

The Cosmopolitical—Today

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In this age where the catchwords ‘globalization’, ‘transnationalism’ and ‘postnationalism’ have taken hold, nationalism and its political embodiment—the nation-state—appear to be outmoded. In its stead, ‘cosmopolitanism’ seems the obvious intellectual ethic and political project to better express real universalism (as opposed to ‘particularistic’ nationalism). This essay states that this is not so. It is skeptical of the emancipatory nature of cosmopolitanisms based in contemporary globalization and argues that cosmopolitanism as an alternative to nationalism remains an open question in these contemporary times.

Seluruh dunia kini dapat mengawasi tingkah-laku seseorang.

Dan orang dapat mengawasi tingkah-laku seluruh dunia.

The entire world can now observe the actions of any person
And people can observe the actions of the entire world.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer¹

WE LIVE IN AN ERA WHERE NATIONALISM SEEMS TO BE OUT OF FAVOR in some sections of academia and for some journalists spanning the entire political spectrum. The catchwords of the moment are ‘globalization’, ‘transnationalism’, even ‘postnationalism’. Many argue that the accelerated pace of economic globalization—the intensification of international trade, fiscal and technology transfers, and labor migration, and the consolidation of a genuinely global mode of production through subcontracting—in ‘advanced post-Fordist’ or ‘late capitalism’; the transnationalization of military command structures through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the rise of global hybrid cultures from modern mass migra-

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tion, consumerism and mass communications in the past two decades have combined to create an interdependent world in which the nation-state faces imminent obsolescence as a viable economic unit, a politically sovereign territory and a bounded cultural sphere. Even official United States (US) nationalism feels the need to put on a non-national costume now and then, either as the champion of world-trade liberalization or as the protector of international human rights.

Indeed, the unprecedented growth of academic research on nationalism in recent years predominantly takes the tone of an officiation at a wake foretold. Scholars of both liberal and leftist persuasions in the humanities and the social sciences have tried to hasten the demise of nationalism by pointing to its pathological nature. Nationalism has been linked to the right-wing racist ideologies of the Axis powers of World War II, the rise of new right-wing movements and xenophobia in Western Europe and genocidal wars in Eastern Europe. Third World statist ideologies justifying the oppression of religious and ethnic minorities and, more recently, Islamic patriarchal fundamentalism and oppressive identity politics in the postcolonial South have also been described as nationalist. It is argued that these nationalist discourses give the lie to the promise of freedom made by the national liberation movements during decolonization. To narrow our focus for a moment, the subfield of postcolonial cultural studies emerges from this general disenchantment with nationalism, more specifically exemplified by the argument of the Subaltern Studies scholars of India that nationalism is a 'derivative discourse', an ideological humanism engendered from colonialist discourse (see Chatterjee 1996 and Guha 1993).

Yet, if nationalism as a mode of consciousness and the nation-state as an institution are both undesirable and outmoded, it is not entirely clear what the alternatives are and whether such alternatives, if any, are capable of being realized. Since contemporary critics of nationalism regard it as a particularistic mode of consciousness or even a private ethnic identity which disguises itself as a universalism, cosmopolitanism is the obvious choice as an intellectual ethic or political project that can better express or embody genuine universalism.

Globalization is
making the
nation-state
obsolete.

But is cosmopolitanism a feasible alternative to nationalism in our contemporary era? Philosophical arguments in the affirmative generally focus on cosmopolitanism as an ideal project and a style of practical consciousness that overcomes nationalist particularism. Alternatively, one can focus on transcultural encounters, mass migration and population transfers between East and West, First and Third Worlds, North and South to suggest that past and present globalizing processes objectively embody different forms of normative, non-ethnocentric cosmopolitanism as an ideal project and a style of practical consciousness that overcomes nationalist particularism. Or, one can focus on transcultural encounters, mass migration and population transfers between East and West, First and Third Worlds, North and South to suggest that past and present globalizing processes objectively embody different forms of normative, non-ethnocentric cosmopolitanism because they rearticulate the boundaries of regional and national consciousness and local ethnic identities. In comparison with more philosophical approaches to cosmopolitanism, the second type of argument, espoused by cultural critics such as Arjun Appadurai and James Clifford, proposes that cosmopolitanism is no longer merely an ideal project but a variety of actually existing practical stances: contemporary transnationalism has provided the material conditions for a new radical cosmopolitanism from below.

Yet one might exercise a degree of skepticism about the emancipatory nature of cosmopolitanisms based in contemporary globalization. For instance, as Aihwa Ong has argued, the entrepreneur business migrant riding the crest of capital flows that are unrestrained by citizenship ties is an important type in contemporary Chinese cosmopolitanism. Benedict Anderson, probably the most well-known defender of nationalism among contemporary scholars, rejects the dominant tendency which equates ethnicity with nationalism and universalism with cosmopolitanism. He makes the striking argument that nationalism operates according to a universalistic logic of unbounded seriality and that it is the cosmopolitan migrant who obeys the logic of a bounded essentialized ethnicity that remains unchanged in exile and leads to fundamentalist identity politics. The feasibility of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to nationalism in our contemporary era thus remains an open question and, in this paper, I want to speculate a little on why this is so.

THE UNSTABLE OPPOSITION

ONE fundamental theoretical reason why the choice between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as alternative vehicles of universalism remains so contentious is that the putative thematic opposition between these terms has always been unstable. In the next section, I suggest that this opposition is even more volatile today with the blurring of the hyphen between nation and state in globalization. But in the first place, it is anachronistic both from a historical and intellectual-historical perspective to regard cosmopolitanism *qua* institutional project or intellectual ethic as something that comes after and seeks to transcend an anterior mass-based nationalism. As a central concept of the 18th century French *philosophes*, cosmopolitanism is derived from *kosmo-polites*, a composite of the Greek words for 'world' and 'citizen', by way of the *esprit cosmopolite* of Renaissance humanism. It primarily designates an intellectual ethic, a universal humanism which transcends regional particularism. The regional particularism that is opposed here may be defined territorially, culturally, linguistically or even racially but it is not defined *nationally* as we now understand the term because, in a Europe made up of absolutist dynastic states, the popular national state did not yet exist. Nor, indeed, had the doctrine of nationalism been fully articulated. Cosmopolitanism thus precedes the popular nation-state in history and nationalism in the history of ideas.

Cosmopolitanism
preceded the popular
nation-state.

A second look at Immanuel Kant's moral-political project for perpetual peace is instructive for it reveals that cosmopolitanism is not identical to 'internationalism' and that its antonym is not 'nationalism' but 'statism'. Kant's vision of institutional cosmopolitanism involves a shift from a merely voluntary ethical community of intellectuals to a world political community grounded in right. What Kant (1991a) calls 'a universal *cosmopolitan existence*' refers nothing less than to the regulative idea of 'a perfect civil union of mankind'. This constitutional global federation of all existing states 'based on *cosmopolitan right*' (*jus cosmopoliticum*) is articulated around the idea that 'individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal

state of mankind' (Kant 1991b; cf. Kant 1991c). It is a legitimately institutionalized world community that falls somewhere between the political community of the state in its lawful relations with other states (*jus gentium*) and a world-state. At times more ambitiously described as 'a universal federal

state' (*allgemeiner Völkerstaat*) (Kant 1991d), this world political community would be able to assert cosmopolitan right—make rightful claims on its constituent states with respect to their treatment of individuals and other states in the name of humanity—even though it does not possess the coercive means of enforcement

available to a world-state. Kant argued that the material conditions for fostering such a community already existed in international commerce and an emerging universal culture comprising the fine arts and sciences.

Kant's cosmopolitanism signifies a turning point where moral politics or political morality needs to be formulated beyond the *polis* or state-form, the point at which 'the political' becomes, by moral necessity, 'cosmopolitan'. His vision remains the single most important philosophical source for contemporary normative theories of international relations, including accounts of global civil society and the international public sphere. For present purposes, however, what is striking is the historical timing of Kant's vision.

Writing at the intersection between feudal and capitalist modes of production, Kant argued that international commerce was a historical condition of the cosmopolitan community because commerce was incompatible with war and the self-interest of states. We can, however, situate Kant's cosmopolitanism even more exactly as a vision essentially formulated prior to the spread of nationalism in Europe. Written in 1795, 'Perpetual Peace' clearly precedes what Lord Acton (Dahbour & Ishay 1995) disparagingly names as the age of 'the modern theory of nationality', the period between 1825 and 1831 where nationality, in search of statehood, emerges for the first time, as the primary basis of revolution. This era of the nationality principle saw the rise of Greek, Belgian and Polish nationalist movements, first aroused by the Napoleonic invasion, and now rebelling against their Ottoman, Dutch and Russian governments for the primary reason that these were foreign regimes. Since Kant's idea of the cosmopolitan is for-

For Kant, the political becomes, by moral necessity, cosmopolitan.

mulated too early to take into account the role of nationalism in the transition between the age of absolutism and the age of liberalism, it is more a philosophical republicanism and federalism designed to reform the absolutist dynastic state than a theory opposing the modern theory of nationality. ('Perpetual Peace' was written after the Treaty of Basel in March 1795 which ended the War of the First Coalition between the monarchical states of Europe and France and can be read as an implicit defense of republican France as the potential leader of a peaceful cosmopolitan federation.) Indeed, because Kant (1991c) writes at a time² when the phenomenon and concept of 'the nation' is still at an embryonic stage, he points out that the Right of Nations is a misnomer since it actually refers to the lawful relation of states to one another, *jus publicum civitatum*.

In the 19th century, nationality emerged as the primary basis of revolution.

The original antagonist of Kant's cosmopolitanism is therefore absolutist statism and its appropriate historical context is not the age of nationalism but the interstate system of anarchy established by the Treaty of Westphalia after the breakup of the vast religious political communities of the Medieval period. This interstate system, which arguably prevails in the 20th century, is anarchic in at least two senses.³ First, because the states within the system are not subject to an overarching universal sovereign authority, they are sovereign actors who claim absolute authority over the territories they govern. Second, much like corporations in a market, these states relate to each other and to individuals according to utilitarian principles or moral purposes to regulate their actions. Kant's vision of cosmopolitical right asserted in the name of a common humanity attempts to provide an ideal institutional framework for regulating the anarchic behavior of states.

It follows that cosmopolitanism in the narrow sense of non-commitment and unfeeling detachment from particular affective and concrete ties deviates from the spirit of cosmopolitanism in its original articulations. Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right is not anti- or postnationalist. A pre-nationalist attempt to reform absolute statism, it is not in the least an ideal of detachment opposed to national attachment. It is instead a form of right

based on existing attachments that bind us into a collectivity larger than the state: it can be claimed against states because ‘individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind’ (Kant 1991b). This collectivity also includes states because international commerce is a form of sociability that brings states and individuals into relation, connecting all of us into a larger whole. However, Kant could not possibly predict that capitalism, or more specifically, print-capitalism to use Benedict Anderson’s felicitous phrase, was also the material condition of possibility of a different type of collective glue with similar humanizing aims. I am, of course, speaking of nationalism which, like cosmopolitanism, also sought to provide rightful regulation for the behavior of absolutist states toward their individual subjects. In the initial moment of its historical emergence, nationalism is a *popular* movement distinct from the state it seeks to transform in its own image. Thus before the nation finds its state, before the tightening of the hyphen between nation and state that official nationalism consummates, the ideals of cosmopolitanism and European nationalism in its early stirrings are almost indistinguishable. As late as 1861, Giuseppe Mazzini (Dahbour & Ishay 1995) would emphasize that the nation was the only historically effective threshold to humanity:

Your first Duties...are...to Humanity. You are *men* before you are *citizens* or *fathers*...But what can *each* of you, with his isolated powers, *do* for the moral improvement, for the progress of Humanity?...The *individual* is too weak and Humanity is too vast...But when God gave you this means when he gave you a country, when, like a wise overseer of a labor, who distributes the different parts of work according to the capacity of workmen, he divided Humanity into distinct groups upon the face of our globe, and thus planted the seeds of nations...Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as brothers into the fellowship of Peoples. You are the bastards of Humanity...Do not beguile yourselves with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not first conquer a Country for yourselves...Do not be led away by the idea of improving your material conditions without first solving the national question...In laboring according to the true principles for our Country we are laboring for Humanity; our Country is the fulcrum of the lever which we have to wield for the common good. If we give up this fulcrum we run the risk of becoming useless to our Country and to Humanity. Before *associating*

ourselves with the Nations which compose Humanity we must exist as a Nation.

Indeed, even when cosmopolitanism is diluted in its usage to designate a universally normative concept of culture identified with the culture of a certain ethnolinguistic people such as in Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808), it is still compatible with nationalism because the national culture in question is not yet bonded to the territorial state and can be accorded world historical importance without being imperialistic. The crucial point here is that prior to its annexation of the territorial state, nationalism is not antithetical to cosmopolitanism. Thus in his classical study, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, the German social historian Friedrich Meinecke (1970) argued that in its initial phase, German spiritual or ethical national feeling was also cosmopolitan in nature and that cosmopolitanism was only superseded by nationalism with the birth of a genuinely national state.⁴ This unbounded and cosmopolitical extensiveness of pre-statized nationalism may further indicate that nationalism is not reducible to ethnicity and that nationalist politics is not necessarily a form of identity politics.

Nationalism is not
reducible to ethnicity.

The secondary understanding of cosmopolitanism which opposes it to nationalism and sometimes equates it with exile status (as migrant) only makes sense after the nation has been bonded to the territorial state which then naturalizes its boundaries through official nationalism. In the history of ideas, the notorious tensions between nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the derisive connotations associated with the latter become more apparent from Marx onwards. Whereas cosmopolitanism in idealist philosophy had designated a normative horizon of world history, for Marx (1973), cosmopolitanism is realized as exploitation on a world scale through international commerce and the establishment of a global mode of production.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a *cosmopolitan* character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under

the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed....In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. (emphasis added)

This passage documents the two crucial developments that occur between the cosmopolitanisms of Kant and Marx. For Marx, cosmopolitanism is no longer just a normative horizon or a matter of right growing out of international commerce. It is an existing and necessary condition resulting from the development of the forces of production on a global scale. But more importantly, in the intervening years between Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), a significant sense of national belonging had obviously developed. Nationality was not even an issue in Kant's vision of the cosmopolitical. It is therefore a little startling to see Marx characterizing the nation and its appendages—national economy, industry and culture—in naturalistic and primordial terms only 53 years later. Indeed, by then, the nation is sufficiently annexed to the state

Cosmopolitan
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for it to be characterized as a particularity to be opposed and eroded by (capitalist and proletarian) cosmopolitanism. For Marx, nationality belonged to an initial phase of capitalist production, the natural or immediate stage of the appearance of the capitalist form of capital. Even though this natural/national phase of capitalism was antiquated and in the process of being

sublated (*aufgehoben*) into the higher and truer phase of cosmopolitan capitalism, it still existed and its passing had to be hastened by ideology-critique.

Marx's ambivalence towards capitalist cosmopolitanism is well-known. As the unfolding of the true nature of capital as a concrete universality, the monstrous global totality that cosmopolitan bourgeois capital

builds in its own image is both the necessary and positive condition of a worldwide proletarian revolution and also that which proletarian cosmopolitanism has to destroy. But Marx was also ambivalent about the nation. In his early writings, he unmistakably depicts the sundering of natural local ties by liberated cosmopolitan capital as a violent dehumanizing process of upheaval that deprives labor of the last vestiges of 'an *apparently* social meaning, the meaning of genuine community' it still has under feudal forms of agriculture and urban crafts, guilds and corporations (Marx 1975). It is this ameliorative dimension of feudal ties that Marx (1975a) likens to nationality:

In feudal landownership we already find the domination of the earth as of an alien power over men. . . . But . . . the lord at least *appears* to be king of the land. . . . [T]here is still the appearance of a relationship between owner and land which is based on something more intimate than mere *material* wealth. The land is individualized with the lord, it acquires his status, it is baronial or ducal with him, has his privileges, his jurisdiction, his political position etc. It appears as the inorganic body of its lord. . . . In the same way the rule of landed property does not appear directly as the rule of mere capital. Its relationship to those dependent on it is more like that of a fatherland. It is a sort of narrow nationality.

Thus, although Marx regards nationality in similar terms to religion—as a false form of consciousness obstructing the genuine development of universal human nature—there is still a weak compensatory dimension to it insofar as it provides the appearance of a natural collective-psychological or affective barrier against the dehumanizing, atomizing effects of capital. But at the same time, the nation turns out to be a false natural community, an ideological construction: the appeal to nationality in Listian exhortations to protect the national economy and industry mystifies the class interests of less developed bourgeois states.⁵

Marx's anti- and postnationalist cosmopolitanism is thus different from Kant's pre-nationalist cosmopolitanism. Kant missed the potential of popular nationalism as an emancipatory force against statism because he could not predict that the material links brought about by capitalism would engender the bounded political community of the nation. Marx summarily dismissed nationalism although he witnessed its rise. Identifying the na-

tion too hastily with the bourgeois state, Marx reduced the nation to an ideological instrument of the state and saw nationalism as a tendentious invocation of anachronistic quasi-feudal forms of belonging in modernity. The antagonistic relation between socialist cosmopolitanism and nationalism is premised on a collapsing of the nation into the state. Marx's cosmopolitanism presupposes a historical scenario in which the masses are able to recognize the nation as a tool of oppression because the hyphen between nation and bourgeois state has been rendered so tight that it has completely disappeared. The aphorism, 'the working men have no country' (Marx 1973), refers to the inevitable inability of bourgeois nations to command the loyalty of their proletariat in global exploitation and pauperization. Indeed, Marx was more concerned about abolishing the state-apparatus than its epiphenomenon, the nation-form. Since nationality was already becoming obsolete, its dismantling would not require much effort and the proletariat should direct their efforts at seizing state power instead: 'The supremacy of the proletariat will cause [national differences]...to vanish still faster...In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end' (Marx 1973).

Marx's teleological argument about socialist cosmopolitanism is often dismissed for ignoring the continuing disparity between the working classes of different countries, a fact illustrated by the breakup of the Second International. But the more important reason why Marx missed the tenacity of nationalism so badly may be that he deduced the ideological nature of nationality too hastily from the economic and cultural nationalism of European states and thus foreclosed its popular dimension and its potential for being an ally of Marxist cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the father of historical materialism worked with an entirely ahistorical premise. He took for granted that the hyphen welding the nation and the state was immutable. Capitalism is certainly the progenitor of the European territorial national state. But in different historical situations, the global connections brought about by capitalism can also mutate to loosen the stranglehold of the bourgeois state over the nation so that the state can undergo a popular re-nationalization. Marx seems to make a similar point in his unelaborated notion of the proletarian nation that occupies the interregnum between the bourgeois nation-state and the proletarian world-community. 'Since the

proletariat... must constitute itself as the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word' (Marx 1973).

Not surprisingly, the most notable reevaluation of the national question in socialism so far has occurred in response to anticolonialist struggles.⁶ Using national liberation movements as his example, Lenin (1951) argued in 1914 for a strategic alliance between the proletarian struggle and the right of nations to political self-determination based on the principle that the former would be served by supporting the bourgeois of an oppressed nation to the extent that it fights against imperialism:

If the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights against the oppressing one, we are always, in every case, and more resolutely than anyone else, in favor.... But if the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for its own bourgeois nationalism, we are opposed. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressing nation, but we do not condone the strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation.... The bourgeois nationalism of every oppressed nation has a general democratic content which is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we support unconditionally, while strictly distinguishing it from the tendency towards national exceptionalism.

Lenin's argument widens the small foothold opened by Marx's tentative acknowledgment that nationality, as a form of collective solidarity that shelters the worker against capital's atomizing effects, has a compensatory dimension. Decolonizing nationalisms flourish in this opening, seizing this precarious foothold and filling Lenin's abstract notion of nationality with positive cultural content.

In the colonial situation, global capitalism has enslaved African and Asian territories either by establishing colonial administrative states (colonial India, Africa or Malaya) or by the indirect colonization of traditional dynastic states through extraterritorial demands (China, Siam, Ethiopia). At the same time, it leads to the birth of nations with interests diverging from those of existing colonial or colonized states. No longer just an ideological tool of the state, the decolonizing nation can now serve as an agent of socialist cosmopolitanism to the extent that it attempts to save the state from the clutches of cosmopolitan capital. By bringing to the fore again, the similar aims of cosmopolitanism and nationalism that Marx obscured

Save the state from the
clutches of
cosmopolitan capital.

and by distinguishing these progressive goals from those of an imperializing cosmopolitanism, decolonizing nationalism destabilizes Marx's rigid antithesis between the two terms.⁷ Thus in words that seem to adapt Mazzini's position to decolonizing Asia, Sun Yat-sen (1927), the father of modern China, argues that

nationalism is the necessary basis of genuine cosmopolitanism:

[Western colonial powers] are now advocating cosmopolitanism to inflame us, declaring that, as the civilization of the world advances and as mankind's vision enlarges, nationalism becomes too narrow, unsuited to the present age, and hence, that we should espouse cosmopolitanism. In recent years some of China's youths, devotees of the new culture, have been opposing nationalism, led astray by this doctrine. But it is not a doctrine which wronged races should talk about. We... must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism... We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we want to extend cosmopolitanism we must first establish strongly our own nationalism. If nationalism cannot become strong, cosmopolitanism certainly cannot prosper.

But it is not only progressive nationalism that can ally itself with genuine cosmopolitanism. Reactionary (bourgeois) nationalism can also be the accomplice of capitalist cosmopolitanism. Thus, Frantz Fanon (1963) suggests that the retrograde national consciousness of underdeveloped countries is 'the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mold that its mind is set in'. Similarly, in World War II, Japanese imperial nationalism actively modulated into a violent institutional cosmopolitanism: the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere that stretched from Southeast Asia through Korea and China to conquered Russian territory.

THE COSMOPOLITICAL IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION

FROM a historical perspective, it is evident that the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism has fluctuated between varying degrees of alliance and opposition and that both discourses have progressive as well

as reactionary dimensions. This shifting relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism and the unpredictable content and consequences of both practical discourses imply several things. To consider nationalism as an outmoded form of consciousness is a precipitate act.

An existing global condition ought not to be mistaken for an existing mass-based feeling of belonging to a world-community (cosmopolitanism) because the globality of the everyday does not necessarily engender existing popular global political consciousness. *Ipso facto*, neither cosmopolitanism nor nationalism can be seen as the teleologically necessary and desired normative outcome of past and present globalizing processes.

Popular nationalist movements contain exclusionary moments that can easily develop into oppressive official nationalist ideologies when these movements achieve statehood. Conversely, the staging of an international civil society of elite non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at United Nations (UN) World Conferences can become an alibi for economic transnationalism which is often United States (US) nationalism in global guise. Through strings-attached funding to elite NGOs that take over some social services from the public sector in developing states, international aid agencies can erode the ability of these already weakened states to implement genuine social redistribution. In the latter case, the point is to look at the consequences of cosmopolitanist claims in a given historical situation, just as in the first case, the point is not to demonize the state as the corrupter of the nation-people but to account for the necessary link between the decolonizing nation and state in the current conjuncture and the built-in dangers of official nationalism.

In other words, the ethico-political work that nationalism and cosmopolitanism can do at any given moment depends on how either formation emerges from or is inscribed within the shifting material linkages created by global cosmopolitanism at a particular historical conjuncture. The corollary to this is that, although capitalism is the condition of possibility of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism, neither discourse can be reduced to its ideological instrument or regarded as its simple reflection. The tightness or laxity of the hyphen between nation and state is an important historical factor in evaluating the aims of nationalism and their compatibility

The point is not to
demonize the state.

with normative cosmopolitanism. Hence, instead of indulging in the complacent demystification of nationalism as a 'derivative discourse' or moralistically condemning cosmopolitanism as uncommitted bourgeois detachment, we ought to turn our critical focus to the mutating global field of political, economic and cultural forces in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism are invoked as practical discourses.

'The cosmopolitical' is an apposite term for this global force field of the political. The question is whether the cosmopolitical today is conducive to the ride of new normative cosmopolitanisms, mass-based emancipatory forms of global consciousness or actually existing imagined political world-communities.

In contemporary cultural studies, postnationalism has become an increasingly popular trend. Adopting the modes-of-production narrative that Fredric Jameson borrowed from Ernest Mandel, some argue that the deterritorialization of space in transnational, flexible, disorganized or late capitalism erodes the naturalized borders of the nation, pointing to its imminent demise or at least, to the eventual development of an alternative spatialization of politics. For instance, Arjun Appadurai suggests that contemporary transnational cultural flows create a zone in which emergent global forms of cosmopolitanism are brought into a conflicting relationship with nationalist forms of culture. Appadurai (1988) claims that the cosmopolitanization of cultural consumption—the widening of its horizons by greater frequency of travel and improved media communications—has political repercussions because national culture is the site where oppressive politics and culture are conjoined. He suggests that insofar as the state attempts to tether the masses to it by deploying ideologies of 'national belonging' and 'national culture', subnational/local uses of transnational cultural messages and deterritorialized ideas of nationhood formed from population flows challenge the nation-state's cultural hegemony and contribute to its crisis.⁸ For Appadurai (1993), these are the signs of the dawning of a postnational, post-statist age and they require a theoretical vocabulary which can express 'complex, nonterritorial, postnational forms of allegiance' and 'capture the collective interests of many groups in translocal solidarities, crossborder mobilizations and postnational identities'. Otherwise, 'the incapacity of many deterritorialized groups to think their way out of the nation-state is itself a cause of much global violence

since many movements of emancipation and identity are forced, in their struggle against existing nation-states, to embrace the very imagined [political community] they seek to escape' (Appadurai 1993).

Appadurai's argument is a useful example of postnationalism in cultural studies because it details its three fundamental presuppositions. First, like Marx, the postnationalist relies on a restrictive definition of the nations as 'the ideological alibi of the territorial state' (Appadurai 1993). In this definition, popular nationalism involves masses who are duped by state ideology. Second, the postnationalist subscribes to the teleological argument that flexible capitalist accumulation tends toward a postnational age. Appadurai, for instance, suggests that a global economy constituted by disjunctive flows offers greater resources for undermining the oppressive nation-state. Thus, where intellectuals participating in anticolonial liberation movements had considered the loose hyphen between emerging nation and state in colonialism as an opportunity for a popular re-nationalization of the state, the postnationalist takes the distending of the hyphen in contemporary globalization as a sign of the disintegration of both nation and state. Finally, the postnationalist suggests that the constraining discourse of nationalism/statism can be transcended through acts of thought and imagination which find sustenance from a large variety of existing transnational movements. Grouping transnational NGOs and philanthropic movements, diasporic communities, refugees, and religious movements under the rubric of actually existing 'postnational social formation', Appadurai (1993) suggests that these organizational forms are 'both instances and incubators of a postnational global order' because they challenge the nation-state and provide nonviolent institutional grounding for larger-scale political loyalties, allegiances and group identities.

There are, however, more cogent reasons to be more cautionary about the virtues of contemporary transnationalism and less dismissive of the future of the nation-state and nationalism. In the first place, transnationalism is not only a contemporary phenomenon and it has always coexisted with the state. Michael Mann (1993) points out that European capitalism 'was specially transnational in its early industrial phase, with virtually free mo-

A global economy
undermines the
oppressive nation-state.

bility of capital and labor and with most of its growth zones located in border or crossborder areas, like the Low Countries, Bohemia and Catalonia'. Nor does the intensification of transnational capitalism today undermine the utility of states. Instead, 'the increasing density of global society gives states new geopolitical roles', notably in negotiations over tariffs, communications, and environmental issues (Mann 1993). Indeed, even though capitalism erodes state sovereignty, it also needs the agency of states. Capitalism, Mann (1993) suggests, 'seems to near its state-subverting limits' and 'will not further reduce the nation-state': 'Capitalist profit-taking has resulted in not quite Fredric Jameson's 'postmodern hyperspace'. Though capitalism has reduced the social citizenship powers of the nation-state, and in association with military and geopolitical trends, it has also reduced the military sovereignty of most states, it still depends on continuous negotiations between sovereign states in a variety of ad hoc agencies.

The necessity of popular nationalism as an agent of ethico-political transformation in transnationalism becomes clearer once we observe that notwithstanding increased transnational labor migration in the contemporary era, the deterritorialization of peoples remains limited for reasons that are structural to the global political economy. Samir Amin suggests that popular nationalism in the periphery is a necessary step toward socialist cosmopolitanism because we live in an uneven capitalist world system that largely confines the most deprived masses of humanity to national-peripheral space. He points out that the globalization of production—liberalization of trade and capital flows—involves the global integration of commodities and capital but stops short of an unlimited integration of labor—the unrestricted opening of the centers to labor migration from less or non-industrialized peripheries where the bulk of capital's Reserve Army is located.⁹ Consequently, 'the mobility of commodities and capital leaves national space to embrace the whole world while the labor force [largely] remains enclosed within the national framework' (Amin 1994).

As long as there is no free movement of workers worldwide, the globality of capital remains truncated. Contrary to the neoliberal sermon that the global spread of free-market mechanisms will lead to generalized development and global democratization, neocolonial globalization only exacerbated world polarization and leads to the formation of *comprador* states. Resource-intensive and wasteful macropolicies of economic devel-

opment and market-economy-led linear models espoused by international development agencies and financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mortgage the state to transnational capital and state adjustment to global restructuring loosens the hyphen between nation and state. Because the *compradorized* state cannot actively shape its own society and political morality, democratic national projects for social welfare in the periphery are either killed off or handicapped from the start. For social redistribution to occur, the state must resist structural adjustment. But resistance is only possible if the state is made to serve the people's interests. Thus, instead of producing large groups of deterritorialized migrant peoples who prefigure the nation-state's demise and point to a postnational global order, *uneven* globalization makes popular nationalist movements in the periphery the first step on the long road to social redistribution.

The contrast between Amin's argument for the sociopolitical necessity of popular nationalism in the South and postnationalism in cultural studies is even more striking because of Amin's Marxist-internationalist bent. For Amin, the new phase of globalization beginning in the 1970s intensifies global crisis. The negative impact of the former phase was mainly felt as the failure of national development and the still birth of genuine social democracy in the South. Contemporary globalization, however, clashes with national interests in the center. The rise of an autonomous global economy through heightened forms of financial and technological transnationalization is not matched by the emergence of supranational social and political mechanisms for regulating accumulation (Amin 1992).¹⁰ Even as the historic role of the nation-state as a framework for economic management is eroded in the new phase of globalization, existing forms of social and political power remain based on national realities. Amin (1992) points out that:

The US and Japan are not merely geographical areas of a world economy that is under construction. They are and will remain national economies, with a state that ensures the continuance of national structures while grabbing the lion's share of world trade.... These national options remain decisive at such levels as: spending on research, development, and labor force retraining; de facto protection of agriculture;

mineral and oil resource development; and even manufacturing and financial management.

Consequently, the increasing interpenetration of national productive systems at the center 'destroys the effectiveness of traditional national policies and delivers the overall system to the dictates and errors of the constraint of the world market, which cannot be regulated as there are no genuinely supranational political institutions, or even a political and social consciousness that really accepts this new demand of capitalism' (Amin 1994).

Amin's internationalist solution to global crisis is emphatically not postnationalist because it begins from and revolves around the success of popular nationalist movements in the periphery. Only an international political and social consciousness can equitably regulate the uneven global economy. But in the initial instance, popular nationalisms, whatever their shortcomings, are needed to save the state from capitulation to the demands of transnationalization. They alone can re-nationalize the state and

allow it to gain control over accumulation: 'The system of real existing capitalism being first and foremost a system condemned to perpetuate, reproduce and deepen world polarization, the revolt of the peoples of the periphery against the fate that had been ordained for them constitutes the central axis of the recomposition of the internationalism of the peoples' (Amin 1990). As was the case of the decolonizing nationalisms, this proposed alliance between nationalism and cosmopolitanism also grows out of a situation where the hyphen between nation and state needs to be strengthened because global neocolonialism has unmoored the state from its nation. Amin's typical case is the *comprador* state in Africa but his general argument can be extended to describe people's diplomacy in the Philippines or the popular mobilization in support of Sukarnoputri in Indonesia.

However, these arguments about the structural necessity of the nation-state in the global political economy do not exactly answer the question of whether the cosmopolitical today is conducive to the rise of new normative cosmopolitanisms. They certainly show us the untenability of postnationalism. But then cosmopolitanism need not be postnationalist. As we

Global neocolonialism unmoored the state from its nation.

have seen, cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not logical antagonists and it is possible for new cosmopolitanisms to stress the importance of a strategic alliance with the nation-state. Proponents of new cosmopolitanisms and postnationalists do, however, share one assumption. They both suggest that existing transnational movements translate into actually existing popular cosmopolitanisms understood as pluralized forms of popular global political consciousness comparable to the national imagining of political community. The question is whether this claim is premature.

The necessity and even urgency of a cosmopolitical frame of analysis is not in question here. The problem is not whether there is material interconnection at a global scale; whether more women and men of discrepant class and cultural backgrounds are transnationally mobile and inhabit competing worlds. The world is undoubtedly interconnected and transnational mobility is clearly on the rise. However, one should not automatically take this to imply that popular forms of cosmopolitanism already exist. Whether this mobility and interconnectedness gives rise to meaningful cosmopolitanisms in the robust sense of pluralized world-political communities is an entirely separate issue. Anthony Smith (1995), for instance, suggests that a mass-based global loyalty is anthropologically impossible:

A timeless global culture answers to no living needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity-in-the-making, nor aspirations for one, nor any collective amnesia to replace existing 'deep' cultures with a cosmopolitan 'flat' culture. The latter remains a dream confined to some intellectuals. It strikes no chord among the vast masses of peoples divided into their habitual communities of class, gender, region, religion and culture. Images, identities, cultures, all express the plurality and particularism of histories and their remoteness from...any vision of a cosmopolitan global order.

But even if a popular global consciousness exists, is it or can it be sufficiently institutionalized to be a feasible political alternative to the nation-state form? Or is it merely a cultural consciousness without political effectivity?

The uneven force field of the cosmopolitical has produced and will continue to produce inspiring examples of politically oriented cosmopoli-

tanisms: Amnesty International, *Médicins sans Frontières*, the Asian Pacific People's Environmental Network based in Penang, Malaysia, for example. Mainly articulated by intellectuals and activists in both North and South, these cosmopolitanisms deserve support and admiration. However, it is questionable whether these cosmopolitanisms are mass-based even though

Mass-based global loyalty is anthropologically impossible.

they initiate or participate in grassroots activities. Even grassroots feminist NGOs do not represent 'all women'. Moreover, it is unclear how these cosmopolitan activities are related to transnational underclass migrant communities. For instance, over and above interventions on behalf of underprivileged migrant minority

groups on an ad hoc basis, to what extent can activist cosmopolitanisms take root in the latter [i.e. among underprivileged migrant minority groups] in a consistent manner to generate a genuinely pluralized mass-based global political community within the Northern constitutional nation-state as distinguished from the defensive identity politics of ethnic, religious or hybrid minority constituencies? Can these cosmopolitanisms be embedded in a global community in the South forged from transnational media networks? This leads to the most difficult questions of all: In an uneven neocolonial world, how can struggles for multicultural recognition in constitutional-democratic states in the North be brought into a global alliance with postcolonial activism in the periphery? The realizability of a global civil society or an international public sphere capable of representing/mediating the needs and desires of humanity's radically different constituencies through cross-identifications stands or falls here.

Transnational mobility notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether transnational migrant communities can be characterized as examples of cosmopolitanism in the robust normative sense even after we have acknowledged that this normative dimension is necessarily diluted or compromised by historical contextualization. It is unclear how many of these migrants feel that they belong to a world. Nor has it been ascertained whether this purported feeling of belonging to a world is analytically distinguishable from long-distance, absentee national feeling.¹¹ Furthermore, the argument that transnational print and media networks extend a world community beyond transnational migrancy to include people dwelling in the South has to

reckon with the banal fact that many in the South are illiterate and/or do not have access to a television or hardware capable of receiving CNN and Rupert Murdoch's Asia-based Star TV. Finally, if we recall that the nation is a *mass-based* imagined *political* community, it is unclear whether in the current interstate system, the so-called international public sphere or global civil society (names for mass-based global communities) formed by transnational networks can achieve social redistribution on a global scale if it does not go through the institutional agency of the nation-state.¹²

Specially in the postcolonial South, relying on the state as an agent for social development involves changing its political morality, more often than not by a counter-official popular nationalism and electoral education. As long as the state is mortgaged to global capital and unmoored from its nation-people, talk of social democracy in the South is meaningless. If transnational networks can only be politically effective by working through popular nationalism, then it may be more appropriate to describe such activity as nationalisms operating in a cosmopolitical force field rather than mass-based cosmopolitanisms.¹³ This would allow us to exercise due caution toward the World Bank's cosmopolitan rhetoric: its utilization of the concept of international civil society to bypass the beleaguered sovereignty of Southern states and dictate adjustment according to the imperatives of global restructuring. Gayatri Spivak (forthcoming 1998) calls the non-Eurocentric ecological movement and the women's movement against population control and reproductive engineering 'globe-girdling movements' and emphatically distinguishes them from both the international civil society of elite NGOs and the postnationalism of 'Northern radical chic'.

The point is that in the cosmopolitical today, even activist cosmopolitanisms are in a conflicting embrace with the popular nationalisms that are imperative in the postcolonial South. These popular nationalisms cannot afford to refuse the resources and gifts of aid offered by transnational networks. However, given their irreducible inscription within the material linkages of global capital, these activist cosmopolitanisms can also unintentionally undermine popular attempts to re-nationalize the compradorized state. Global justice involves an interminable navigation through the uneven and shifting force field of the cosmopolitical that engenders and circumscribes nationalisms and activist cosmopolitanisms alike.

NOTES

This article is a slightly revised version of my introduction to Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins (eds), forthcoming 1998, *Cosmopolitanism—Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

1. From *Bumi Manusia* (1983:316), my translation. The first volume of the Buru quartet has been translated as *This Earth of Mankind*, in Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1991) *Awakenings*, trans. Max Lane, Victoria: Penguin Books Australia.

2. *The Doctrine of Right* was first published in January 1797.

3. For a succinct account of the Westphalian system as international anarchy and an alternative account of global civil society, see Lipschutz (1992).

4. 'Cosmopolitanism and nationalism stood side by side in a close, living relationship for a long time. And even if the idea of the genuine national state did not come into full bloom within such relationship, the meeting of these two intellectual forces was by no means unfruitful for the national idea' (Meinecke 1970).

5. See Marx's 'Draft of an Article on Friedrich List's Book, *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie*' in Marx & Engels (1975). For a more extended discussion, see Szporluk (1988).

6. For a concise summary of the national question in socialist cosmopolitanism, see Colás (1994).

7. But in his concise and detailed account of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in Latin America, Noël Salomon (1979) distinguishes cosmopolitanism from internationalism, arguing that the former is supranational and has a negative meaning whereas the latter affirms nationalism.

8. See Appadurai (1990).

9. The analytical distinction is between Marx's theory of the capitalist mode of production on a world scale (presupposing a truly generalized world market that integrated commodities, capital and labor and results in global homogenization) and capitalism as an existing world system (leaving labor unintegrated and leading to polarization). See Amin (1994). See also Amin's 'The Social Movements in the Periphery: An End to National Liberation?' in Amin et al. (1990).

9. 'The new stage [of globalization] marks the emergence of a "world economy", i.e. a much deeper degree of integration. The consequences of this change are major. Accumulation in the central nations was formerly regulated by national political and social conflicts that structured the hegemonic alliances. But there exists today no analogous mechanism that could structure such alliances on the grand scale of the economic decisions being made—even for the United States-Japan-EC tripolar cluster' (Amin 1992).

10. Long-distance nationalism in postcoloniality is the flipside of minority ethnic politics in the North. As Benedict Anderson (1994) notes, 'that

same metropole which marginalizes and stigmatizes [the ethnic minority] simultaneously enables him to play, in a flash, on the other side of the planet, national hero'.

11. For critiques of the concept of global civil society in international relations theory, see Peterson (1992) and Shaw (1994). Peterson cautions us against regarding international society as a larger version of civil society because it operates in a decentralized political system where loyalty to the world as a whole is insignificant. Shaw points out that civil society institutions are largely defined in terms of national bases and that social movements have little impact on interstate relations because they rely on cultural impact instead of connections within the political system. He suggests that global civil society is more potential than actual and that, at best, social movements with global networks make national civil societies more globally aware.

12. I have argued this in Pheng (1997).

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