventing terrorist attacks since the authorities could easily spot suspicious deposits and withdrawals that might expose trails of funds leading to the hands of local terror groups.


Asec. Torralba also assured everyone that the government is committed to fully implement the Bangsamoro Organic Law, alongside the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). He stated that the government welcomes the support of peace-inclined groups such as the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and that these groups work hand-in-hand with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in dealing with terrorist groups that continue to terrorize local communities.

He emphasized AFP's role in countering extremist views on the ground by improving its understanding of radicalization. On the part of the Defense Department, Asec. Torralba is one of those who are strongly advocating for legislative measures in strengthening the country's national defense capabilities and improvement of national security. The valuable support of the academe and strategic partners and stakeholders is necessary in advancing the country's legislative agenda in the 18th Congress according to him.

Asec. Torralba also used the opportunity to explain the Defense Department and the AFP's call for the Congress to prioritize the Anti-Terrorism Law. According to him, if the Anti-Terrorism Law is enacted, it would no longer necessitate the proclamation of Martial Law and that there will be no need to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.

Asec. Torralba concluded his speech by expressing gratitude and hope that the programs and advocacies of the Department of Defense will be supported by the people. He also called on the audience to take part in peace and security efforts by utilizing academic freedom to foster a dynamic and proactive discourse on varied national issues relating to our country's national security.



SESSION 1

Maritime Security

CHAIR

Maria Thaemar Tana, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

PAPER PRESENTATION

Philippine Coast Guard: Institutional Developments, Changes, and Continuities

Jay Tristan Tarriela

Philippine Coast Guard

Lt. Commander Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) presented the institutional developments of the Philippine Coast Guard, including its functions and significance in helping advance the country's interests alongside the Philippine Navy. According to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela, it was in 2012 when the PCG gained prominence after its white ships replaced the Philippine Navy vessels in patrolling the West Philippine Sea (WPS). This was done to reduce the tension during the Scarborough Shoal stand-off.

Lt. Cdr. Tarriela immediately followed this up by emphasizing how the PCG is seen as an important preventive diplomacy instrument in dealing with territorial disputes, despite the fact that this role does not entirely capture the reason behind PCG's emergence as a new maritime institution.



Lt. Cdr. Tarriela's paper presented the importance of the PCG including the institution's role in white hull deployment in the West Philippine Sea and in addressing multifarious issues in the maritime sector. He posed the following research question: Why is PCG developing despite the presence of the Navy?

In his paper, Lt. Cdr. Tarriela explored the three underlying factors that would significantly affect whether the PCG would be developed or not:

- (1) *Military influence.* If the Armed Forces of the Philippines would have more significant influence to the national government, it would undermine PCG's growth since the AFP would naturally advance military interests instead.
- (2) *Presidential priority.* If the concern of the elected president is in line with one or more PCG core functions, and as long as the PCG does not compromise its regime, the odds for the Coast Guard to expand is likely.
- (3) *Maritime stakeholders.* They serve as a measuring tool for the President to evaluate support for the Coast Guard's development.

“External factors” also catalyze the development of PCG, according to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela. He elaborated on these “external factors” as those which can either be supporters or agitators. The supporters are foreign countries that provide grants and loans for the PCG, while the agitators are those foreign countries that stir up the government to pursue the development of the PCG.

The interaction of these three internal and external factors could be seen in different timeframes. The first phase focuses on the Navy is the Coast Guard. It covers the period of former President Ferdinand Marcos, when the Philippine Navy supervised the PCG by virtue of RA 5173. During these years, the Philippines enjoyed the mantle of security protection of the US, thus the Navy focused more on the constabulary functions, which the Coast Guard performed.

According to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela, President Marcos understood that affronting the AFP is not worth the risk to his government, and that he was aware of the advantage of separating the PCG from the Navy. However, Marcos’ priority remained to be the appeasement of the military, and therefore the functions of the PCG remained limited.

As for the presidency of Corazon Aquino, there were no attempts for the PCG to be separated from the AFP. This is despite the call

The Present day Coast Guard?

- *What matters most: Presidential priority, military interest, maritime stakeholders?*
- *Development of navy=development of coast guard*
- *CG development is not just maritime security...*
- *With or without the “catalyzers” the PCG will develop due to its domestic roles in the maritime industry...*

from some quarters for the PCG to be transferred to a civilian department in order for it to be professionalized and therefore effective in performing its mandate. According to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela, President Aquino did not attempt to execute such drastic action since this would add more fracture to her relationship with the military. It was believed that the transfer of the PCG to a civilian department would cost Aquino's presidency.

The second phase is the Coast Guard is Not the Navy. This phase is divided into the two presidencies of Ramos and of Arroyo. President Ramos supported the transfer of PCG to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). The military recommended that the PCG transfer could only be realized through congressional legislation. Regardless, President Ramos decided to sign the Executive Order 475 that initiated the transfer of the agency from the Philippine Navy to the DOTC. It was believed that President Ramos decided to play by military's rules.

Arroyo's term, on the other hand, is very critical in the PCG history. It was PCG's role in marine safety and maritime security that was highlighted because of former President Arroyo's "Strong Republic Nautical Highway Program." Apart from this, the Super Ferry bombing incident further stressed the PCG's role in maritime security. This was also the time when the maritime environmental protection function of the PCG was emphasized.

According to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela, the institution could not move forward and that despite all the active engagements of PCG under the Arroyo administration, the submitted bills that were supposed to be the Coast Guard's enabling law in the 12th and 13th Congress were never legislated. He expressed some confusion on how the lawmakers then failed to see the relevance of the PCG, especially since it was separated from the Navy.

The third and last phase elaborated on the Coast Guard is Acting like the Navy, and this period covers the Benigno Aquino III and the Rodrigo Duterte administrations. When Aquino was elected, one of

his main concerns was to address the aggressive stance of Beijing in the West Philippine Sea. According to Lt. Cdr. Tarriela, this was one of the reasons why President Aquino recognized the need for the AFP to shift its focus of operations from internal to territorial defense. He added that Pres. Aquino did not just support the development of the PCG, he utilized it in such a way that the institution would assert the country's maritime interests.

Pres. Duterte, on the other hand, has consistently mentioned that the Philippine military is weak and that it would be a "suicide mission" to engage the Chinese forces head-on in the West Philippine Sea. Pres. Duterte's approach in the WPS can be attributed to his pronouncements that China is a good friend and that he cannot risk offending the country due to its contribution to Philippine economy. In addition to this, China has invested in the Duterte administration's Build Build Build infrastructure projects.

However, for the past three years, the PCG has been receiving plenty of attention, and the agency's budget has been steadily expanding. Needless to say, the increase in budget is to cover the procurement of additional equipment in order to boost the PCG's capability.

Lt. Cdr. Tarriela gave four reasons why Pres. Duterte is trying to develop the PCG:

- (1) PCG white ships do not provoke as much as Navy ships when utilized in the disputed areas in the West Philippine Sea.
- (2) Foreign grants and loans to support the PCG's assets and equipment are more available.
- (3) The mandate of the PCG also addresses domestic issues in the maritime sector and not just territorial maritime security.
- (4) Coast Guard organizational studies is an emerging practice in the region.

Lt. Cdr. Tarriela concluded by highlighting the relationships between the priorities of various presidencies and the interests of the military as well as of other maritime stakeholders. He emphasized that the link between these factors significantly influenced the development of the PCG. He also explained that military influence is essential in the decision making capacity of the national leaders in shaping the PCG's emergence as another maritime force.

Lt. Cdr. Tarriela gave the recommendation that in order to get the military onboard the development of the PCG, the Philippine Navy should also be given importance. At the same time, the mandates and the specific functions of the Navy and the PCG must be clearly defined.

However, Lt. Cdr. Tarriela admitted that looking at the PCG development in maritime security is a shortsighted assessment. Still, he emphasized the increasing importance of this agency by saying that governments then and now recognize the Coast Guard as an important institution. For an archipelagic country that is dependent on sea trade routes, its development should be a priority.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Influence of Two Philippine Responses to the South China Sea Dispute: Ideas, Interests and Institutions

Chester A. Yacub, SJ

John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues

Mr. Yacub, who is associated with the John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues based in the Ateneo De Manila University, started his presentation with the statement that during the respective terms of Philippine Presidents Benigno Aquino III and Rodrigo Duterte, the two presidents adopted different foreign policies in

response to China's aggression in the West Philippine Sea. Pres. Aquino's foreign policy involved a balancing strategy to counter China's expansive claim. In 2013, Aquino's administration filed a dispute settlement case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In spite of the favorable result from the Tribunal, the Duterte administration implemented a foreign policy that is seen to stabilize Sino-Philippine diplomatic relations. Mr. Yacub emphasized that the July 2016 decision of the PCA was a milestone as far as international law is concerned, but it revealed the contrasting strategies and priorities of the Aquino and the Duterte administration.

Mr. Yacub presented the following research question: "What shaped Aquino's and Duterte's strategies on the South China Sea dispute?" He argued that the variation is explained not by systemic factors but by changes in domestic influences, i.e. ideas, interests, and institutions. To prove this, Mr. Yacub needed to compare and contrast the policy responses of the Aquino and the Duterte administrations.

Comparing the strategies: A realist systemic-level approach

- China's persistent claim and unwillingness to compromise
- The United States' neutral stand on the maritime row
- Japan's stability goals and strategic partnership with the Philippines

- *The differences between the policies cannot be explained by the consistency of the international geopolitical landscape.*

The main argument of the research was addressed in four ways by Mr. Yacub. First, he elaborated on the positions of all the key world players particularly the US, China, and Japan. According to Mr. Yacub, these countries remained relatively constant during the times the different policies of the two Philippine administrations were adopted. He surmised, therefore, that the variations between the policies cannot be explained by systemic factors.

The second argument is that the idea of invoking the rule of international law was promoted by certain groups in the Philippine society. These include the political elite, those with interests in the energy sector, environmental advocacy groups, and the fishermen. Mr. Yacub noted that these groups rely on liberal and democratic institutions and that all these groups prompted the Aquino presidency to bring China to court. In contrast, it was a populist, anti-establishment mindset that pushed Pres. Duterte into adopting a distinctly different foreign economic

Contrasting the policies: Domestic ideas, interest groups, and national institutions

- *System-level approaches – particularly power-based analyses – do not fully explain IR; instead, states' foreign policies can be analyzed using factors that operate within states.*
- Ideas: The rule of law as opposed to an anti-establishment mindset
- Interests: Advocates of legal settlement set against patrons of bilateral relations
- Institutions: Concerted administrative effort versus authoritarian management

Considering counterfactuals

- An international legal battle through and through
- Duterte's engagement policy would not have instigated a maritime dispute resolution
- *Validates the premise of this paper – that the two strategies could not have been part of an integrated plan. Two different sets of domestic ideas, political and economic interest groups, and national institutions exerted their influence, and as a result, yielded two contrasting and irreconcilable Philippine strategies.*

policy. The reliance on Chinese-Filipino businesses and socio-cultural organizations also helped in the crafting of this foreign policy direction.

The third argument addresses the counter that the explanation to this specific international phenomenon is due to systemic factors. Mr. Yacub argues that the international regime, in this case, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as regional organization, could have influenced the strategies of the two administrations.

Finally, using counterfactuals to support his argument, Mr. Yacub challenged the possibility that the Aquino and Duterte foreign policies might have been an inclusive strategy of the Philippine government. He argued that the two Philippine foreign policies could not be part of one grand plan, not only because they evidenced contradictory approaches to Sino-Philippine relations,

but also because they were motivated by two dissimilar set of factors within the Philippines. The two different sets of domestic ideas, the political and economic interest groups, and the national institutions exerted their influence, and as a result, yielded two contrasting and irreconcilable Philippine strategies.

Mr. Yacub concluded by saying that a seemingly small and insignificant country such as the Philippines cannot be regarded as an innocent victim of China's external aggression, or as a passive partner in China's peaceful emergence into power for that matter. He stressed that internal factors also influence international relations and that it would be wrong to assume that international factors are the only explanations to a complex issue like the West Philippine Sea dispute.



PAPER PRESENTATION

The South China Sea and the East China Sea: Implications for the Philippines

Jaime B. Naval

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

Asst. Prof. Naval of the UP Department of Political Science started his presentation by describing the East China Sea (ECS) and the South China Sea (SCS), and the maritime issues that currently take place in them. These two adjoining bodies of water, which are connecting the littoral states of East-Southeast Asia, both serve as vital sea lanes of passage not only in the sub-region but also to and from the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Asst. Prof. Naval stated that in both the ECS and SCS, competing claims reputedly related to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), historic rights, and unilateral actions have complicated the situation. According to Asst. Prof. Naval, the rival claims in the ECS and SCS highlight not only the efforts of claimant states to pursue purported vital interests

as domestic dynamics in the surrounding states, which are subject to change, but claimant posturing in the disputed waters also change as well. In addition to these, economic development, leadership continuities and successions, and patriotic motives complicate the already fluctuant international situation.

Asst. Prof. Naval stressed that China should not just be seen as a ginormous claimant on both seas, but also as the most assertive, if not militant and more comprehensively capable, compared to other claimants. The United States, on the other hand, is an established lone superpower in the post-Cold War period which seeks to perpetuate its privileged position.

Regarding the ECS dispute concerns, the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands (DDS) prominently pits China alongside Taiwan against Japan, which are countries with much historic enmity. As with the SCS dispute, this has been a locus of complex, overlapping, multi-state maritime claims, according to Asst. Prof. Naval. Various assertive civilian and military measures conjoined with select third party activities, further muddling the disputes. As a claimant country in the SCS, the Philippines is not exempt from the continuities and changes in the larger geostrategic landscape. Prof. Naval has observed that in a number of ways the country is even a leading player or contributing factor in the regional geopolitical dynamics.

Asst. Prof. Naval claims that the Philippines is not a “bystander,” particularly in the time of President Duterte, since the President has contributed immensely to the reshaping or disturbing the already dangerous waters. The Duterte administration’s version of independent foreign policy is vividly demonstrated by the way it conducts relations with China and is most manifest in the SCS dispute, according to Prof. Naval.

For the Philippines, a country virtually situated at the center of the SCS-ECS issues, there is a need to look closely into the dispute cases, evaluate their respective, even combined, implications, and prepare and undertake certain resolution-oriented measures or plans.

Contextualizing the SCS and the ECS


1. geopolitics - while indeed it “does not have singular all-encompassing meaning or identity” the meaning more often referred to by both analysts and state leaders alludes to intense nationalism, state expansionism and overseas empire-building
2. legal transformations - especially in view of the regime changes and entitlements states earn or may invoke consequential to the UNCLOS
3. resource-related competition and the dilemma of having to compromise environmental considerations.
4. people factors - especially, at the under-research and under-rated level of sub-national communities and sub-central government units - the affected fishermen (those affected by a “little maritime incident”) and others persons

According to Prof. Naval, this would enable the country to manage, if not contain, the impact the unresolved disputes may bring about. He also emphasized that the SCS is a real, present, and dangerous problem, despite the “massaging practice” of ASEAN, that is, their efforts to shun and sweep the issue as if it does not exist.

According to Asst. Prof. Naval, the SCS and ECS cases may be considered as tinderboxes for a massive conflagration that could cause complications in the regional dynamics in Asia and in the world.

After examining, comparing, and contrasting the two cases, Prof. Naval identified the implications of the maritime and territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS. First, the SCS and ECS share common and related features, and there is no natural subdividing of the two areas. The subdivisions are man-made and artificial, which the littoral states determined. Secondly, the disputes affect not only the claimants, but all the other countries in the world. Passage restrictions can upset the human trade and natural traffic in the SCS and the ECS, Prof. Naval has noted. Third, the disputes cannot be confined or left alone to the littoral states. The role of big powers, particularly the United States, cannot be ignored, and will always have to be factored in. Prof. Naval also added that there is a need to

acknowledge the fact that there are symmetries and asymmetries in the relations and powers among the countries involved. While it is not possible to anticipate or predict actions which principal claimants may pursue, trained and skilled second-guessing can allow parties to somehow identify patterns or indicators for some future actions. Prof. Naval concluded by stating that the historical baggage, however heavy, must be examined since it underpins the two disputes in the ECS and SCS.



SESSION 2

Political-Economic Development in Southeast Asia

CHAIR

Ariel C. Lopez, Ph.D.

Asian Center, University of the Philippines

PAPER PRESENTATION

BRI Discourse as Social Identity: China's Great Power Status and Vision for Global Economic Governance

Enrico V. Gloria

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

Asst. Prof. Gloria started by defining the scope of his presentation, and explained that the focus is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including its implications on global governance. He also said that he plans to discuss the reasons why China advances BRI.

Asst. Prof. Gloria stated that the primary motivation of this research is exploring the current state of the literature on the BRI. He argued that the current literature on the BRI is based on rational choice theory frameworks, realism, liberalism, and has emphasis on core power implications. According to him, this is understandable considering its possible impact on policy making and policy execution.

Asst. Prof. Gloria's argument is that states aim to exhibit a positive and distinct social identity, which is what China is doing through the BRI. This is also the main concept in the Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is a theoretical framework borrowed from social psychology. In adopting the SIT as a theoretical framework, Asst. Prof. Gloria hopes to identify what identity strategy a major power is pursuing.

Asst. Prof. Gloria's paper sought to address the following questions:

Digging Deeper: China's Pursuit for a Great Power Identity

1. **BRI and China's Grand Strategy:** Why has China created the Belt and Road Initiative?
2. **BRI and Global Governance:** What does the Belt and Road Initiative mean for the future of global economic governance?
3. **BRI and Major Power Relations:** Will China pushing for the BRI entail major power competition between the US and China? Is the BRI a revisionist agenda for China to lead the international system in its own terms? (BRI and US-China Relations)

He gave a brief overview of the SIT framework and emphasized the identity dynamics over objective conflicts, as well as the social categories that are integral to the theory. According to Prof. Gloria, having a positive social identity is a basic need for a particular state.

There are three state strategies that China can pursue, namely social affiliation strategy, social competition strategy, and social creativity strategy.

Asst. Prof. Gloria noted in his presentation that China has consistently adopted a social creativity strategy. Consistent with this identity strategy, China's BRI discourse emphasizes the distinctiveness of its guiding principles as a representation of how global governance should be evaluated. For Prof. Gloria, this would entail China focusing on a different aspect where it could fare better

relative to the relevant out-group, which are the states collectively known as the West. It is not directly competing with the relevant out-group, but rather finding a different area where China can compete.

Asst. Prof. Gloria looked into the official discourse of China on the BRI to support his argument. He went through an extensive discourse analysis of China's official documents and speeches pertaining to the Belt and Road Initiative, which is a total of 22 English-translated speeches delivered mostly by Xi Jinping.

Asst. Prof. Gloria arrived at the conclusion that China is presenting itself as an inclusive and responsible major power, so in terms of state identity, this is what China wants to pursue. China presents the BRI as a way to reform global governance in terms of addressing pressing global challenges, indicating relative comparison with respect to existing order. By looking at the discourse created by these official documents, Prof. Gloria sought to uncover China's identity strategy in achieving a unique and positive identity as an inclusive and responsible major power. The analysis enabled the proponent to understand what global governance means for China's President Xi Jinping. In forwarding the BRI as one of China's contributions to reforming global economic governance, China is able

Community of Shared Future for Mankind: Xi's Vision for Global Governance

1. "We should build partnerships in which countries treat each others as equals, engage in extensive consultation, and enhance mutual understanding." [SOVEREIGN EQUALITY]
2. "We should commit ourselves to multilateralism and reject unilateralism." [PARTNERSHIPS > ALLIANCE]
3. "We should create a security environment featuring fairness, justice, joint efforts, and shared interests." [WIN-WIN OUTCOMES]
4. "We should abandon the Cold War mentality in all its manifestations..." [POSITIVE SUM]
5. "We should promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all" [INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT]

Xi Jinping, "A New Partnership of Mutual Benefit and Community of Shared Future", Speech at the UNGA 70th General Debate (New York, 2015)



What **PRINCIPLES** should guide international relations?

*"From the principles of equality and sovereignty established in the **peace of Westphalia** over 360 years ago to international humanitarianism affirmed in the **Geneva Convention** more than 150 years ago; from the four purposes and seven principles enshrined in the **UN Charter** more than 70 years ago and the **Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence** championed by the Bandung Conference over 60 years ago, many principles have merged in the evolution of international relations and have been widely accepted. These principles should guide us in building a community of shared future for mankind"*

Xi Jinping, "Towards a Community of Shared Future for Mankind", Speech at the UN Office (Geneva, 2017)

to advocate for a discourse that forwards certain principles and norms as new dimensions or as alternative criteria by which effective global governance should be evaluated.

According to Asst. Prof. Gloria, the major theme for Pres. Xi Jinping's international diplomacy, at least publicly, is the Community

of Shared Future for Mankind. From the discourse analysis, three guiding principles of the BRI were identified. These principles are shown in the following table.

BRI Guiding Principles	What it Means	GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Extensive Consultation	Dialogue and Negotiations at Equal Footing	Emphasizing Multilateralism Equality among nations Positive-sum Relations Peaceful Coexistence Co-Governance
Joint Contribution	Openness and Inclusiveness	
Shared Benefits	Win-win outcomes, Interdependence Chinese/Everyone's Dream	

"The BRI is open, inclusive and transparent. It does not harbor any hidden geopolitical agenda, nor is it designed to form an exclusive circle or impose discriminatory trade terms on others"

*Yang Jiechi, "Yang Jiechi on the BRI and Preparations for the Second BRF"
Interview Transcript (Beijing, 2019)*

Asst. Prof. Gloria then revisited the focus of the paper and gave emphasis on why China chooses to adopt this particular discourse. According to him, the way that they delivered and presented China's global governance matters more than the pronouncements themselves.

In conclusion, Asst. Prof. Gloria highlighted that China is not necessarily competing with the US for multilateral governance, but instead attempts to join the other powers for governance. The Chinese also refer back to historical experiences to make the governance principles unique to them. For Asst. Prof. Gloria, this is a clear case of social creativity strategy and not social competition strategy. Moreover, China is trying to present itself as an inclusive and responsible power, not so much to dethrone the US, but rather to assume dominance in a different area.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Organized Crime, Illicit Economics, and the Philippines-China Relations in the Duterte Administration

Marielle Marcaida

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines


With the illicit drug trade becoming the most lucrative among all criminal activities today, Asst. Prof. Marcaida's ongoing study seeks to explore the changing state and nature of illicit drug activities by organized crime groups in the context of Philippines-China relations under the Duterte administration. Reports have shown that unprecedented increase of meth (also called "shabu") trade has been witnessed in Southeast Asia, which has become a cause of concern for states like the Philippines and China.

The study argued that tensions between China and the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea have overshadowed other pressing security issues such as non-traditional ones, specifically the expansion of transnational organized crime. Recent incidents that indicate the intensification of organized crime involved seizure of "shabu" from China, arrest of Chinese chemists and "cooks," and cases of dismantling meth laboratories in the Philippines and areas where there is lack of control and supervision.

Asst. Prof. Marcaida stated that there is an argument among experts that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has inadvertently driven the proliferation of organized criminal activities in the region, given the new access to markets, which means that it is easier for organized crime groups to further expand their meth trade. The bilateral economic, trade, and infrastructure cooperation of the Philippines and China has been accompanied by security cooperation to combat transnational organized crime. China has also expressed its full support for Duterte's War on Drugs despite the cases of extrajudicial killings and human rights violations that occurred since he became the President.

Illicit Drug Situation of the Region

- Synthetic drugs have become the most profitable illicit business for organized crime groups in Southeast Asia (UNODC 2019)




Data source: UNODC
 Photo source: ABS News (Graphic by Jamod Fankhauser)

Asst. Prof. Marcaida's paper aimed to achieve three main objectives. The first is to explore the changing state and nature of illicit drug activity by organized crime groups in the context of the Philippines-China relations under the Duterte administration. Secondly, to problematize how the expansion of organized criminal activities has been enabled or hindered by the economic cooperation of the two countries. Lastly, to examine how these threats have reflected security cooperation arrangements, strategies, and efforts between the Philippines and China, and the foreseeable successes or failures thereof.

Asst. Prof. Marcaida's main objective is to identify how law enforcement alone is capable of challenging illicit drug trade, specifically in meth. The paper focused on the drug situation of the Philippines, especially that reports have shown alarming developments on the expansion of meth trade and trafficking in the region.

The charts shown by Asst. Prof. Marcaida illustrate the estimated retail market values of methamphetamine in parts of Asia. It also suggests that there is a shift in terms of drug preference in the region,



i.e., from natural or plant-based drugs towards synthetic drugs, since these kinds of drugs have become more profitable. Another illustration shows that there is an increase in methamphetamine seizures in Southeast Asia between the years 2014 and 2018. In the case of the Philippines, the country saw a 20% increase in seizures, which, when compared to the other countries in the region, is the lowest.

Another notable finding was how women became vulnerable to meth trade. Prof. Marcaida noted that this observation calls for a more gender-specific approach due to the fact that the experience of female drug abusers would be different from that of males, as most have been associated with sexual and physical abuse, as well as sex trafficking.

With regard to the Philippines-China cooperation on the “drug war,” China has provided RMB100M (PHP 714.57M) worth of grant for anti-illegal drugs campaign and police cooperation projects. According to Asst. Prof. Marcaida, these grants include donations of drug detection equipment, training from China, and funding of

rehabilitation centers. There have also been technology transfer, technical expertise, and intelligence, as well as joint investigation capabilities for the agencies of the two countries.

One of the challenges that Asst. Prof. Marcaida has observed would be the limited information available, especially the mechanisms that would measure drug prevalence in the country. In addition to this, corruption and money laundering through casinos, increased demand for and supply of cheap labor, inadequate criminal justice and lack of accountability, death penalty, human costs, and the expansion of trade and production of synthetic opioids and other drugs complicate the situation.

Asst. Prof. Marcaida explained that it is of critical importance that China, the Philippines, and other countries in the region work together in curtailing the flows of precursor chemicals. Moreover, the response must not only focus on the supply through policing and law enforcement cooperation but also on the demand which could be addressed through investment in drug prevention, education, and treatment. According to Asst. Prof. Marcaida, it may prove valuable to take into consideration the drug reform policies adopted by Malaysia and Thailand.

The whole process of expanding organized crimes has been made easier due to the new access to markets brought by the BRI. Asst. Prof. Marcaida suggested that there is a need to forge cooperation and develop security frameworks to address these problems.



PAPER PRESENTATION

The ASEAN Aviation Single Market and its Impact to Regional Integration among ASEAN Member States: A Case Study for Capacity Building of the Philippine Aviation Industry


John Kennedy Villanueva

Philippine State College of Aeronautics

Mr. Villanueva started his presentation by enumerating the objectives of his research. He aimed to provide a discussion on the ASEAN Open Sky Policy and its integration among the member states. This includes the implication of the Open Sky Policy for the tourism industry, the status of the air connectivity in the Philippines, and the future of the Philippine aviation industry under the regime of the Open Sky Policy.

According to Mr. Villanueva, the ASEAN Aviation Single Market refers to the liberalization of the aviation market among ASEAN member states through bilateral or multilateral bases. Air transportation plays a bigger part in the economic development in the

The “Open Sky Policy” aims to liberalize aviation market, without restriction that might hinder to the demands of liberalize regime in air connectivity.



Source: Economic Benefits of ASEAN Single Aviation Market



ASEAN community. He stated that some developed ASEAN member states favor liberalization, while countries with less developed and/or small airlines are not in favor of it. According to Mr. Villanueva, this is because these states see liberalization as not exactly aligned with their national interests.

The progression of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market made its historical mark in infrastructure investments and the development of the aviation industry in the region. However, the implementation of the Open Sky Policy encountered plenty of challenges, including the reluctance of some countries to fully participate in this policy. Regardless, the Open Sky Policy invites a competition between airlines through the lowering of ticket prices and opening the opportunity for domestic airlines to become players in the region.

For Mr. Villanueva, capacity building must be initiated first in order to have a full operation of the ASEAN Single Market. He suggested that it should focus on safety standards and the development of a framework which would promote fair competition, not just for the liberalization of the market.

According to Mr. Villanueva, the tourism industry would benefit from the Open Sky Policy. Increasing the demand for air travel, which is still the fastest way of transportation, illustrates the importance of air transportation and infrastructure developments in ASEAN member states.

Mr. Villanueva noted that a major factor in the development of the tourism sector in the Philippines is air connectivity. Under the administration of Pres. Duterte, there are 17 commercial airports that are being rehabilitated. This is supported by the Department of Transportation (DOTR) which is the primary government agency tasked with advancing air connectivity in the country. DOTR officials believe that air connectivity is a key element for socioeconomic development. Mr. Villanueva emphasized that through the building and rehabilitating of existing airports, the transportation sector could contribute to the national and regional progress. He added that doing so would help with the decongestion of air traffic at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) terminals.

Mr. Villanueva concluded his presentation by saying that with the initiation of infrastructure development programs, particularly the Build Build Build Project, the Philippines could become an aviation hub in the ASEAN region.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Indonesia Political Economy Post-*Reformasi*: A Theoretical Debate

Asih Purwanti

National Sun Yat-sen University

Ms. Purwanti started her presentation by providing a brief overview of the Indonesian economy after the *Reformasi*, a socio-political

movement that happened in Indonesia after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. She focused on the discussion of the political situation that has contributed to the development of the economic system in Indonesia after the *Reformasi* in order to explore its political, economic, and social dimensions.

Ms. Purwanti noted the significance of the 1997 Asian economic crisis to the political situation in Indonesia. She observed that after the 1997 economic crisis, and following the end of the authoritarian *Orde Baru* regime, Indonesian society wanted to have a total reform in political economic dimensions. Ms. Purwanti noted that people seem to have wanted democratization, which caused a shift from authoritarianism to democracy as far as most Indonesian institutions are concerned.

Ms. Purwanti quoted Abonyi's (2005, 4) description of the *Reformasi* as a "profound transformation from a highly centralized political and policy decision system with a powerful and dominant

Indonesia Post-*Reformasi*

- *Reformasi* or reform
- Suharto resignation and the end of Orde Baru regime
- a total reform in political economic dimensions in Indonesia
- Politics
 - democratization
- Economy
 - neo-liberalism




president, who held power for 32 years, to a more pluralistic, diffused and evolving system with an increasingly active parliament.” Ms. Purwanti compared this statement to the paper written by Hadiz and Robison (2013, 35) in which the authors noted the following: “such institutional changes were not reflected in the way social and economic power was concentrated or imposed in Indonesia. Many of the old faces continue to dominate politics and business, while new ones are drawn into the same predatory practices.”

According to Ms. Purwanti, it would be interesting for scholars to look at Indonesia’s political economy, given the effects of the *Reformasi* and the 2008 Great Recession. She also noted that some scholars argue that the domestic conditions in Indonesia contributed for the relatively stable political economy in the country after *Reformasi*. To further examine this, Ms. Purwanti explored three perspectives: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.

For Ms. Purwanti, realism has a significant role in the development of the Indonesian economic system. She noted that after the 1998 *Reformasi*, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put a great pressure for Indonesia to open its economy with conditions aligned with the neoliberal agenda. Neoliberalism states that international cooperation and international organizations contribute to the political economic stability. According to Ms. Purwanti, this applies to Indonesia right after the *Reformasi*. However, the 1998 Asian financial crisis indeed contributed to the end of the strong role of the state in the Indonesian economic system.

Ms. Purwanti proceeded to discuss constructivism and concepts on nationalism, particularly *pancasila*, which placed emphasis on social justice and social welfare. In relation to this, the *Orde Baru* regime successfully implemented the idea of *pembangunan*, which was applied in the political and economic dimensions of Indonesia. Ms. Purwanti also stated that the *pembangunan* still remains as a strong influence in Indonesian society years after the *Reformasi*. Ms. Purwanti concluded her presentation by stating that the *Reformasi*

brought neoliberal values in the political and economic system in Indonesia. The result was a mixture of a strong nationalist state leadership and neoliberalism.



SESSION 3

Conflict and Security

CHAIR

Raisa E. Lumampao

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

PAPER PRESENTATION

Empowering the Filipino Muslim Youth as Agent of Change: A Counter Radicalization Strategy

Commander Norsal D. Dimaporo, PN (GSC)

Philippine Navy

Philippine Navy Commander Dimaporo started his presentation by explaining that his study was presented during his stay at the National Defense College of the Philippines in 2018. He then introduced himself as a person from Lanao, raised in Marawi City, and a victim of the Marawi siege.

Comm. Dimaporo gave an overview of his presentation as guided by the following research questions: First, what are the key dimensions that lure Filipino Muslim youth in joining terrorist organizations? Second, what counter-radicalization model or strategy based on the key dimensions of recruitment to terrorist organizations is appropriate to motivate the youth in nation building? Lastly, what policy, based on the counter-radicalization model or strategy, can the nation use to neutralize national security threats posed by terrorist groups in the Philippines?

According to Comm. Dimaporo, the Marawi siege in 2017 was unprecedented and the bloodiest terror attack in the Philippines. The five-month long battle waged by the Maute Group ruined the whole city, displaced thousands of residents, and destroyed hundreds of lives of civilians, rebels, and soldiers alike.

For him, one significant characteristic of the crisis that captured the watching public were images of children having high-powered firearms and being actively involved in the fighting. These appalling images have led to the realization that instruments of terrorism have radicalized the hearts and minds of the weak and vulnerable members of the society, including the youth. Comm. Dimaporo cited some studies that reveal that children are radicalized due to psychological reasons such as anger, social or peer pressure, and threat or intimidation. These studies refer to concepts such as diverse triggers and push and pull factors explaining the process of radicalization.

Comm. Dimaporo discussed the conceptual framework of his study. He found it suitable to study radicalization through dimensional analysis, which considers that a person moves in a space of distinct yet collaborative elements.

There is also a need to discern ideological perspective, environmental circumstances, psychological condition, and physical needs to completely understand an individual, according to Comm. Dimaporo. In doing this, his study employed a descriptive qualitative method research design, which comprised a comprehensive summary of specific events experienced by individuals or groups of individuals. The data gathered through interviews, including an interview with a member of the Maute Group, were analyzed in conjunction with research literature and policy documents.

The respondents of the study include young Muslim professionals, students, learners from *toril*, out-of-school youth, and children from evacuation centers. Parents, teachers, guardians,

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



community leaders, Islamic scholars, and LGU officials were among the respondents as well.

Comm. Dimaporo reported that young Filipino Muslims join terrorist organizations because of ideological, physical, environmental, and psychological factors, or what he called key dimensions.

First is the ideological underpinning. It teaches that Islam is the only true way for humanity, which can be achieved through strict observance of religious practices and strengthening the Muslim *ummah*. The militants try to entice the youth to rally behind their religion in defending the persecution of Muslims in different parts of the world, and obligated every believer of Islam to wage holy war or *jihad* against “infidels.”

Another dimension involves the physical and material needs of the vulnerable. These youth members are mostly from poor families in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, and are without a source of livelihood. In exchange for their membership in the group, these youths’ families were given money, or a monthly allowance of varying amounts. Some groups employ a system of

4 KEY DIMENSIONS



“cash for every child recruit” and some recruits were promised job opportunities.

The third dimension is the environment which conditions and shapes the behavior and thinking of the vulnerable members of the youth who have grown up in Mindanao conflict areas. These vulnerable members of society see fighting as a regular occurrence not only between the government forces and the insurgents but also through the case of the rido or clan wars between the quarreling families.

The fourth and last dimension is the psychological approach, in which the extremists try to induce hatred and anger in the youth for them to fight the central government. According to Comm. Dimaporo, extremists use these tactics to highlight apparent anti-Muslim policies which continue to discriminate and marginalize the Bangsamoro people.

Comm. Dimaporo’s findings reveal that the root causes of the conflict in Mindanao and the concern of the Moro people are still not appropriately addressed. Additionally, the use of counter-radicalization as a framework for countering violent extremism and terrorism is not effective as it does not introduce to security and law enforcement the true nature of terrorism. His findings highlight the mistake in conceptualizing “radicalization,” and “Islamizing”

the issues, which make violent extremism seemingly justified. Comm. Dimaporo observed that the intervention programs of the government are short-term or “band-aid treatment,” and that the grievances and critical issues lodged by the Marawi City constituents caused by the government forces were not tackled.

Lastly, Comm. Dimaporo recommended that the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction program of the Philippine government must reflect the religious and distinct cultural identity of the Maranao people. Based on the summary of findings, there is a need for the national government to formulate the most appropriate counter-radicalization strategy based on the identified key dimensions. To prevent radicalization and the spread of extremism among the youth, a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach is necessary. It must be contextualized according to the key dimensions earlier identified in order to focus on strategies that would prevent potential individuals from being recruited by terrorist organizations. This could be done through education, orientation, and training as well as through motivating the youth in nation-building.

Comm. Dimaporo concluded with a recommendation that scholars need to design a model policy that would empower the youth. This model policy should characterize the empowerment of the youth, the voiceless, the marginalized, and other vulnerable targets of radicalization.

- ✓ **Empower** the youth through a package of peace education, human rights, legal, social, political and economic training program;
- ✓ Cultivate their sense of nationality as a **Filipino** by promoting respect, understanding, and acceptance between Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos;
- ✓ **Embrace** diversity in religion and culture by acknowledging their distinctiveness as **Muslims** through inclusive and culture-sensitive policies, and convening interfaith dialogue;
- ✓ Recognize and nurture their natural characteristics as **Youth** through health, life skills, and sports development programs; and
- ✓ Foster an enabling environment conducive to intellectual, emotional and social development of the youth as **Agents of Change**.



PAPER PRESENTATION

**From International to Local, From Local to International:
The Roles of Local Government Units in Conflict Resolution**

Dennis F. Quilala

University of Canterbury •


Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

Asst. Prof. Quilala gave a short overview of his presentation before discussing the two movements that figure prominently in his study. The first, which are movements among international and global actors, is about the dynamics between such actors that influence conflict resolution. On the other hand, the second movement involves discussions between the local and the national level and the directions of their movements. This is also in relation to the national government adopting the best practices of the local governments.

Asst. Prof. Quilala's study focused on the conflict between the Philippine government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA) of the National Democratic Front. It has been five decades since the communist groups have been engaging a war against the Philippine government. The question that Asst. Prof. Quilala posed is: How is it possible that the said conflict has endured for five decades?

Asst. Prof. Quilala showed a slide which illustrates a decrease in the armed clashes between the Philippine government and the CPP/NPA, starting in the late 1980s. He also used this chart as transition in explaining his use of the Ramsbotham five-level conflict analysis.

Using this conflict analysis, Asst. Prof. Quilala looked at the different sources of conflict. According to him, one could analyze that there are a number of factors that could result in conflict. One example given was the use of violence in order to get political demands.



“When you look at conflicts, it can be a mixture of all of those factors. In the case of the Philippines, according to the National Unification Commission, the causes of conflict in the Philippines would be poverty, economic inequity, poor governance, justice, structural inequity, and exploitation and marginalization of indigenous communities,” Asst. Prof. Quilala said.

According to him, what is interesting in conflict studies is that the sources of conflict for one group may be different from sources of conflict for other groups. At the international level, international actors provide one solution for all conflicts. This results to failure in areas where they have intervened.

Asst. Prof. Quilala defined conflict resolution as a state when the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed, and that the “behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed” (Ramsbotham et al. 2017, 31). However, this condition is hard to achieve, Asst. Prof. Quilala stated.

Roles	Province	Governor
Social Services and Public Goods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agricultural Extension - Industrial Research and Development Services - Health Services - Social Welfare Services including projects for rebel returnees - Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks, public assembly areas and similar activities - Infrastructure facilities - Housing - Investment Support Services - Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services - Inter-municipal Telecommunications services - tourism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - chair the local health board - chair of the provincial development council - generation of resources and revenues - ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - power to choose the PNP provincial director -oversee the implementation of the provincial safety plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - formulate peace and order plans - call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law
Supervision/Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - general supervision of provincial programs, services, and activities - visit component cities and municipalities - call on national employees and officials stationed in his province
Voice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sectoral representation in the provincial council - nongovernmental organization representation in special bodies 	

Asst. Prof. Quilala also emphasized the importance of local actors and how the literature highlights the roles of the national government, non-governmental organizations, communities, and the indigenous peoples. He further explained the role of local governments, which has primarily been overlooked in the literature.

He cited the similarities in the cases of Bohol and Davao Oriental regarding their development programs, vision, coordination, and people’s perception. First, by focusing on development programs, the communities are supported so that they could achieve the status of “development-ready.” They also have a unified vision. In fact, even the military has to follow the vision set by the local government, according to Asst. Prof. Quilala. The third thing similar to them is that they coordinated the activities of all the actors that could influence or affect the development of their provinces.

Asst. Prof. Quilala further explained that when it comes to the movement from the local to the national in the cases of Bohol and Davao Oriental, conflict resolution worked and that they seemed to have managed insurgency in their jurisdictions. This was made possible by the people following their responsibilities in accordance to the local government code.

He concluded by raising the challenge of sustaining the solution. Asst. Prof. Quilala posed the following questions: Can it be implemented in the national level? You've resolved the insurgency problem in one province, but what about the insurgency in their neighboring provinces? Is it sustainable? Can it be replicated?

Asst. Prof. Quilala recommended that the whole-of-nation approach is necessary in order to mobilize the resources of the government and to cater to the needs of each individual.

Asst. Prof. Quilala ended his presentation by raising questions on sustainability and asked if the program would still continue if it was just based on an Executive Order and not a law. He also added that replicating the successful programs is also crucial in order for the provinces that experience conflicts to move forward.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Countering China's Three Warfares in the West Philippine Sea: An Outward Whole of Nation Approach

Robin Lucas
House of Representatives

D. S. Dalisay
Philippine Army

Mr. Lucas stated the following research questions in their research paper:

- (1) What motivates China's Three Warfares?
- (2) How does the Three Warfares manifest in other countries?
- (3) How vulnerable is the Philippines?

(4) How should we respond?

According to the presenters, the objective of their research is to promote awareness, as well as to encourage vigilance among Filipinos. They also wanted to inspire further research on the subject and assist in policy-making. As part of their methodology, the researchers examined the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Doctrine (2003), the 2010 Guidelines on Political Work of the PLA, and the publicly available PLA National Defence University (NDU) commentaries; Communist Party of China (CPC) subordinate agency websites; United Front Work Department (UFD) websites and provincial committee websites; local Chinese-language media; a case study on Australia and New Zealand; as well as Philippine security policies such as the National Security Strategy, Commonwealth Act No. 616, and Executive Order No. 70, s. 2018.

Mr. Lucas started by citing some news reports regarding Philippine-China relations, including reports of Chinese warships in Philippine waters, the incident involving the M/V Gem-Ver 1 ship, the prevalence of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs), and the controversial loans and workers from China.

Mr. Dalisay later took over and discussed China's "three warfares," which he defined as psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. He added that these three strands of warfare are non-kinetic means to influence the population of the target country.

Moreover, he traced the likely influences of this "three warfares" by looking at the ancient strategic culture in China. Mr. Dalisay noted that for ancient China, in order for a force to control the mountains and the rivers, it needs "vibrance" and "culture." He briefly referred to the modern revolutionary Marxist experience and the Chinese history during World War II. Other influences that Mr. Dalisay have cited include the lessons of the First Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign, as well as the 1999 publication *Unrestricted Warfare* and various works by the PLA military strategists.

In 2015, these three warfares received an elevated status, when Pres. Xi Jinping directly ordered the Party to consider the utilization

What are others worrying about?

Politics

- Elite Capture
- Political Donations, Bribery
- Mobilization of Ethnic Chinese

Civil Society

- Covert propaganda network
- Information Saturation

Business

- Recruitment of 'agents of influence'
- Leveraging interdependence

Academia

- Coercive persuasion
- Censorship
- Harassment


of these tools by the united front. They looked into how these tools can be further weaponized. Above are some of the concerns that other countries are preoccupied with.

Mr. Dalisay also looked at the vulnerability of the Philippines to being corrupted and exploited by China. He cited the case of Australia and New Zealand, which are less corrupt countries than the Philippines, but were still influenced to some extent by the PLA. He highlighted the disparity and how it has been so easy for China to influence politicians. For Mr. Dalisay, this is very telling of the vulnerability of the Philippines.

Mr. Dalisay also pointed out how Chinese propaganda works through motherhood statements such as “Towards a Shared Future for Mankind.” This for him is hypocritical, since in essence, the country still uses violent methods. Moreover, China is deliberately creating ambiguity in their claims. According to Mr. Dalisay, the CPC was never clear in saying that their core interest is the South China Sea.

When it comes to public opinion warfare, Mr. Dalisay mentioned the extent of Chinese media’s reach, particularly how the country’s

“Borrowing the boat to reach the sea”




covert radio network changed its name to Global CAMG Philippines. According to Mr. Dalisay, Global CAMG Philippines spreads China-friendly news across the country.

Lastly, Mr. Dalisay discussed the legal warfare aspect and briefly talked about the claims of de jure sovereignty, the dismissal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling, the City of Sansha, the military-police-civilian coordination, and the maritime militia.

Mr. Lucas then presented and discussed the whole-of-nation approach in response to unconventional warfare. He recommended the updating of the country’s infrastructure to withstand external threats to national security, and the creation of a system for classifying and protecting sensitive information. Mr. Lucas also emphasized the importance of reinforcing Executive Order No. 608, s. 2007, which capacitates the national government and local government units to collect and share information with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) for the use of the National Security Council (NSC). This would give the NSC a greater capacity in

determining the countries of concern and activate certain protocols when necessary.

Mr. Lucas concluded the presentation by saying that we must be able to respond against a clear and present danger of elite capture and compromised national security apparatus. He added that we need to be wary of the recent developments in the media and should be able to determine which ones we should pay attention to, and which ones are not important. Lastly, Mr. Lucas stressed the importance of fostering a shared sense of national security, in which everyone is involved in promoting national security for all.



SESSION 4

Reading the Tea Leaves: Future Developments in the Region?

CHAIR

Jean S. Encinas-Franco, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

PRESENTATION

Naval Projections

Rear Admiral Giovanni Carlo J. Bacordo

Fleet Commander, Philippine Navy

Radm. Bacordo began his discussion by presenting a matrix of the Top 10 Most Powerful Militaries based on a number of factors. He highlighted the Defense Budget column to make a point that the most powerful militaries are the ones with the highest budget.

In the Philippines, our defense budget is about 3–5 billion, like that of Vietnam, but if you look at our budget, 70% of which goes to retirement benefits of soldiers.

He moved on to discuss about the most powerful navies in the World, which are the ones with the aircraft carriers that are able to project power and bomb headquarters.

The Most Powerful Militaries in the World

Country	Total Population	Total Military Personnel	Total Aircraft	Combat Tanks	Total Naval Assets	Defense Budget
1. USA	324 M	2.36 M	13,762	5,884	415	587.8 B
3. China	1.37B	3.71 M	2,955	6,457	714	161.7 B
4. India	1.27 B	4.21 M	2,102	4,426	295	51 B
7. Japan	126.7 M	311,875	1,594	700	131	43.8 B
12. S Korea	50.9 M	5.83 M	1,477	2,654	166	43.8 B
14. Indonesia	258.3 M	975,750	441	418	221	6.9 B
16. Vietnam	95.2 M	5.49 M	278	1,545	65	3.4 B
18. Taiwan	23.5 M	1.93 M	850	2,005	87	10.7 B
20. Thailand	68.2M	627,425	555	737	81	5.4 B
22. Australia	23 M	81,000	465	59	47	24.1 B
23. N Korea	25.1 M	6.45 M	944	5,025	967	7.5 B

Source: Christopher Woody, Business Insider

Maritime countries tend to strengthen their navies, but the Philippines strengthens the army more than the navy. For the naval trends, emerging economies of Asia are spending more on defense acquisition, on naval build-up, but not necessarily as a naval arms race, “We’re just given hand-me-downs. The last time the Navy bought brand new vessels was in 1990 to 1995 period.”

Other naval trends observed include broadening cooperation, amphibious warfare capability and undersea capability, unmanned systems, and stealth ships.

Radm. Bacordo noted that there has been an eastward shift in naval power (China, India, Japan, South Korea) as a result of the declining defense budgets in Europe and the growing economies of Asia. At the end of the Cold War, the most powerful navies were concentrated in Europe (UK, France, Italy, Russia, and Germany). But now, China has the world’s largest navy by the number of ships. It has more ships than the US Navy. Moreover, India has the second largest carrier fleet.

Naval power will be measured by the number of aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines. These are being considered by defense analysts and defense planners, that these are necessary in the inventory in order to become the most powerful Navy.

“But not in the next 20 or 30 years will the Philippines have a need for an aircraft carrier or a ballistic missile submarine.”

On the projections of military power, China will constantly strive to be a world power. In short, China will still be China. It will have the world's largest navy in terms of numbers. There will be leveraging of use of non-hard power assets (e.g., Belt and Road Initiative) to exert its influence globally.

By 2030, China is projected to have 60 killer submarines (SSK). These are the submarines which hunt other submarines. Or submarines that hunt the ballistic missile submarines. Then, there are the nuclear submarines. They will have 16 units added to their existing navy. For their ballistic missile submarines, they will have six new submarines in addition to their existing ones, and for their aircraft carrier, they will have three new carriers added to their existing one. But the US Navy is still currently the strongest. It is still the world's largest navy in terms of tonnage and technology.

What is certain is that navies are increasingly involving themselves in bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms to address non-traditional maritime security threats, which include climate change, natural disasters, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and transnational crimes. But in ASEAN, we are most concerned with piracy, armed robbery at sea, IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated) fishing, and human and drugs smuggling.

Another certainty involves cooperative mechanisms, including the ASEAN Navy Chief's Meeting (ANCM), Transnational Cooperative Activities (TCA), and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Before, the Philippines had exercises with Australia and Malaysia; right now, the country has emerging exercises, like the ASEAN-China

Military Exercise and the US-ASEAN Military Exercise. Navies will be more concerned on all these cooperative engagements.

Ships will also remain as versatile platforms for HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief)—lessons learned from Typhoon Haiyan. The Navy is not just a means for war, naval ships will be mostly focused on the implementation of these bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms, especially on HADR.



PRESENTATION

A View from Australia

Richard Sisson

Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy

Mr. Sisson conveyed his appreciation to the University of the Philippines for creating a platform for discussion on contemporary defense. He then highlighted the strong diplomatic ties between Australia and the Philippines, which date back to World War II (WWII), when some 4,000 Australian soldiers helped liberate the Philippines. After the WWII era, members of the AFP and the Australian Defense Force served together in Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, East Timor, and a whole range of UN peacekeeping operations. This close cooperation suggests that the Philippines and Australia have some mutual security interests.

Australia has provided a significant amount of training to the Philippine Army, and their good defense relationship demonstrates the commitment of both nations to defeat emerging security challenges, such as Islamic state-inspired terrorism. Mr. Sisson discussed the three factors that will fundamentally showcase the strategic outlook of Australia into the future and maybe also the Philippines: the region both countries live in, the actors that the region is shared with, and the rapid pace of technological change.

With his remarks, he aimed to give the audience a uniquely Australian perspective on the challenges and opportunities facing the region. In 2016 and 2017, two white papers were released on defense and policy, and were set to guide the foreign policies of Australia for the next decade. Australia takes a broader definition of the region, which it calls the Indo-Pacific, which geographically covers the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

He highlighted the shift in global naval power towards Asia, which is also going to reflect in the global economic performance. The Indo-Pacific is going to be the engine of global economic growth by 2050. The prosperity of this region and, indeed, the world, is underpinned by a global rules-based order, which is more than 70 years in the making. This rules-based order consists of a system of laws, institutions, norms, and behavior that are designed to promote peace, stability, and predictability. It is not a perfect world order, but it is an order that we have all benefited from and continue to benefit from. This order means that any country regardless of size gets a seat at the table and is able to express its views.

In a recent speech, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, who expressed concern about the tensions between Washington and Beijing, urged both countries to resolve bilateral tensions peacefully. It is incumbent of great powers to exercise their strength and to stand by their commitment to the rules-based order, so that all nations can continue to benefit.

The Philippines and Australia both have military alliances with the US, but China is a large trading partner of both countries, so it is really an interesting dynamic and tension for both nations. The question is how these two countries can help preserve that peace, prosperity, and security in the region during these changing times. Nations like the Philippines and Australia might have more tools at their disposal than they might have recognized at first glance. By virtue of their size and resources, middle powers are made to be politically, economically, and militarily agile. “We have to be flexible. We are resourceful, we are creative.” Collectively, middle powers have a voice at multilateral fora, which means that the Philippine and Australian governments have the ability to influence regional affairs.

This is the idea of the seat at a table. Mr. Sisson added, “We also have the advantage of robust bilateral relationships with the Indo-Pacific great powers.”

New technologies are being introduced that will fundamentally change lives and the way business is done. Mr. Sisson mentioned emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, ultrasonics, automated vehicles, next generation of communications equipment, 3D printing, and the list goes on. Some of these technologies will be as transformative as their predecessors. These technologies will not only alter business practice, but security and national defense as well.

Changing times call for changing approaches, and to keep abreast with emerging technologies, and to maintain a capability edge, governments need to work more closely with the defense industry. Gone are the days of waiting for commercial providers to develop market equipment. If we want to find truly innovative responses to contemporary security challenges, government cannot begin at the procurement phase. It has to be involved intimately in research, design, and testing to ensure that the complexities of needs are being met. Access to cutting-edge capabilities and technologies is going to be critical in achieving national strategic objectives.

Australia has taken a strategic decision to invest in and develop a strong and sustainable naval ship-building capability. It’s going to be enormously expensive, but it does not have to be constrained to the borders of a single nation. In fact, it is becoming increasingly prominent for defense projects to draw in government and private sector expense from two or more nations. This aspect to defense cooperation is of increasing importance.

The pace of change will create challenges for the region and nations, more than ever before. Thus, there is a need to be creative and proactive in developing and implementing novel approaches to emerging challenges. This is essential to achieve both countries’ objectives of steering the future of the region towards peace and prosperity, not conflict and competition.



PRESENTATION

Democracy in Southeast Asia

Aries A. Arugay, Ph.D.

Co-convenor, UP CIDS Strategic Studies Program •

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines

Dr. Arugay began by highlighting the three main points of his discussion. First, at the regional level, plenty of countries conduct their foreign policy based on domestic developments—politics does not stop at the waters' edge in most of these countries. What happens at home remains influential in determining whether policies continue, get switched, or whether there could be instant changes in posturing and relationships with powers big and small. The second point is that increased changes at home get projected outside, and it makes the world and the region more VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous) than ever. More countries in Southeast Asia seem to be in the state of permanent turbulence, as the world itself is turbulent. They are shaking inside and outside in various directions. The last part would discuss where the Philippines is headed. This is the most dangerous enterprise for any political scientist, but for the next three years, what is thought of as the new normal seems to be untenable and can also change.

Dr. Arugay then spoke on how democracy in Southeast Asia has always been in deficit, referring to a table showing scores from Freedom House, which has been tracking civil liberties and political freedoms for quite some time. Scores revealed the reality that, with the exception of Timor Leste, there is no currently “free country” deemed free by Freedom House in SEA for quite some time. However, the following figures revealed that democracy or erosion of democratic and liberal norms tend to be gradual rather than abrupt. Democracies tend to not suffer from sudden deaths, but from a gradual and painful erosion, oftentimes, starting with the violation of previously agreed norms and principles, called the guardrails of democracy. These norms are not written; they are supposed to be internal pacts between political elites to somehow have some basic rules of fair play in appointing and firing officials.

To simply say that the Duterte administration is destroying democracy is incomplete. It needs to be balanced with the fact that the last time the country was judged free by Freedom House was 2004, and we have always been partly free since then. Wherever you are in the political fence, democracy has already been eroding. Maybe at the fault of both sides, especially if the conflict has been polarized. When talking about democracy in SEA, the discussion should be about how liberal norms and the liberal version of democracy has been undermined and eroding for quite some time, and how countries tend not to have a linear process in being an authoritarian country to becoming more democratic.

At times, SEA countries tend to transition from one variety of authoritarianism to another, and therefore the entire scholarly literature on supposed democratic transition is currently confounding that conventional wisdom. Whatever happens to these countries domestically influences how they project themselves in the region. Dr. Arugay puts the 2019 Philippine elections under study and noted that, “If you rule by public opinion, you can also be undermined by public opinion. This is not something that the administration should comfortably rest upon.”


He proceeded to discuss political trends in SEA and the Philippines, underlining the point that the only country that somehow pays a commitment to liberal democracy in SEA for a long time is the Philippines. Part of the democratic erosion that is happening in the Philippines is the erosion of liberal norms, something that other countries thought were already ingrained in our identity, as we have signed every human rights treaty in existence. However, now, even the concept of human rights is being questioned, just like how some US politicians are questioning climate change.

There is something at play in the domestic politics of the countries in the region, and this is the presence of “Sharp Power.” The International Forum on Democratic Studies recently released a paper about the corrosive impact of certain major authoritarian countries on democracy worldwide. We call this influence operations, funding campaigns of politicians, supporting their ascent to power in exchange for concessions in their foreign relations.

“I hope I’m wrong, but this, if not already, will become a vital factor in future elections in our Republic.”

The things that the Duterte administration has done have consequences beyond the formal end of his term in 2022. His continued performative political style does not bode well in building institutions and providing mechanisms that can outlast his term in 2022. The President still has not visited a Western country, and it is already more than half way into his term. One might want to ask how Philippine interests are promoted and protected when the President simply does not want to be shown. We know it is just optics, but optics in international relations influences perceptions.

The possible implosion of the very big Duterte coalition, which might be cannibalizing one another as we near 2022, does not bode well for some of us who are planning, who wanted policies to continue, who wanted institutions to be put in place, so good things will outlast the bad, and bad things can be addressed. Will there be continuity or change? Dr. Arugay states, “This is where I don’t hazard any response. Just like many of you, we need to constantly watch because things are still uncertain.”



SESSION 5

Impact of Development in Science and Technology

CHAIR

Charmaine M. Willoughby, Ph.D.

International Studies Department, De La Salle University

PAPER PRESENTATION

The Gathering Storm: Threats to National Security from Power, Water, and Internet Shortages

Alan Ortiz, Ph.D.

Center for Philippine Futuristics

Dr. Ortiz expressed his interest in the topic which, in many ways, starts measuring the Philippines's national power. Dr. Ortiz asks, "Do we have the rights to sit across the table and argue for our rights, our properties, our people?"

The methodology employed in the study is simple arithmetic. He emphasized the importance of knowing what we bring to the table and what we have to offer, so that we can demand our fair share in return.

"While we aspire to challenge China, do we have the power to demand what is our rightful share?"

Dr. Ortiz's presentation seeks to serve as a guide on measuring the respect that we deserve from our contemporaries and protagonists across the table. One key point of his discussion was that we are all responsible for our national security.

In 1988, due to numerous coup attempts to unseat her, President Cory Aquino revived the National Security Council, with an expanded mandate to pursue economic security through an all-out battle to eradicate poverty. Therefore, the definition of national security must now include economic security, target the eradication of poverty as its major and only aim, because everything else falls by the wayside if poverty is reduced. "Our main enemy is poverty and that has been the battle cry of the NSC then and until now."

As the country surges ahead to join the 4th Industrial Revolution and ease into middle-income status, the provision of the basic utilities, power, water, and the internet, becomes crucial to sustain our growth momentum.

Dr. Ortiz posits to the body that, "Clearly, we are on a growth path towards middle-income status, now how do we sustain that growth path?" The presentation is about getting there and how to make it happen.

The country's forecast GDP growth rate of 6% per annum for the next three years and beyond will generate even higher demand for power, water, and internet services nationwide. Abundant supply of these basic utilities is crucial to the attainment and preservation of our national security. Failure to provide these basic utilities creates unintended political consequences that wreak havoc on governance, resulting in political instability. "Without power, water, and internet, you have no right to go into battle with others."

Moreover, he discussed the current situation of the Philippines in terms of basic utilities:

- (1) Our power system has very thin reserves—only 10% nationwide of total installed capacity of 21,000 MW; the global standard is 23%.
- (2) Traditionally, one percent growth in GDP translates into one percent growth in new demand based on installed capacity; therefore 6% annual GDP will need 1,260 new MW year-on-year for the next three years or 3,780 MW; but according the Department of Energy, only 2,000 MW are ‘firmly committed’ to be built by 2022, resulting in 1,780 MW deficit.
- (3) It takes four to six years to build one power plant.
- (4) The Energy Regulatory Commission has a 2.5-year backlog of 85 Power Supply Agreement (PSA) applications and another 460 other various applications—so no new power supply services can be expected by 2022.
- (5) Just last Friday, the Supreme Court affirmed its May 2019 ruling that all PSAs approved since June 2015 are deemed rescinded and will have to go through competitive bidding all over again.

According to Dr. Ortiz, the Philippines is a water-rich country with a guaranteed 20 typhoons a year. According to the World Bank (2015), the annual available water volume per capita is twice that of other Asian countries and six times the global scarcity threshold, and yet:

- No new bulk water supply projects were completed in the last two Administrations, resulting in 550 Million liters per Day (MLD) supply deficit in Metro Manila (per the NWRB); underground aquifers countrywide severely depleted;
- 8,000 MLD (8 billion liters per day!) in the Sierra Madre mountains, the last available bulk water source on Luzon, remain untapped (Kanan, Laiban, Kaliwa riverine system);

- Governance (strategic planning, water resources inventory, program execution) of water industry nationwide is weak and disorganized, and in many cases, non-existent;
- Water and waste treatment management practices are absent and uncoordinated, and in most cases, non-existent; and
- Private Sector participation is discouraged nationwide; no legal framework for safeguards, incentives, and performance benchmarks.

Lastly, Dr. Ortiz tackled the issue on internet connectivity. “Each one of you has a weapon of mass disruption.” Unfortunately, in this country, even if we are second in the world in the usage of social media, we only have 9 million units.

“If we want to be part of the 4th Industrial Revolution, then by all means, let us weaponize the Internet for our sake.”

What have we not done? The “Third Telco” Project of the Department of Information and Communications Technology will take two to three years to install 55,000 towers under its contract; full operation of Dito Telecommunity Corp. (formerly Mislattel) cannot be expected until 2022; and full 5G rollout is not expected until 2023.

To date, the Philippines is still the only country in Asia without its own telecoms satellite—a necessary tool for connectivity and development in the 4th Industrial Revolution. Previous Administrations failed to renew/coordinate with the International Telecommunications Union for the use of the six orbital slots assigned to our country.

“You want to fight the war and you don’t have Internet? The Chinese occupy our 98.2 orbital slots, because we did not certify it with the ITU. It takes two to five years to re-certify.”

According to him, let us not talk about national security in highfaluting terms, “Give me water, give me power, give me Internet first.”

He concluded by explaining what needs to be done.

Power:

1. Deploy power barges in strategic areas in Luzon and in the off-grid islands ASAP to provide supplemental electricity for the next three years of supply deficits
2. Order ERC to accelerate the approvals for the Power Supply Agreements and other applications pending before it
3. **Fastrack** renewable energy projects using solar, wind and hydro
4. Mobilize and intensify info campaign for energy management and conservation

Water:

1. Pass HB #2725 known as the ‘Water Security Bill’ which seeks to reform the water industry by creating three apex institutions, namely: a) the Department of Water; b) the Water Regulatory Commission; and c) the National Water Corporation; the Bill also identifies three sectors for Public-Private Partnership or Joint Ventures namely: a) the Origination/Generation; b) the Conveyance/Transmission; and c) the Water and Waste Treatment sectors

Internet:

1. Accelerate the **Pipol Konek** and the Free Wifi Programs of the DICT
2. Push the Globe and Smart duopoly to complete their fiber, submarine cable and tower based networks in record time
3. Recover the six orbital slots reserved for the Philippines and launch first telecom satellite

“In the name of national security, let’s do these three utilities, pronto, because some of us are not young anymore, and it’s your generation to be hit by these shortages.”

According to him, the country’s growth momentum cannot be sustained unless we provide for the short, medium, and long term more than sufficient supply of the basic utilities services, namely power, water, and internet. Our well-being and our national security depend on it.



PAPER PRESENTATION

A Cyber Revolution for the Philippines

Francis C. Domingo, Ph.D.
De La Salle University

Dr. Domingo promptly discussed the different technologies utilized for strategic affairs and the operations in cyberspace, from network attack to network defense and exploitation. China and Russia have been in the news for such intelligence collection through computer networks. His presentation argues that the Philippines cannot exploit the “cyber revolution” without developing a coherent foreign policy and strengthening the force projection capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.


The idea of the “cyber revolution” has generated interest among powerful states such as China, Russia, and the United States, influencing them to exploit the potential of cyberspace for espionage, sabotage, and subversion. He showed the number of cyber disputes countries had been involved in, with China topping the list.

According to Dr. Domingo, cyber revolution talks about three things:

- (1) Network technologies change the way global actors interact;
- (2) Network technologies are advantageous for addressing conflicts and fighting wars; and
- (3) Network technologies level the playing field in strategic affairs.

Cyberspace has emerged as a new domain of conflict and cooperation between states, changing global interactions characterized by rapid spread of information, anonymity, and uncertainty.

Looking at how cyber capabilities are advantageous for fighting wars, Dr. Domingo explained that deterrence in cyberspace is



not effective, and that cyber revolution is offense-dominant and asymmetric in nature. He noted that such capabilities level the playing field by empowering weaker actors, enabling more strategic options, and are feasible despite limited resources, as such capabilities can function with limited personnel.

Without defining a coherent foreign policy, the Philippines cannot make strategic use of cyberspace. Moreover, incoherence disorients the development of cyber capabilities. It disrupts the implementation of cyber strategy, as well as impedes external cooperation in the area of cybersecurity.

Dr. Domingo emphasized that cyber capabilities are not effective standalone strategic instruments. There is still a need for traditional force projection capabilities. Limited force projection cannot be strengthened by cyber capabilities alone. Network technologies can enable but without the traditional capability, it lacks strategic utility.

Dr. Domingo identified the strategic implications of cyber capabilities. First, he argued that cyber capabilities have limited utility when employed as foreign policy instruments by weak states, such as the Philippines. Second, he emphasized the need for a clear foreign policy direction, which is necessary to determine the trajectory of cyber capability development. Lastly, strong force projection capabilities are necessary to use cyber capabilities as a strategic instrument to advance foreign policy.

Basically, focus on the more traditional capabilities. Let us start with the basics.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Conceptualizing Scenario-driven Approach for Identifying Opportunities and Challenges of Adopting Additive Manufacturing in the Philippines

Gian B. Franco
University of the Philippines

Mr. Franco began by explaining how industrial developing economies are now racing towards implementation of their national strategies for the 4th Industrial Revolution to boost their manufacturing base and security advantages in the global value chains of the future.

Policy changes need new drivers of growth and more efficiency amidst economic uncertainty. The Philippines is no stranger to this. More recently, the Philippine government unveiled two 3D printing (Additive Manufacturing) research facilities dedicated to furthering applications of 3D printing.


These significant developments make the Philippines one of the forerunners among Southeast Asian nations in the adoption of new technology that is expected to lead the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution.’




Within several years, 3D printers have become more accessible, more portable, and easier to use. The premise of 3D printing is its made-to-order efficiency in manufacturing anything from orthodontics to airplane engine parts. Over 70,000 types of materials can now be used for 3D printing, with more materials being developed to be more durable and heat-resistant.

3D printing technology presents an exciting opportunity for socio-economic development in the Philippines as the country seeks to hop in early on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. First, 3D printing solves the lack of innovation that holds back small to medium industrialization in the Philippines. Second, the new technology could open new niche markets never explored by rather expensive methods of mass production and customization. Third, 3D printing skips the gaps in critical linkages that the current state of production networks in the country could not fill. Finally, 3D printers barely need infrastructures and services for the logistical requirements that the country still lacks.


Mr. Franco presented the advantages of Additive Manufacturing to the Philippines' current capabilities (see next page). He further argued that government's inability or unwillingness to invest in developing Additive Manufacturing could inadvertently compromise national and domestic security.



The commercial and government use of 3D printing technology come with challenges to regulation and disruptions to the economy. Legislating intellectual property rights for 3D models and their enforcement would be just some of the many challenges. New regulations for fair competition among emerging niche markets would be imperative. The Philippine government must also implement policies to cushion the impact of 3D printing manufacturing on the traditional sectors of the market. Environmental concern over certain materials would also be an issue. Finally, new government programs are needed to increase digital literacy and incentivize innovation for the benefit of the larger framework of industrialization in the Philippines.



Given the potential range of AM's application and significant impact to critical policy areas, it is important then that the national government has the technological foresight to predict opportunities of emerging technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.



SESSION 6

Development of Military Industries in Developing Nations

CHAIR

Maria Carmina B. Acuña

National Security Council

PAPER PRESENTATION

“Straiting” Maritime Spaces: The Implications of Unmanned Systems Technology Towards the Securitization of the Philippine Rise

Kirk Patrick S. Pablo

Office of Naval Strategic Studies

In the public discourse, there is much clamor for the happenings in the West Philippine Sea, given China’s projection of power in maritime SEA as well as beyond it. Mr. Pablo began his discussion by stressing the need to consider the fact that the Philippine Rise is also an important area for all of the actors in this geopolitical region.

The Philippine Rise could be considered as a smooth space, and the relationship between spaces could be seen in the ambit of *technopolitics*, wherein the state would like to take control of a certain geographical area.

The fluid nature of the vast maritime borders of the Philippines remains one of the pressing issues for both the policy and defense

sector. In the advent of Chinese expansionism in the region, a call for policy makers and the defense sector to secure and retain the territorial integrity of our declared borders lies in the consistent action of these institutions through numerous international and state mechanisms, may it be through legal, military, and conceptual means.

The Philippine Rise is a strategic location for China. This area could be a potential space for the PLA-Navy to maneuver towards the Western Pacific, with the First Island Chain serving as a hard component of its “fortress fleet strategy.” The PLA-Navy continued to expand operation and training as the Chinese are content in what is called the maritime dilemma.

The strategy of cutting the islands into smaller pieces could be able to afford avenues of approach to and from the Western Pacific, to the South China Sea, extending to the Eastern Indian Ocean. There are four responsibilities: (1) the protection of overseas people, and (2) of the fortune of the seas, (3) the guarantee of trading, and (4) the prevention of overseas intervention. Establishing complete steering the steel shipment industry will make this force gradually possess the capability of offering logistics to Chinese naval vessels that will become China’s strategic support in Southeast Asia.

The Philippine Rise, being situated between the First and Second Island Chain, is seen as a fluid battlespace. Mr. Pablo argues that the intensification of China’s persistent and intrusive Maritime Scientific Research (MSR) operations vis-à-vis its apparent “striation” would eventually be translated into public discourse, therefore enclosing it in the language of securitization. This leads to the state eventually considering this phenomenon as a policy priority.

Below are the possible implications of such intrusive actions:

Possible Implications of such actions:

- Invalidation of existing international and regional regimes/conduct
- Rendering domestic laws incapable of being enforced
- Normalization of intrusive activities in all possible forms
- Maritime Scientific Research as a vital component of Chinese Strategy Formulation

To counter this striation of the Philippine Rise, the country's defense sector can secure our eastern seaboard with the help of cost-effective technologies.

The adoption of such technologies ushers the development of the defense sector from a conventional to a more network and system-centric armed forces.

The increase in the deployment of unmanned systems technology can augment the accomplishment of our mandate in two ways: it will free up the already scarce resources of the defense establishment, and the normalization of the deployment of unmanned systems will result in increased adoption within the existing defense regime.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Exploring Japan and Philippine Defense Industry and Military Partnership: Prospects and Challenges

Santiago Juditho Emmanuel L. Castillo

National Security Council

Since 2012, there have been some serious efforts in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to revise the AFP modernization program. The revised AFP modernization program includes plans to acquire advance defense equipment in order to bolster the AFP's capabilities, particularly when it comes to territorial defense. Part of the defense modernization plan of the Philippines involves improving the local defense industries in order to cater to the country's defense needs.

The Philippines has a broad experience in shipbuilding, marine/ naval architecture, small arms and light weapons (SALWs), and even drone-making. Defense industries in the Philippines are still maturing technologically and are still trying to catch-up in terms of development levels in critical industrial-technological areas.

Mr. Castillo pointed out that since the establishment of post-war Japan, the country has maintained a very strict self-imposed ban on exporting defense equipment to other countries. But last 2015, there has been a sharp change in Japan, as it lifted the veil of that ban and they can now officially export defense equipment to countries under the guidelines of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

We have to understand that Japan has a strong defense industry base, and some of its own defense companies are part of the world's 100 top defense companies, according to a study made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Despite this, Japanese defense companies mostly catered to one client for defense equipment, which is the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Only recently, Japan has exported the technology to the US.

JAPAN	PHILIPPINES
National Security Strategy (Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation)	National Security Policy
National Defense Program Guidelines (2015-2018)	National Security Strategy
Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Revised AFP Modernization Act of 2012 (RA 10349)
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.”	“AFP to have credible deterrence.”

Basis for Defense Industry and Technology Partnership

Mr. Castillo’s presentation examines the possible areas of defense needs that Japan can partner with the Philippines in both defense capabilities and defense industrial capacity. It seeks to look at the challenges faced by both a developing country (Philippines) and a highly developed country (Japan) when it comes to defense industry and technology partnerships. Lastly, the study can complement a policy guide on improving Japan-Philippine defense cooperation and partnership.

Despite the long-standing close ties and security partnership between Japan and the Philippines, there has been little interest and leeway in defense partnerships. Mr. Castillo argues that defense industry and technology partnership between the Philippines and Japan has plenty of potential gain, but it also faces internal challenges.

The challenge for the Philippines is if it can secure the protection of highly sensitive information when it comes to handling defense technology from Japan, or secure intellectual property rights.

The Philippines also has to deal with its long-winded bureaucratic process, which has led to inefficiencies in the country’s procurement system. This is manifested in the bidding process under Philippine

Republic Act 9184, which has long been viewed as time-consuming and too constraining.

- In February 29, 2016, Japan Signed a pact to supply defense equipment to Philippines. The agreement provides a framework for the supply of defense equipment and technology and will allow the two countries to carry out joint research and development projects.
- Japan could be one of the countries that not only supply defense equipment and technology for the Philippines, but also having its defense industries form partnerships with Philippine counterparts in order to help further improve the latter's defense industrial capabilities and capacities.
- At most, Philippine defense industries could learn how to produce advance defense equipment from Japan. Or, they can produce the important key components of the given defense equipment at least. Particularly when it comes to advance weapon platforms and systems.

Prospects

What is the way ahead? While Japan's failure to sell its defense equipment to Australia and New Zealand proved to be a painful experience, they also serve as valuable lessons for future prospects of defense exports and partnerships with other countries like the Philippines. (1) The Japanese government and defense companies taking a more flexible and accommodating approach to the needs of a particular client country is essential in this kind of business and partnership. (2) Philippines should improve its means in protecting the intellectual property and sensitive information of Japanese defense technology if that level of defense partnership is seriously pursued. (3) A review of Philippine procurement system might be needed in order to address the time-consuming and tediously bureaucratic process in acquiring new defense equipment. This is something that policy-makers can look into to help facilitate our partnership with Japan.



PAPER PRESENTATION

Artificial Intelligence as a Strategic Asset in the Military

Joseph Mari I. Fabian

Office of Naval Strategic Studies

The main purpose of the presentation is to get the word out that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a game-changer in international security. Up to now, AI has still been a very sensitive topic, particularly in the Philippines. Some say that it is still at its infancy stages in the country, but nonetheless, for Mr. Fabian, there is no harm in getting the word out.

Mr. Fabian talked about the general applications of AI in the military, which are as follows: (1) warfare platforms, (2) logistics and transportation, (3) cybersecurity, (4) target recognition, and (5) threat monitoring and situation awareness.

He further revealed that the world's leading military powers are at different stages of AI research and development. The US, for instance, has the Third Offset Strategy (2014), which focuses on AI, robotics, and miniaturization, as well as a policy of "human-machine collaboration."

China, on the other hand, has a Next Generation AI Plan (2017) to secure "first mover advantage." There has also been a migration of US-based Chinese AI scientists from US to China.

Lastly, Russia established a "10-point AI Plan" by the Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Defense, and Russian Academy of Sciences. Compared to the US and China, Russia is lagging behind because of its relatively smaller economy. Moreover, China and the US have more AI engineers.

When it comes to strategic implications for security, AI is seen as "third revolution in warfare." It is the biggest thing yet after the development of gun powder and nuclear weapons. Mr. Fabian outlines the strategic implications for international security:

explosion of new functional actors (e.g., terrorist groups), transfer of high-stakes decision making to non-biological hosts, deterrence, meaning seizing the asymmetrical edge against adversaries, which is a new kind of security dilemma, and finally, ethical considerations.

III. Strategic implications for international security

- AI as a 'third revolution in warfare'
- Democratized access to AI resources (vs. nuclear weapons material) → explosion of new functional actors (e.g., ISIS)
- Transfer of high-stakes decision making to non-biological hosts
- Deterrence means seizing the asymmetrical edge against adversaries

- A new kind of 'security dilemma'?
- Ethical considerations

In conclusion, Mr. Fabian says that there is a new strategic environment accessed by sub-state groups. In this new environ, data-driven decisions will become the new normal (Monterola 2019). He recommends to develop public-private R&D, as well as train personnel with background in Mathematics, Physics, and Engineering in Data Science.

Lastly, Mr. Fabian underscored that AI development should be within the parameters of accepted moral and legal principles.

He ended his presentation with the guiding doctrine of the Warrior-in-the-Design principle:

The Warrior-in-the-Design principle


“I am the Warrior-in-the-Design;

Every decision to employ force *begins with human judgment* [emphasis added];

I verify the autonomous weapon systems target selection before authorizing engagement, escalating to fully autonomous capabilities when necessary as a final resort;

I will never forget my duty to responsibly operate these systems for the safety of my comrades and to uphold the law of war;

For I am the Warrior-in-the-Design.”



SESSION 7

Chinese Foreign Policy and Security

DISCUSSANT

Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong

Vice Commander, Philippine Navy

Radm. Ong gave an overview of his presentation, which explores the Why, How, and What. The Why tells us the historical antecedence that gave rise to China's strategic culture; the How tells us about its structures and approaches, that is, the way it does things from the point of view of military and non-military actions; and the What are the events and patterns of behavior that we can see in other countries, which we can use to reflect on what is happening in our own country.

The survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) largely depends on the sustainability of its growing economy and its internal stability. Historians explained how the Sino-centric mindset became the philosophical underpinning for China's modern national policies and strategies.

Radm. Ong gave a brief look into historical narratives to offer a sense of how the CCP draws from China's past to justify its global ambitions. What are the takeaways from China's history? We look at its history from a geographical, political, and psychological perspective. Secondly, we look at the actions of China as part of what we call a global insurgency, offering its own version of how the world order should be crafted or evolved.

What is the shape of China's two-pronged strategy? First, it integrated deterrence using military means in the United Front Work, which works on non-military aspects. In providing an understanding of the nexus between regime survival, trade and maritime security, where the People's Liberation Army is situated. For regime survival to take shape, it requires stability and ability to hold power all together.

China uses exchanges as part of its general scheme of public diplomacy. One is establishing relationships between Chinese cities and Philippine cities. What is wrong with these arrangement? The problem arises from the lack of oversight functions on the foreign policies these cities and provinces have engaged. Basically, Philippine cities and provinces are conducting their own foreign policies. The national government and its security agencies do not know what the terms and references are in those agreements. That is between the Chinese and their "sister-city." These is something to China's efforts in socializing and receiving countries in lieu of personal relationships to be presented in promoting greater interaction between local level officials and leaders. Right now, the Philippines has 23 "sister-cities" with Chinese foreign investments.

Radm. Ong shared a recent cyber-defense exercise of theirs, where they were working on a scenario with three components: 1) CCTV program in place, 2) Huawei access to our telephones, 3) if infiltrators manage to penetrate our national ID system.

Chinese think tanks will work for the benefit of China, especially in safeguarding national security interests.

It is a fact that they have access to the archipelago, which is a cause of concern. We need to conduct further study on the United Front Work. The Navy started it, but there were more questions than answers. Most of these are beyond us in terms of comprehension. There are others who are more intelligent in some areas, who can tell us whether we are right, wrong, or in-between. We need to engage China with open eyes and discern its motives, but at the end of the day, we, as Filipinos, must figure out where we stand on this. You

have to respect China for what it is doing for its own self-interest. We cannot take it away from them.

It haunts us maybe because we are not aware of our own interests. If we are more familiar with our interests, then maybe we can engage in influences and vectors of engagement more responsibly. The question is how do we balance these vectors of engagement from three great powers and make sure that we perfect our own national interest or the interest of the Filipino public, and come out on top.

DISCUSSANT

Aileen S.P. Baviera, Ph.D.

Professor, UP Asian Center

China is different from any other country we know, and so different from us. There is no distinction between the Communist Party and the state. Its diplomacy is an extension of the Party's United Front Work.

What we see as a normal function of diplomacy is the embassy facilitating networking with their *kababayans* (countrymen). It is part of our function to network with our own diaspora and to get them to support our national objectives and interests.


China has a very strong central control and very high aspirations, and that is what scares us. It has efficiency and effectiveness, and China aspires to be a strong, powerful, modern, and rich socialistic country. Part of the uncertainty comes from the lack of familiarity with such a model, especially for Western countries.

The question is how do we relate to this? China is relatively a successful economy, so in that sentence, it is a challenge. Everything that China does becomes subject to scrutiny. Now that they are too strong, too rich for comfort, then we have to worry with what is happening.

Our concern is where do we take this? We talk about securitization of Chinese presence.

Many things that are connected to China we have to be vigilant about. But we need to understand the nature of this phenomenon and we have to be objective about it.

The point is agency. We can exercise our will, and we can create opportunities from this kind of situation.




Closing Remarks

Maria Ela L. Atienza, Ph.D.

Chair, Department of Political Science
University of the Philippines

Dr. Maria Ela L. Atienza officially closed the 4th Katipunan Conference, thanking everyone for an intensive two-day discussion. The main goal of the Katipunan Conference has been achieved since the start of the discussions. The Conference was able to cover many of the current and emerging issues that may impact Philippine foreign policy. Many of the panelists and the discussions after the formal presentations were also able to produce a scanning of the international environment from different perspectives and help the Strategic Studies Program (SSP) to come up with some sort of proceedings or policy proposal out of this two-day conference. The event allowed the SSP to gather very important policy opinions and decision-making inputs that will hopefully be noticed by government officials. It also provided a space where different scholars, both based in the country and abroad, as well as practitioners from different agencies of the government, were able to engage in meaningful and very frank dialogue about pressing strategic issues facing the country. Instead of ways forward, the SSP will be preparing the proceedings and the policy proposals coming from these two days of fruitful discussion.



The UP CIDS Strategic Studies Program

The Strategic Studies Program (SSP) of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) aims to promote interest and discourse on significant changes in Philippine foreign policy and develop capacity-building for strategic studies in the country. The program views the Philippines' latest engagement with the great powers and multilateral cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region as a catalyst to further collaborative and multidisciplinary research between the intellectual communities within East Asia.

Strategic studies is an interdisciplinary academic field centered on the study of peace and conflict, often devoting special attention to the relationship between international politics, geo-strategy, diplomacy, international economics, and military power. While traditionally centered on the use of military power for defense and security purposes, strategic studies have now evolved to embrace human and multidimensional aspects of security.

The Program will continue to bring issues of strategic importance to a Philippine public that tends to be very inward looking in its appreciation of its immediate environment. There will be a clear focus on reinforcing and strengthening a core group of experts and academic research interested in strategic concerns within the University and the consolidation of networks that link this core group with institutions in government and the private sector that might be interested in developments around the region and internationally that affect the policy options of the Philippines.



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