

The 'Muslim-Filipino' and the State

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This essay problematizes the resistance-collaboration dichotomy in Muslim responses to state formation. Rather than viewing these responses as proof of a multi-faceted 'nationalist struggle', it argues that these were efforts by Muslim leaders to cope with a power transition. Their power diminished by the Americans, the Muslim leaders tried to overcome their weakness by trying to play Americans and Filipinos against each other. As Filipinization moved forward, Muslims gradually shifted their political attention to getting a niche and protecting it within the state. The first part of this essay shows how and why these shifts in political allegiance occurred. The second part examines the so-called 'Muslim-Filipinos', the first generation of Muslim leaders who facilitated the integration of southern Mindanao to the colonial body politic.

AS THE DEBATE OVER THE BACON BILL HEATED UP, FILIPINOS OPPOSED to the bill received an unexpected support from one group. Taking the floor as a point of privilege, Abdullah Piang, the son of Datu Piang and representative of Cotabato to the Philippine Assembly declared that 'if the Bacon [Mindanao] bill is passed, I will reside during the rest of my life in Manila because I do not want to separate from you. Look at my skin. The blood that runs in my veins is not different from that of you Christian Filipinos' (PFP 1933). Piang was not alone. His fellow Muslim politician, the 'eternal Hadji Butu of Sulu, was cited by Maximo Kalaw (1919) as having assured the latter (and by extension, most Filipinos) that 'We are one in spirit and one in blood!'¹

These instances of fidelity to the Filipinized colonial state was odd given that the popular and political image of Muslims then was their incessant opposition to colonial integration. Hadji Nuno of Sulu spoke of belonging to a 'different race' and a 'different religion' when compared to the Filipinos. Nuno spoke of no other demarcating definitions except these

two. His preference was to remain 'in the hands of the Americans, who are father and mother to us now, than to be turned over to another people.' It is interesting to note that these two options both emanated from a common premise, i.e. the subordination of the Muslims (Gowing 1983). Abdullah's father, the Magindanao strongman Datu Piang himself, expressed his uneasiness to the Bill. Responding to Vice-Governor Joseph Ralston Hayden's inquiry as to what he thought was 'good for his country', Piang replied:

The American Army officers who governed us then were good men and just. They gave us assurance that they would protect us and not turn us over to those whom we do not trust. Whether those officers had the power to make those promises we do not know. But we trusted them.... But year after year, slowly, they have given the Christian Filipinos more power over us. Their laws are too complicated for us; the Moros need a simple government. Our own is more simple, ours are laws that have been handed down from father to son for many centuries (Hayden 1926a).

While army rule during the first decade of American presence had successfully pacified 'Moro Mindanao' and restricted Muslims within the narrow horizons of a colonial boundary thus cutting them off from maritime Southeast Asian connections, under Filipinization, they were supposed to be integrated further into the colonial body politic. To undertake this program, colonial officials created the Department of Mindanao and Sulu to replace the military-run Moro Province.

Muslim response to Filipinization remains an unstudied episode in state formation and local power in southern Mindanao because scholars continue to regard the resistance-collaboration dichotomy as unproblematic. This dichotomy, however, obscures rather than clarifies. Much like their reactions to the Moro Province's establishing of control over southern Mindanao, Muslim responses to Filipinization were diverse and often overlapping (Abinales, forthcoming). The simple (and often simplistic) explanations of opportunism and anticolonialism obscure a more complex situation. Instead of viewing collaboration as springing from sheer opportunism and resistance as proof of a multi-faceted nationalist struggle, I view these responses as efforts to cope with a power transition which *datus* feared

would marginalize them further. Muslim communities had accepted the restricted horizons of American colonialism and had begun to accustom themselves to it. In Filipinization, however, the *datus* faced an authority committed to strengthening Manila's hand over southern Mindanao. The *datus'* vulnerability was compounded by the army's assault on their authority, leaving them with little room to maneuver.

This essay thus looks at the changing character of these responses to Filipinization. I will argue that it would be simplistic to view these actions under the resistance-collaboration dichotomy that is often the standard measure of Muslim responses to the colonial state (Majul 1985; Tan 1977 & 1982). Their power diminished by the Americans, the Muslim leaders tried to overcome their weakness by playing Americans and Filipinos against each other. What was clear, however, was that they were operating within a narrow political frame — the Filipinized colonial state dominated by the likes of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña.

As Filipinization proceeded in earnest, Muslims began to realize that the center of power had already shifted to Manila. Thus, they gradually shifted their political attention to carving a niche and protecting it within the state. While the first generation of *datus* initiated the process, this would be sustained by their progeny; a new generation whose political awareness and pilgrimage were now framed by Philippine territory.² These new leaders were the first to declare themselves as 'Muslim-Filipinos'. This political tag, which had previously been given a more revolutionary interpretation, was actually a stamp of political allegiance to the colonial state (Majul 1966). It would also be the foundation of a lengthy period of mutual accommodation between Muslim strongmen and the postwar Republic.

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This essay is divided into two sections. In the first part, I will discuss variations in the *datus'* actions, including resistance against Filipinization and the character of Muslim collaboration with the new order. I will demonstrate how and why these responses overlapped one another, as many *datus* switched between being oppositionist and collaborationist. The second section examines the so-called 'Muslim-Filipinos' as the first group to

declare loyalty to the Filipinized colonial state. The concluding section analyzes the obstacles these new leaders needed to surmount in their quest for greater power and influence.

THE LEGACY OF THE MORO PROVINCE

THE US army left a legacy of dependence in southern Mindanao. Its administration fostered a deep sense of loyalty to the United States among many Muslim groups. Even the most bellicose *datus* of Lanao were eventually won over to the American side. But martial law also divested Muslim leaders of their military power. While most *datus* retained influence over their followers, they were aware that their preeminence was conditioned on American approval or at least tolerance.³ This slide in *datu* strength continued through the early years of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, most notably following the 1915 abdication of the Sultan of Sulu of his 'temporal sovereignty over the Sulu Islands, including the "right" to collect taxes, the right to decide lawsuits and the reversionary rights to all the lands' (Harrison 1922; Gleek 1991).

The only consolation for these emasculated *datus* was the American assurance that they would be protected from their 'traditional enemies', the Filipinos, and that for as long as the Americans were present, 'they will never be under Filipino rule' (Horn 1941).⁴ Politically astute *datus* therefore saw fit to establish long-term associations with Americans in the hope of

gaining political benefits. During the Moro Province period and even into the early years of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, no *datu* imagined himself seeking political associations in Manila with Filipinos, and none envisaged himself joining a Filipino organization like the Nacionalista Party. Setting their sights locally, they were content to work in their districts confident

of the American umbrella that protected them from Filipinos. The Muslims recognized the finality of American rule, but it was an acceptance based on the incorrect premise that Mindanao would be kept separate from the Philippines.

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When the army withdrew and Manila extended its powers to Mindanao, the Muslims voiced their opposition. But given their loss of firepower and their dependent leadership, this resistance was more noise than substance. Reports of 'Muslim resistance' were indicative of this. Actual battles against Filipino or American forces were insignificant compared to the 'threats' expressing opposition to Filipino rule.⁵ Warnings of an impending breakdown of order once Filipinos took over were empty rhetoric, aimed at changing the American decision to hand over 'Moro Mindanao' to the Filipinos.⁶ Whether or not the Filipinos took the threat seriously was incidental. The Muslims knew that Americans had the final say; if they could successfully revive the myth of Muslim ungovernability (i.e. the 'Moro Problem'), southern Mindanao might remain free of Filipino control.⁷ Resistance, ineffectual though it proved, should be understood not simply as Muslim resistance against American rule, but as the expression of Muslim resistance as an appeal to American rule. The more strident these 'warnings' became, the more apparent it was that this resistance had no potency.

Yet to dismiss this saber-rattling as ineffectual rear-guard action understates its value from the point of view of the *datus*. The petitions, threats and small 'revolts' were significant in showing how the *datus* attempted to maintain a say in a process whose outcome remained unclear until the 1930s. While Filipinization was indeed proceeding in earnest, an appointment like Leonard Wood's signified the possibility of reversing the process. Thus *datus* were sensitive to the impact of American electoral politics on the Philippines. At the same time they believed, perhaps naively, in American promises of protection. Warning of Filipino despotism and of the turmoil which would result from resistance to such rule, the *datus* tried to play on American prejudice and fears, for this was the only feasible option they had under the circumstances.

It is also notable that, except for the minor revolts, the *datus* used new methods of political action: petitions, letters of protests, speeches and even the idea of sending 'missions' to the United States to argue their case.⁸

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With the loss of firepower, these actions were clearly the only ones available. Yet, they were also significant because they show the Muslim *datu*s learning a new way of doing politics. In fact, the entreaties, requests, lobbying and threats of 'bloodshed and disorder' were tactics first used by Manuel Quezon and his cabal when negotiating with the Americans.⁹ In picking up the political tactics of their opponents, *datu*s showed the extent to which they were — perhaps unconsciously — being drawn into the world of Filipino-dominated colonial politics.

Even the character of their armed 'revolts' changed. A good illustration is the revolt of Datu Tahil Lidasan who had fought the Americans at Bud Bagsak in 1903 and later became a third member of the Sulu provincial board. In 1927, Tahil withdrew to a *cotta* to await government attack after he had announced his opposition to the head tax and ban on carrying weapons in public and demanded an 'end to regulation by the government'. These were issues similar to those he raised in 1903. Though the causes were still popular — Lidasan easily mustered 100 followers — this was not a simple case of revivalism (Thomas 1971). On the contrary, this revolt turned out to be a ruse in his wife's pursuit of local political power. The American-educated Princess Tarhata, niece of the Sultan of Sulu, exploited her husband's 'fame' to incite the revolt after failing to get him appointed as Jolo governor in place of a disliked American. Tarhata had plans to firm up her control over Jolo politics and saw the American as an obstacle. The result was her husband's revolt, suppressed by the Constabulary at the cost of 35 lives and Tahil's sentence of seven years in jail (Forbes 1928). Tarhata soon divorced her now politically-useless husband, married a Cebuano, and tried her hand at local politics once again (Horn 1941).¹⁰ Colonial politics was thus not absent even in cases of armed resistance.

If 'Moro opposition' made any impact on colonial politics, it was in the way it redefined the notion of a 'Moro problem' in Philippine politics. The existence of an opposition to Filipino rule and American withdrawal became the launch pad for another group of *datu*s who opted to participate in the politics of Filipinization. These leaders declared themselves to be a 'moderate' alternative, functioning as legitimate mediators between suspicious 'Moros' and the colonial state which were undergoing the process of Filipinization.

Who were the Muslim 'collaborators' and what were their reasons for choosing to work within the new Filipino-dominated system? In a 1917 listing, those Muslim individuals who publicly expressed their support for Filipinization, Muslim representation in the colonial legislature, and the eventual granting of Philippine independence were described as 'men of distinction' in their communities (Carpenter 1917). Most had already worked with the Americans as advisers or tribal leaders and were familiar with aspects of colonial practice. These leaders had also been the first to accept the transformation of their 'traditional political system' from the *orang besar* days and to take advantage of the new, narrower opportunities offered by American rule.¹¹

With Filipinization, many of these *datus* switched their allegiance to Manila and the Filipinos with little uneasiness because of their prior experience in collaborating with the Americans. Many came quickly to the conclusion that their fortunes would be better served by changing patrons. Prominent among these 'opportunist' collaborators were leaders like Hadji Butu and Hadji Gulamu Rasul. Rasul was appointed Frank W Carpenter's aide-de-camp and became an avid supporter of government settlement programs for Mindanao (PFP 1914a, 1916a & 1916b), while Hadji Butu was appointed to the Philippine Senate (PFP 1917a & 1917b). The Zamboanga rebel Awkara Sampang, his Lanao counterpart, Amai Manabilang (Tan 1993), and the German-Jolo mestizo Julius Schuck were also champions of Filipinization and were all elected to the provincial board (MDB 1915; PFP 1915).

Motives for collaboration were not confined to sheer opportunism. There were those who collaborated because of their enfeebled status. The Sultan of Sulu supported Filipinization in order to recover part of the power he had lost. He was hoping that Filipino leaders like Quezon would be sympathetic and would reinstate him to his position as leader of the Sulu archipelago.¹² Muslim leaders were also drawn to Filipinization because they were impressed by the 'progress' colonial rule had brought to the rest of the colony and were hoping that similar

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improvements could reach Mindanao. These *datu*s were recruited by the promise of universal primary public education and the creation of a development plan for Mindanao.¹³

And there were those who were simply awed by the glitter of the colonial center. The Sultan of Sulu could be counted among this group, but it also included the 'infamous' Datu Alamada who defied Spanish and American authorities for 20 years before surrendering in 1914 to his 'friend' Carpenter who then sent him to Manila to show him 'civilization'. Harrison (1922) described Alamada's transformation after his Manila visit:

He seemed to me like a wild bird, poised for instant flight, and supremely uncomfortable among the large crowd of officials at Malacañang Palace; his hand was cold from suppressed nervousness and embarrassment. He had agreed to come to Manila upon the assurance that he could carry his *kris*... at all times, and that he would not be obliged to wear "Christian" clothing. Before the end of his first day in Manila, he had discarded his *kris* and surreptitiously procured an American suit of clothes. Upon his return to Cotabato, he became insistent in his demands for schools.

As it turned out, some of these collaborators were not the partisans of Filipinization that they seemed. Even those who were appointed to the legislative assembly apparently remained mistrustful of Filipinos and secretly hoped for American intervention. These leaders 'played along' with Filipinization, and yet were censured by both Filipinos and Americans when their 'duplicity' was discovered. The same Hadji Gulamu Rasul who became Carpenter's aide-de-camp, for example, was described to be intensely pro-Filipino and pro-independence when in Manila. But when he and his father addressed their fellow Muslims, however, 'they spoke of continued American protection in the face of Christian Filipino domination.'¹⁴ Both Maximo Kalaw and Cameron Forbes — with their opposing views regarding Mindanao — noted *datu* deception. Forbes, on the one hand, observed that even as Muslim representatives voted consistently with Quezon's Nacionalista Party in the assembly, in 'talking with Americans and disinterested parties, they frequently express the desire for separation from the rest of the archipelago and a continuance of American rule in case independence is granted' (Forbes 1928).¹⁵ Kalaw (1931), on the other hand,

cited an incident which convinced him that Muslims 'secretly' favored Filipinization:

I am reminded of a story about the Moros told me by Director Hidrosollo himself. The Director accompanied some Americans to Mindanao and on one occasion the Moro chieftains in their usual oratorical fashion told the Americans that they did not want the Christian Filipino to rule them, and that they wanted the Americans to remain there. Later on when one of those Moro chiefs realized that Director Hidrosollo was there, he invited the Director to a private corner. When they were out of hearing of the Americans, the Moro *datu* said, "Well, Director, don't mind what we said in our speeches. They are for American consumption. The real thing is that we are brothers. Christian Filipinos and Moros are of the same blood and race. So don't believe what I told them." The Moros are unfortunately forced by circumstances to play that kind of politics.

Datu Piang, among the first to accept the US army's authority, also talked out of both sides of his mouth. Piang opposed Filipinization when with Americans he trusted and supported the separatist plots of his eldest son. However, he also made sure one foot was in the other camp by accepting his nomination to the Philippine Assembly as a representative of the 'Moro people' (Report 1916). Despite recognizing his sons' anti-Filipino sentiments, he nevertheless sent two of them, Ugalingan and Gumbay, to schools which would prepare them for employment in the colonial state. Piang may have agonized over the pressure, but he was astute enough to realize the political value in supporting both sides, if not for his personal benefit then at least for the future of his political clan (Hayden 1926a; see also Mastura 1984).¹⁶

These various acts of cooperation were not well-defined or immutable positions based on unchanging motivations. There were few who were staunchly pro-Filipino or pro-American among these *datu*s, and not all could be classified as opportunists seeking to maximize their own interests through the 'opportunity structure' of Filipinization.¹⁷ Instead we see in these overlapping and contradictory responses an effort by the Muslim elite to negotiate their way through political change. The switching of sides, the discrepancy between public declarations and private assurances, and the

attempt to play Americans off against Filipinos were less the actions of slick operators or small-time conspirators than of a 'local elite' unsure of its fate.¹⁸ In its eyes, the Americans appeared to give way to the Filipinos, but even this was not definite, as the return of Leonard Wood seemed to portend.¹⁹

To describe *datu* collusion as opportunism is thus simplistic while an uncritical use of the collaboration-resistance dichotomy conceals rather than elucidates. It was only when Filipinization consolidated itself in Mindanao that these political ambiguities were clarified. Anti-Filipino and separatist sentiments steadily diminished in rhetoric and influence as more *datus* accepted Filipino rule (Kalaw 1931b). As the ranks of collaborators grew, a number of them began to stand out because of their decision to stake their claim with Filipinization.

These *datus* were the first to recognize the consolidation of the new order and to realize the potential of 'working within the system' — appointment to official positions from insular assembly seats down to village headmen, membership in the expanding 'national' parties and the forging of political and social ties with both Americans and Filipinos.²⁰ I refer here not only to the likes of the well-known Datu Piang and Senator Hadji Butu

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but also included in this group were those who became known because of Filipinization. Among the 'fresh faces' was Datu Sinsuat who rebuilt his following by using his position as tribal ward leader of Dinaig, Cotabato. There were also the 'nationalist sultans' of Lanao — Sultan Benito and Datus Tiburon, Dianalan, Nadankup

and Dimacota — and 'educated' leaders like Gulamu Rasul, Tarhata Kiram and the brothers Menandang and Ugalingan Piang.²¹ From their ranks rose the first generation of Muslim leaders who accepted that Mindanao was part of the Philippines and that its politics were inextricably linked to the larger political frame in Manila. It was this group that became known as the first 'Muslim-Filipinos'.

THE 'MUSLIM-FILIPINOS'

WHILE there was some overlap between the 'old' Muslim leaders and their successors, a generational and political shift unfolded as Filipinization

moved forward. Younger *datu*s set themselves apart from their predecessors — many of whom remained suspicious of Filipinization — by embracing the inevitability of southern Mindanao's integration into the Philippines. Having recognized the new condition, they also acknowledged the need to learn the new rules of the game, including the new requirements for being representatives of the 'Moro people'.

One way of appreciating these changes among the younger *datu*s is to look at their educational and political 'pilgrimages'. While many began with pedigreed origins and thus had substantial resources and power behind them, the next steps in their political and administrative journeys were closely linked to the colonial state. The opening up of schools and opportunities for higher education, in particular, were vital in the emergence of what Cesar Majul calls a 'group of young professionals who were generally co-opted by the powers that be' (Majul 1976).

The case of Ugalingan Piang, the second son of Cotabato's Datu Piang, is illustrative. Ugalingan was sent to public schools in Cotabato and Zamboanga and then to the Central Luzon Agricultural School in Manila where he earned a teacher's degree while showing 'signs of leadership'.²² He returned to Cotabato to become the principal of the Dulawan Elementary School, then became the head cashier of Settlement Colony 2. He was later appointed deputy provincial treasurer of Cotabato and auxiliary justice of the peace for the province. From there Ugalingan was sent back to Dulawan and appointed municipal president. This demotion was more than made up for by his appointment to the lower house of the Philippine legislature.²³

After his term, he was reappointed mayor of Dulawan and then elected as third member of the provincial board. In 1938, Piang was elected into the Philippine legislature, holding that position until World War II (Bautista 1939). He was reported to have been involved in separatist schemes during the 1920s, but once state positions began to come his way, it was clear where his intentions lay (Hayden 1926b, 1926c, 1926d).²⁴

The rise of the new Muslim leaders signified the thorough marginalization of the so-called 'traditional authority' that had distinguished the

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Muslims from the Filipinos. Not only did these new leaders depart from their predecessors' concern with preserving their precolonial power and prestige; they regarded being a *datu* as secondary to and supportive of the more important title of a colonial official.²⁵ These leaders had dual roles: both as leaders of their communities and representatives of the colonial state (Mastura 1984). The phenomenon that Muslim scholar Mamitua Saber (1974) described 40 years later could be traced back to this generation:

Through traditional ascription or inheritance, the same person who carries the title of the sultan, *datu*, etc., might at the same time be appointed or elected to state office as a governor, mayor, army officer, or a simple clerk. Such a leader holding a dual role or role-conflict bridges the relationship between the traditional community and the modern government, although such dual leadership is undocumented, or not formally recognized by the two authorities.... In this situation of culture-contact whereby a person assumes dual leadership between two separate societies and cultures, his role might be conceptualized as that of a "marginal leader" or double-agent of two kinds of authority system. Concrete examples of "marginal leaders" are those persons in Maranao society who carry the hyphenated titles of "sultan-mayor", "sultan-colonel", "sultan-clerk", "*sangkopan*-policeman", etc. Again these hyphenated titles are undocumented, nevertheless, the people recognize the authority of persons enacting dual leadership.

The *datu*s who staked all their claims with the colonial state began to catch up with the local 'elite' in the rest of the Philippines. They valued their positions as officials of the colonial state as much as other Filipinos did, recognizing the status that these offices brought them as local leaders and spokesmen of the 'Moro voice'. This pertained not only to the advantages of contacts with Filipino leaders, especially Quezon and Osmeña, but also to what the colonial state could offer them.²⁶ The benefits passed on to local power holders were considerably expanded by Filipino leaders seeking to consolidate their presence in the south.²⁷

The effort to gain access to the colonial state and its resources further differentiated these *datu*s from their predecessors. The Sultan of Sulu and Hadji Butu found working in Manila difficult and yearned to return to a time when they could enjoy the benefits of American rule in exchange for

their loyalty, imagining their status to rival that of, say, the Sultan of Johor.²⁸ On the other hand, Datu Sinsuat and Sultan Benito had no aspirations to be like Malay rulers. For them, being 'Representative', 'Senator', 'Deputy Governor', 'Municipal President', 'Captain', or 'Director' — all titles identified with the state — was the important thing. It was colonial politics that they regarded as the basis of their power, not the benefits and prerogatives of the *orang besar*. In aspiring to become the 'representatives' of their localities, they brought to a formal end southern Mindanao's precolonial ties with the 'Land below the Winds' and inaugurated a new Muslim relationship with the colonial state.²⁹

The formal 'national' debut of these leaders in the Philippine colonial arena appropriately came during the convention to formulate a Constitution for the Philippine Commonwealth. Several Muslim leaders were elected to the convention, led prominently by old supporters of Quezon but also including new faces like Cotabato's Menandang Piang and Blah Sinsuat and Lanao's Aluya Alonto (Hayden 1934a). In his first speech before the convention, Alonto (1935) implored his fellow delegates to stop referring to all Muslims as 'Moros'.

We do not like to be called "Moros" because when we are called "Moros" we feel that we are not considered as part of the Filipino people. You also know that the name "Moro" was given to us by the Spaniards because Morocco had been under the rule of Spain like Mindanao and Sulu. So that I would like to request the members of this Convention that we prefer to be called "Mohammedan Filipinos" and not "Moros", because if we are called "Moros" we will be considered as enemies, for the name "Moro" was given to us by the Spaniards because they failed to penetrate into the Island of Mindanao.

Alonto then proposed that a 'permanent and final solution' to the 'Moro problem' could only come by giving Mindanao its appropriate share of economic aid. By granting 'Mohammedan Filipinos' equal status with Filipinos 'under the constitution', beginning with the right to full suffrage, Alonto argued, the 'Moro problem' would eventually fade away. His speech was received with approval by Manila officials. Maximo Kalaw (1931b), adviser to Quezon and the first Filipino political scientist, proclaimed that with the recognition given by Alonto and his group to the con-

vention and their acceptance of their roles, Mindanao's integration was only a matter of time:

The Moro problem is being solved, silently and surely. Let foreigners not try to divorce the Moros from their Christian brothers, and the process will be faster. Independence will enhance a greater unity. In the words of Jose P Melencio, son-in-law of General Aguinaldo and for many years a representative in the Legislature of a Moro district, "A new Mindanao is even now emerging. It does not, and it need not stand in the way of freedom [from] the uncertainties of yesterday, the ramparts of a better order are there being constructed. On all sides evidence of a quickened existence [is] discernible. The cross and the crescent are not inconsistent there."

Alonto's speech was significant because it was the first admission by a Muslim leader that he was also Filipino. In demanding that they be referred to as 'Mohammedan Filipinos' (later 'Muslim-Filipinos') rather than 'Moros' (or, by extension, 'non-Christian tribes'), Alonto and others not only confirmed their acceptance of the new regime and its politics. They also conveyed the message that their participation must be underpinned by the special character of southern Mindanao communities. The

'Moro problem' could not be done away with simply by making Muslims politicians or citizens; it was still necessary to acknowledge a 'Muslim voice' within colonial politics.³⁰ This was how other leaders would make their pitch for a measure of 'autonomy' in the Muslim-dominated provinces. The Vice-President of the 'Sulu Mo-

hammedan Students Association' and Datu Balabaran Sinsuat proposed that given the 'political background', the 'peculiar makeup' and the 'long independent existence' of Muslim groups, granting Cotabato, Sulu, Lanao and Zamboanga some form of autonomy would ensure the 'advancement in the social and political fields' of Muslims 'through the fraternal guidance of their Christian brothers' (MT 1936a; PFP 1935a). In short, Muslims expressed their willingness to participate in the Filipinization process if they were allowed to retain their identity as 'Muslims' alongside being Fili-

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pinos. While none of these leaders cared to elaborate on the meaning of being Muslim, it was clear that religion was not foremost in their minds. Alonto, Ali and Sinsuat regarded religious difference not as an instrument of resistance but as a means of making their mark in colonial politics. Islam had become a vehicle to unite constituents and gave these leaders credentials as representatives of a specific sector involved in the integration process. Instead of a symbol of defiance to the state, Islam was now a rallying symbol to get more concessions through participation in colonial politics.

This recasting of Islam from a symbol of Moro opposition to a tool of colonial politics marked, in a certain sense, the success of two earlier projects of the American regime. The first was to colonize and control the Muslims but not convert them, as the Spanish had tried to do. This was a policy that the US army closely adhered to and which the Department of Mindanao and Sulu continued to implement (Malcolm 1936). Secondly, the Americans refused to allow religion to be handled by Islamic clerics, but instead designated it as the responsibility of *datus*.³¹ This move precluded the possibility of an alternative center of power emerging through an independent (and potentially radical) clergy. It also channeled Islamic sentiments away from the paths of resistance by delegating the guardianship of spiritual needs to Muslim leaders who had already made their peace with the colonial state.³²

According to *datus* the title of 'titular head[s] of the Mohammedan Church' further constrained the radical potential of Islam by limiting the right to invoke it to these Muslim leaders.³³ And with the emergence of a new generation of Muslim leaders who embraced their religious identity within politics, Islam's value became tied to political aspirations closely identified with the Filipinized colonial state. Islam had thus become an identifying mark distinguishing one set of politicians from another. I would suggest that it functioned for Muslims as other markers functioned for Filipino politicians who represented 'regional blocs' (northern Luzon or western Visayas), 'language groups' (the Cebuano alliance or the Ilocano bloc), or 'economic sectors' (farmers or labor).

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In constitutional or assembly deliberations, Alonto and his colleagues became defined as representatives of an 'interest group' that happened to have as one of its characteristics Islam as a religion. In recasting Islamic identity in this manner, both the colonial state and the 'Muslim-Filipino' leaders had found a way to further the integration of southern Mindanao. Following Alonto's declaration of fealty, local politics in the Muslim provinces began to resemble politics in other areas of the Philippines. There were conflicts over spoils of office that often hampered administration (MB 1934). Embryonic clan-based political battles took place in Muslim provinces as families fought for control over local offices, especially during, but not limited to, election times. Even armed showdowns between rival groups became a regular feature of local politics, making their first appearance in Cotabato in the 1940s.³⁴

In Sulu the election victory of Ombra Amilbansa over his rival Gulamu Rasul in the 1935 legislative elections was offset by Rasul's gaining the support of Manila leaders who installed him as 'special adviser' to the provincial government. Ombra protested that Rasul had been removing 'my political and personal friends and supporters' from their local positions through 'threats and coercion'.³⁵ He warned Quezon, Rasul's patron, that a breakdown of peace and order would likely ensue, forcing Quezon to accommodate the new leader while maintaining close ties with Rasul (Hayden 1936b). In Cotabato, the Piangs fought patronage battles with appointed officials as well. Menandang Piang accused the provincial governor, Dionisio Gutierrez, and two members of the provincial board 'of undue interference in the Commonwealth election campaign' by 'working for the candidacy of Senator Datu Sinsuat who is Piang's opponent for the assembly seat.' He denounced Gutierrez for using soldiers as election inspectors to ensure Sinsuat's victory.³⁶ The first of several factional battles with the Sinsuat family also became evident. Beckett (1977) describes these early clashes between the Sinsuats and Datu Piang's successors:

Until the 1930s all offices were appointive, so that advancement depended on the favor of the governor rather than ability to rally support. As long as he lived, Piang had first call on it, but he died in 1932 and his eldest son Abdullah, who had taken his place in the National Assembly, died a few months later. There were four other sons, well quali-

fied in terms of education to succeed, but they now had to compete with Sinsuat, son of Balabaran, who had stood second to Piang for some years. He already had some experience of national affairs when he was appointed senator in 1935.

These 'Muslim Filipinos' showed that they were learning the ropes of colonial politics. Even as they joined the Manila-based political parties, they also formed youth associations that articulated the 'Muslim voice' in Mindanao and Manila. The *Anak Sug* (Sons of Jolo) was established 'to enlighten the Moro youths along moral and religious lines, to lift the Moro youth from their ignorance, and to cooperate with the government in the maintenance of peace and order not only in the Sulu islands, but in the entire Mohammedan province of Mindanao'. Its real purpose was to be the vehicle for the 'political ambitions [of certain Sulu leaders for] the coming general elections' after 'the people of Sulu were... granted the right to elect the third member of the provincial board and the president of the city of Jolo' (PFP 1930). Its counterpart in Cotabato, the Association of Muslims, was purportedly created 'to act as the unofficial representative of our people at home, in order to protect their rights and interests, to help them realize the value of education, to inculcate in them the merits of cooperating with the leaders of Christian Filipinos in working for the common welfare of the country' (Hayden 1935a; Gopinath 1989).

The effectiveness of this new 'Muslim voice', however, depended on how the colonial government responded to it and whether its rhetoric and political posturing made a mark on its own constituents. In the next section, I will discuss the weaknesses of these new leaders, focusing on the response of the state to their rise to power and their objective limitations as the first Muslim-Filipino leaders.

LIMITS TO POWER

THE Commonwealth of the Philippines was established on 15 November 1935, with Manuel Quezon as its first president. For Quezon and his allies, this transition to eventual independence marked the apex of their struggle to gain control over the colonial state. Henceforth, with only counsel and occasional pressure from the US Resident Commissioner, Filipinos were left to govern the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth

period was also a time of considerable state centralization. Quezon was not only content to achieve full Filipino control of the government; he was also bent on dominating colonial politics through a shrewd use of his powers as paramount leader of the Nacionalista Party and as president of the new regime.

The Commonwealth was described by Joseph Ralston Hayden as developing 'a natural impulse towards "totalitarianism"' of which Quezon was the embodiment (McCoy 1989). Hayden further observed that the early years of the Commonwealth were 'marked by the continuation of the trend towards a one-party, one-man political system and the appearance of a substantial, although not well-organized minority of discontented, economically depressed people who were outside of the system and strongly opposed it.'³⁷ Quezon's attitude toward the Muslim provinces reflected this impulse. He used policies from the Department of Mindanao and Sulu era, such as the appointment of representatives and provincial or municipal administrators, to place trusted lieutenants in power. Quezon was unequivocal about his intention of exercising effective authority over southern Mindanao, and these officials were to do his bidding.³⁸

Yet, he did not limit himself to appointing allies. Quezon reorganized the way in which Manila administered the Moro provinces (Hayden 1934b). Upon the recommendation of Teofisto Guingona, Quezon abolished the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and replaced it with a cabinet-level Commission of Mindanao and Sulu (Hayden 1935b).³⁹ The Commission was to oversee the economic development of Mindanao and the full civilianization of provincial and local personnel. Its other responsibility was the 'removal from all *datus* and local Mohammedan officials of all official recognition' under the Commonwealth.⁴⁰ This third policy was similar to that enunciated by the Americans under the Moro Province and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, but under Quezon the control was tighter. Quezon vowed to accelerate the economic development of Mindanao for the benefit of its people and of the larger Commonwealth (Malcolm 1936). He declared that the Commonwealth was 'resolved to conserve Mindanao for ourselves and our posterity, [and so] we must bend all our efforts to occupy [sic!] and develop it and guard it against avarice and greed' (Quezon 1936).⁴¹ The Commission was therefore viewed as a development agency with enough centralized power to ensure the success of the

Commonwealth's 'colonization program' as well as its agricultural and mineral development plans in Mindanao (Rodriguez 1938; MB 1936a; MT 1936b).

The Muslims and other indigenous groups were cast in these plans as supporting players, with the issue of their integration expected to resolve itself as progress spread in their communities (Kasilag 1938).⁴² In a summation of his position, Quezon reaffirmed the policy in 1938 that only elected or appointed officers were legitimate leaders of municipalities, not sultans or *datus*. He likewise reiterated his disapproval of dual authority among Muslims brought about by the continued existence of sultans and *datus*. Speaking to Muslim representatives, Quezon (1938) 'recognized the title the people before him have as sultans but added that such a title was only expressive of a social distinction and not in any way representing official authority.' Also

he added that the only authority recognized by the government is the authority created by law and the only officials are those who have been officially vested with such authority. Recognizing... that most of the people before him were municipal mayors, Quezon [then] appealed to them to exercise their authority as such in their respective municipalities and proclaimed that he depends on them to carry out the policies of the government. [Quezon] also stated his intention to govern them saying that there is no reason why they need not be governed as Christian Filipinos are governed.

The secondary role accorded the Muslims was most apparent in the sphere of governance. Promises to open more offices and expand 'non-Christian' rights did not stop Quezon from maintaining a Filipino majority, prompting Muslims to complain that Filipinization was not synonymous with 'Moroization'.⁴³ Muslims also remained a minority among members of the provincial governments. Filipinization 'at the expense of Moro aspirations' continued, with provincial and municipal offices given to Filipinos over Muslims (Pelzer 1945). In Cotabato province alone, Filipinos dominated Muslims by a ratio of two to one, with Muslims achieving parity only at the district level (Hayden 1925). Quezon remained suspicious of the Muslims, not easily forgetting their shifting loyalty during the Wood period (Forbes 1928). In a private memorandum to the Secretary of Interior,

Quezon was categorical about his intention to erode the powers of the *datus*:

It has been my opinion that the weakness in the policy heretofore adopted by the government...in dealing with the Mohammedan Filipinos or Moros in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago is to give some sort of recognition to the *datus* so that they have become in practice *ex-officio* officials of the government.... This policy must be stopped and changed radically. It gives the impression that there is a dual government for the Moros — one exercised by the appointed or elected officials of the government, and the other by the *datus* and sultans. It perpetuates the overlordship exercised throughout the ages by these *datus* and sultans over their *sacup*, who continue to be, in fact, slaves of their sultans and *datus* as they were under the Spanish regime. The government is duty-bound to protect the common people in the Moroland, as much as it is bound to protect the common people in the provinces and regions of the Philippines, from the control and exploitation of those Moros and Christian Filipinos, whether they be called sultans, *datus*, leaders or *hacenderos*, or *caciques* who would exploit or abuse them (Hayden 1937).

Quezon's prejudice towards Muslim leaders may have been fostered by the marginal role that Mindanao and the Muslims played in his political considerations. With the Americans acknowledging that Mindanao was part of the Philippines and the success of the integration program of the Commonwealth, there was less reason to devote political attention to

Mindanao and the Muslims than in the earlier periods.⁴⁴ Moreover, while Muslim-Filipinos were indeed becoming involved in colonial politics, they were still regarded as minor actors and novices.⁴⁵ As token representatives of a 'non-Christian group', they had little to offer the political parties. The Muslim provinces made no substantial contribution to the economy, nor did they have

a substantial voting constituency that merited the politicians' attention.

The stipulation placed on elections in the 'special provinces' further restricted the already-limited exercise of suffrage. Voting was not only

While Muslim-Filipinos were becoming involved in colonial politics, they were still regarded as minor actors and novices.

stricted to municipal officials, but only two provincial positions were elective — the Philippine Assembly representative and the provincial board member. The locus of politics then was very much confined to the provincial level. Even an elected assemblyman would be more concerned with cultivating his ties among municipal district officials than establishing connections with Manila leaders.⁴⁶ To someone like Quezon, however, such networks were peripheral, especially in the later years of the Commonwealth when he was engrossed in consolidating his power in Manila, preparing for eventual independence, and becoming occupied with a rising Japanese power.

Finally, Muslim leaders were hampered by their own limitations. As colonial politics progressed, it became clear that for a Muslim leader to participate in the deliberations at the convention or assembly required not only rhetorical prowess. It also demanded the analytic sophistication associated with formal education. Despite the Alontos and the Sinsuats, the new generation of leaders were still drawn from a very small pool. Public education in the Muslim provinces was largely confined to the primary school level.⁴⁷ Of the 37 Muslim scholars sent to Manila in 1935, for example, only five were in the liberal arts, while two enlisted for law-related degrees and six majored in education. The rest were either high school students or were specializing in agriculture, trade, business and commerce, medicine and nursing, nautical engineering, and/or vocational-related disciplines (Hayden 1935c). The few who advanced to the tertiary level received mainly a vocational education, which graduated teachers and even small entrepreneurs but hardly what Carpenter (1917) described as 'the men constituting the controlling factor for or against peace and order under whatever may then be the constituted government'.⁴⁸ Such a limited pool of prospective politicians reinforced the political insignificance of the 'Muslim-Filipinos'. Thus, while they may have succeeded in supplanting their elders as the new authority in the Muslim provinces, the 'Muslim-Filipinos' had to wait until the postwar period before they attained the stature of 'national' political players.

CONCLUSION

IT was the finality of Filipinization that prompted various responses from

Muslim leaders. Some acknowledged the new order, while others resisted it. Some adjusted to it while attempting to preserve whatever autonomy they had retained. Still others attempted to postpone the inevitable by playing off the more powerful Filipinos and Americans against each other. In the end, weakened by army occupation but also divided by their relationship to the colonial center, these leaders made peace with the new order and chose to integrate. In doing so, they also redefined the relationship between the various Muslim groups and the colonial state.

During this transitional period, the contemporary prosaic term 'Muslim-Filipino' appeared, articulated consciously by those Muslim *datus* who had come to accept as their political arena the agencies, institutions and offices opened to them by the colonial authorities. The transition, however, also had to do with people. As the Philippines neared the eve of World War II, the first generation of Muslim leaders was aging and being replaced by a new one. This process of 'succession' occupied the entire colonial period. Thus, while a 'Muslim voice' in Philippine politics was taking shape, its corporeality and even power were still in their infancy. Not only was the new generation still numerically small, it was also incompletely accustomed to the new politics.

In 1933, Vice-Governor Joseph Ralston Hayden received a letter from Edward Kuder, Education Superintendent for Lanao, introducing a young Magindanao named Salipada Pendatun 'whom you met then aboard the SS *Islas Filipinas* and now desires to pay his respects to you.' Kuder added: 'He is studying at the University of the Philippines' (Hayden 1933a & 1933b). Pendatun would have to wait for a decade before he could become one of the leading Muslim *politicos*. The groundwork, however, had been laid. World War II interrupted this growth but only temporarily. It would be in the postwar period when Aluya Alonto's dreams of recognition as 'Mohammedan' and 'Filipino' are fully realized.

NOTES

1. Datu Mandi of Zamboanga was asked about the possible Muslim response if the Moro Province were to be administered directly by Manila and by Filipinos, and his response was quite revealing: 'As I look about, I see far more Moros than the Filipino contingent, and if that is so, that is the reason it is called the Moro Province.... If the American government does not want the Moro Province any more they should give it back to us. It is a Moro Prov-

ince. It belongs to us' (Gowing 1983, emphasis added).

2. On the idea of pilgrimage, see Anderson (1991).

3. Documentation by the Americans of past and present 'crimes and transgressions' meant that charges could be filed against *datus* at any time, putting them, in the words of Cameron Forbes (1928), 'in a position practically [like] that of prisoners on parole.' Forbes added: 'If they behaved themselves and assisted the government in breaking up piracy, cattle thieving and crimes of violence, they enjoyed in effect an amnesty for past offenses.'

4. Many Muslims regarded their relationship to the Americans as intimate and personal; their loyalties rarely went beyond their immediate superiors. The only exception may be Muslim deference to Leonard Wood as a result of his frequent visits to the districts, see Elarth (1991). Muslims were said to be ecstatic about the return of Wood because he renewed his close ties with them (Thomas 1971).

5. In 1917 there was an attempt by a Datu Ambag to attack the Constabulary station in Cotabato. This was repulsed by the military with the assistance of other *datus* (PFP 1917b). In 1923, Datu Santiago of Parang (Cotabato) fought government troops in protest against the head tax (*cedula*) and 'constabulary abuses and exploitation by school authorities'. Santiago's revolt was the most potent in the period, especially after he joined forces with another indigenous group, the Tirurays, and some *datus* near his area. He eventually surrendered. There were also reports of *cotta* opposition and 'messianic movements' vowing to 'overthrow the American government' in Lanao. These were also suppressed by the Constabulary (MT 1937a; Tan 1993).

6. See the petition of Jolo *datus*, 'except the Sultan of Sulu', to the American government requesting the annexation of the 'territory occupied by the Moros and to give them a permanent government by Americans' (Forbes 1928). See also Glang (1969).

7. See the petition prepared by a 'Committee of Petitions and Communications' that was part of a 'Declaration of Rights and Purposes' allegedly signed by various Muslim leaders warning of 'bloodshed and disorder' if Mindanao was not kept separate from the Philippines (Tan 1993).

8. See, for example, 'Letter of Datus M Guiambangan, Hadji Pasandalan, H Nor Usup, Hadji Mukamad Nor Hadji, Amado, Kulabug Sungka, Kamendan Pandita, Datu Kali to the Governor-General, 15 May 1934' (Hayden 1934c). Muslim leaders even attempted to emulate the Filipino practice of sending 'missions' to the United States to lobby for their cause. Datu Piang and his son Abdullah employed the services of an American, Sunset Cox, to form the 'Moro Commission on Separate Government'. Abdullah, who appointed himself 'Chairman' of this commission and Cox, who styled himself 'Publicity Manager' of the Commission, issued a declaration, 'The Moro Voice — A Call to Arms for Islam and your Country', to inspire sympathetic Muslims and Americans to donate to a 'Muslim-fi-

nanced mission to the US by 20 January 1927.' Nothing apparently came out of the mission (Hayden 1926a).

9. Quezon always warned that 'another insurrection is pending' in times of disagreement (Philippine Policy 1939).

10. Nothing was said about Tahil's followers. Without their *datu*, they most likely dispersed.

11. On the *orang besar* or Malay strongmen of prowess, see Wolters (1982). Wolters' observation was 'confirmed' by Philippine scholars like Mednick (1965) who noted that among the Maranaos, a group closely related to the Magindanaos, 'neither leader nor led were automatically fixed in their relationship to the political system by birth. An individual could change the political group and a group could change its relationship to the hierarchy either in the physical or social sense.'

12. The Sultan of Sulu went to the extent of extolling how 'civilized' the Filipinos had become under American rule, suggesting that they were worthy of Muslim emulation (PFP 1914b). Gowing's assessment: 'Some Moro leaders [had] assessed the situation realistically ("if you can't beat them, join them") and had thrown their support behind the Philippine Independence Movement' (Gowing 1983).

13. Those attracted by colonialism's potential for progress included village 'philanthropists' like Datu Ganza, who was paying for the matriculation of forty Muslim children; Sultan Malacao, who, like Datu Piang, offered to pay for schoolbuilding repairs and construction; and Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who equated progress with Filipino leaders like Quezon. On Ganza, see PFP (1916c); on Sultan Malacao, PFP (1916d); and on Kiram, PFP (1933).

14. Like his father — Hadji Butu, Hadji Gulamu Rasul was Deputy Governor of Sulu at the age of twenty-two, spoke English and lived with Christian Filipinos in Zamboanga. Both men were the quintessential 'opportunists at least to the extent that they took advantage of all situations which offered enhancement of their personal power.' Hadji Gulamu Rasul became Justice of the Peace in Sulu and used his control over the *agama* (religious) courts to regain power and influence in Sulu politics (Thomas 1971).

15. When Forbes 'twitted' Senator Hadji Butu for such tendency, Butu was said to reply that 'he favored the Filipinos being given their independence on the condition that American suzerainty was retained in the south' (Fry 1978). Gumbay Piang was also mentioned to be sharing this position (Thomas 1971).

16. Piang was described as being put in 'a difficult position to fill, just as in the old fighting days, when he was on the surface our friend and beneath the surface the friend of the Moros who were out' (Hagedorn 1969).

17. One openly pro-Filipino *datu*, for example, was Abundo Enrile, described as 'a half-Moro' who campaigned against full suffrage to southern Mindanao and favored appointing Christian-Filipinos to most, if not all, of the local offices in the special provinces (MB 1916).

18. Listen to Datu Piang: 'But year after year, slowly, they have given the Christian Filipinos more power over us. Their laws are too complicated for us; the Moros need a simple government. Our own is more simple, ours are laws that have been handed down from father to son for many centuries. My sons have told me [about] one of the bills presented to Congress by Mr Bacon of New York. They tell me that this is to separate Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan from the rest of the Philippines. That would be better. Perhaps not the best solution but better than present conditions. Our hearts are heavy just now' (Hayden 1926a).

19. Again Datu Piang exemplifies this 'shifting' in a letter to US President Calvin Coolidge: 'After our mastery by the Americans, we expected to be ruled by them. This was vouchsafed and promised us. To that end, there was set up by your able military commanders a government simple, clear of understanding and suited to our position and condition. The Moros were a large part of the government. Enforcement of its edicts was by Americans assisted by Moros. All was moving well when suddenly it was decreed from Washington and Manila that "the government was to be changed for one complex in organization", "soothing" in its operation, "effective in its results" [the intent in Washington apparently was not to the detriment of the Moros]. And from Manila, it has been carried out in a manner the most humiliating to the Moros, he believes, ever imposed by a great power upon a loyal and helpless people. Early there swarmed over our country, under the aegis of the American flag, buttressed by bayonets [who never dared come otherwise] an array of Filipino officeholders, herein the "soothingness" of the law — to pluck the now helpless Moros and pressing closely in their wake of civilians, all equally indifferent of our welfare and equally greedy of spoils. Remote was the dream of the Moros from degradation, to extortion, he was soon to become the victim' (Hayden 1927).

20. The Manila media referred to them as the 'pro-independence *datu*' (MB 1926 & 1931a; PH 1931). This group became prominent during the Bacon Bill debates.

21. See Carpenter (1917), MB (1931a & 1931b), and MT (1931) for a description of some of these personalities.

22. Piang was sent to Central Luzon Agricultural School with Samama Inuk (son of Datu Piang's son-in-law Datu Inuk). There they studied 'trade and exchange' and English. According to one account, Piang was 'the most advanced' among the Cotabato students (PFP 1917c).

23. As Assemblyman, Piang was described by a hagiographer as having transformed Dulawan from a municipal district to a first class regular municipality (Bautista 1939).

24. In Manila, Piang dabbled in Christianity and even thought of becoming a Christian (PFP 1919a). Piang was not alone. There was also Samoan Afdal, son of a 'legal adviser' and interpreter for Datu Piang, who went to Cotabato High School and was admitted to the Constabulary Military

Academy in Baguio City (Hayden 1934d).

25. As Horn (1941) observed: 'The Sultanate [was] deprived of all its ancient powers, [and] now identified itself with modern politics and thereby keeps a puny kind of temporal power.'

26. An example would be the promise of the new US High Commissioner for a 'New Deal for the Moros'. See 'Message of His Excellency, Governor-General Frank Murphy to the Philippine Legislature in its Final Session, 14 November 1935' in *The First Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands* (1937).

27. As JP Laurel (1930) pointed out, 'the form of government of a regular and special province is substantially the same, the only main difference being that in the latter there is more centralization in point of administrative control because some of the officials are appointive and because they are, to some extent, dependent for funds upon the Insular Government. The policy of the government is to convert the special provinces into regular provinces as soon as it is found that they could be more or less self-supporting and that their inhabitants are of sufficient culture to enable them to select wisely their own local officials.'

28. On the 'alienation' of the old *datus* when in Manila and American derision of their performance, see Elliot (1917).

29. The term 'Land below the Winds' referred to the Southeast Asian regional trading network that thrived during the 'precolonial' period and survived even the efforts of the various colonial powers to eliminate it by carving their own territorial — and narrower — niches (Reid 1988).

30. As the American provincial governor of Lanao put it: 'There is a Moro Problem and a Moro point of view and it is our aim to give the Moro people more than justice in our relations with them' (Hayden 1934e).

31. Harrison refused to allow an Islamic teacher from the Ottoman Empire to practice in Sulu (Thompson 1975).

32. There are echoes of British colonial administration of Malaya here, although the Americans disallowed the creation of religious bureaucracies.

33. The 1915 agreement between the Sultan of Sulu and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu included the recognition of the former as spiritual leader of the Sulu archipelago (Gowing 1983).

34. See the armed encounter between Datus Andung, Manlaba and Kagui Sampulna (a close relative of Datu Sinsuat Balabaran) on one side and Moros Alim, Zacarias, Guiwan, Kansai and Ali (sons of the late Sultan Mastura) on the other, which ended with three killed. According to one news report: 'The trouble started when Moro Madsig, whose protector Moro Abbas belonged to the Mastura faction, was slapped in the face allegedly by Datu Untung Balabaran, a brother of the former assemblyman. Informed of the incident by his son Duma, the former solon (Datu Sinsuat Balabaran) sent one of his brothers and some cousins and nephews to Abbas to disarm the latter and in that way prevent the encounter. The parties, armed with daggers

and revolvers, met in a road leading to the house of the ex-assemblyman and after a brief exchange of heated arguments, started to fight' (MB 1940).

35. Ombra's father was the Sultan/Senator Jamalul Kiram (Hayden 1936a).

36. Rodriguez denied the charges and was exonerated by Quezon, but the enmity had already been established (MT 1935; PH 1935b).

37. Hayden (1942) added: 'In a country where the opposition is badly underrepresented or, as at present, entirely unrepresented in the legislature; where nine-tenths of the provincial and municipal officials are members of the dominant party; and where the government is as strong traditionally and actually as it is in the Philippines, the minority of the people is peculiarly in need of constitutional protection against the hasty or arbitrary acts of the majority....Once the restraining and stabilizing authority of the United States is withdrawn from the Philippines, a too rigid Constitution might be merely an invitation to illegality rather than a bulwark against arbitrary political action.'

38. Declared Quezon (1936): 'The so-called Moro Problem is a thing of the past. We are giving our Mohammedan brethren the best government they have ever had and we are showing them our devoted interest in their welfare and advancement.' See 'Message of His Excellency, President Manuel L. Quezon, to the First National Assembly, on its First Session, 16 June 1936,' Speeches, Interviews, Statements, Reports and Proceedings, Series VII, Manuel L. Quezon Papers, Box No. 83. See also Quezon (1940).

39. Quezon appointed Guingona acting Commissioner and Ciriaco Raval (deputy director to Guingona) as assistant to the Commissioner. The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was abolished by Quezon with the signing of the Mindanao Act (MB 1936b). Marcial Kasilag replaced Guingona when he retired a year later (MB 1937a).

40. After initial confusion over the powers of the new Commission, Commonwealth Act 75 clarified the extent to which it could exercise its authority (MB 1937b; MT 1937b; PH 1937).

41. Commonwealth planners saw Mindanao as the 'Reservoir of Big Enterprises' and proposed the development of the island's transportation system (MB 1937c; Maxey 1938).

42. Again Quezon (1936): 'Let us reserve for [the non-Christians] in their respective localities such land of the public domain as they may need for their well-being. Let us, at the same time, place in the unoccupied lands of that region industrious Filipinos from other provinces of the Archipelago, so that they may live together in perfect harmony and brotherhood.'

43. See, for example, the Quezon-supported proposal of Representatives Tomas Cabili (Lanao) and Romualdo Quimpo (Davao) 'providing that the election of the members of the national assembly for Lanao, Cotabato and Sulu shall be by popular vote' (MT 1936c).

44. The colonization program and a proposal to settle European Jews in

Cotabato and Bukidnon did generate public attention, but these came late in the Commonwealth period when Quezon was more concerned with the independence issue and Japan.

45. Stories revealing Muslim ignorance of the ways and means of law-making only reinforced the prevailing view of the amateurish participation of these leaders (Thomas 1971). An exception appeared to be Hadji Butu who seemed to enjoy proposing one bill after another, albeit with very little success of passage (PFP 1916e, 1917a & 1917c).

46. And rightly so, as Menandang Piang found out in the 1935 elections when municipal district officers voted him out of office in favor of Datu Sinsuat Balabaran (Gowing 1983). If Manila ever figured in a Muslim assemblyman's calculations, it was as a way of enhancing his prestige among his wards by showing he had appropriate connections. See, for example, the case of Hadji Butu in Alpad-Gopez (1985-86).

47. And was itself undergoing difficulty as Muslims continued to suspect the public school system of being a cover for religious conversion. In fact, public school attendance dropped steadily after the Commonwealth was established (Bentley 1989).

48. An exception was Ugalingan Piang who was sent to the Central Luzon School of Arts and Trade to enrich his training in 'trade and exchange', but who ended up in politics (PFP 1917c). While the government handed out scholarships to talented young Muslims for '*la educacion y la formacion del caracter*', only a few chose to specialize in degrees leading to a political career (PFP 1916f & 1919b).

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