

The Philippine Overseas Employment Program: Public Policy Management from Marcos to Ramos

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Over the last 25 years, the profound importance of labor out-migration from the Philippines has been a major public policy concern for the country's bureaucrats and politicians. The intent has always been to regulate and at best to manage and coordinate the numerous impacts and implications of this phenomenon.

This paper tries to illustrate how the historical evolution of the country's labor out-migration program over the course of two and a half decades led to a policy to deregulate the overseas employment sector and to encourage the activities of private recruitment entities. The official program and policy responses to manage the phenomenon of overseas employment from the Marcos to the Ramos administrations typify the conduct of the country's overseas employment strategy.

The first part of the paper discusses the historical underpinnings behind the current overseas employment program. It describes the historical background for the adoption and conduct of the overseas employment program from the Marcos to the Ramos

administrations, describing the mission and mandate that impel both the program and the policy to export Filipino labor. The second part of the paper illustrates the significant policy shifts and reversals in much of the government's efforts to manage and regulate labor out-migration from the Philippines. Our policy experiences, from Marcos to Ramos, illustrate government's efforts to grapple with the influence of the private sector, including the magnitude of its participation, in the conduct of the overseas employment program.

Introduction

Overseas employment is a phenomenon that has captured popular imagination not only in the Philippines but in most other developing countries as well. Throughout much of the country's 25 years of experience with overseas labor migration, there have been numerous efforts to regulate and at best, to manage and coordinate the numerous impacts and implications brought about by this phenomenon through various government policies.

Alegado (1997) contends that there are two aspects crucial to the conduct of the country's overseas employment program. The first is the predominance of bureaucratic and administrative state apparatuses set up to facilitate and carry out the labor out-migration policy and the second is the pervasive existence of private recruitment agencies, considered to be an important partner as well as player, in the labor out-migration experience of the country.¹

The magnitude of transnational mobility, particularly of labor, can certainly be a serious challenge for national authorities in both sending and receiving areas. 1995 estimates of the number of workers within Asia employed in a country other than their own were between six to seven million, earning no less than US\$ 20 billion annually.² Additionally, the phenomenon has reached the point where an entire "industry" has emerged over the decades to sustain and intensify the flows of people across borders. Each year, countless recruitment agencies, labor brokers and employment service institutions in both sending and receiving areas earn millions of dollars in revenues paid for by migrant workers and their families.

This paper intends to illustrate how the historical evolution of the country's labor out-migration program has led to a policy to deregulate the overseas employment sector. It further demonstrates the complexity of the official program and policy responses to the phenomenon of overseas employment from the Marcos to the Ramos administrations and describes the fundamental principles that typify the conduct of the country's overseas employment strategy.

Much has already been said and studied in regard to the period under consideration, especially up to the Ramos administration.³ In spite of this, the paper hopes to provide further insight on the propagation of policies that regulate (or deregulate) the overseas employment sector, a subject rarely touched upon by earlier studies. The Ramos administration served as a crucial turning point in the labor out-migration program since this is when government began to seriously institutionalize efforts to provide a comprehensive management and regulation policy on overseas employment.

For this study, the overseas employment sector refers to the different business and social networks involved in the selection, procurement, hiring, deployment, employment and return of migrant workers from the country of employment to the country of residence. In the Philippines, the operational significance of this sector is that it mainly involves the activities of private business entities and other welfare and service providers or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the study, recruitment activities refer to the operations of private employment agencies and recruitment entities including shipping or manning agents licensed for such activities by the government.

Stakeholders are key interest groups and sectors involved in overseas employment and are divided into two major groups — those associations of business entities which encourage labor out-migration (e.g., associations of recruitment agencies, service contractors and exporters) and those involved with voluntary associations that support and protect the welfare of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). The stakeholders referred to in this study are not just the private business entities and other service providers but also include the associations of migrant workers and migrant support groups or NGOs. However, this paper is limited only to a discussion of the historical contexts in which these many stakeholders function.

Throughout this study, deregulation refers to the process of reducing and eventually eliminating government regulation, monitoring and control of certain economic and social functions. This paper presumes that deregulation is undertaken to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency and equity in governance relative to what a government-regulated environment can provide. Another term for deregulation used in the study is encouraging entrepreneurship or enterprise management. The operational understanding of deregulation is confined to that of the recruitment and deployment activities concerning the overseas employment sector. More specifically, the operationalization of the concept of deregulation can be found in Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

The first half discusses the historical underpinnings for formulating and adopting the overseas employment program. It describes the historical background for the adoption and conduct of the overseas employment program from the Marcos to the Ramos administrations, describing the mission and mandate that impel both the program and the policy to export Filipino labor.

The second half illustrates the significant policy shifts and even reversals in much of the government's efforts to manage and regulate labor out-migration from the Philippines. In the beginning, the policy action taken was to nationalize the overseas employment sector and to limit private sector participation (if not eliminate it altogether). As soon as the policy decision was made in 1975, it was immediately reversed in 1978. Private recruitment entities and intermediaries became crucial players in the overseas employment program. In early 1982, there was an effort to restrict the participation of the private entities due to reports of rampant illegal recruitment activities. The policy decision was reversed gradually until 1991 when the issuance of new licenses was again allowed. Such a policy experience illustrates government's efforts to grapple with the influence of the private sector, including the magnitude of its participation, in the conduct of the overseas employment program.

Labor Out-Migration From the Philippines: A Century Thence

The country's labor out-migration experience at the turn of the 20th century predominantly featured low-skilled contract agricultural workers from Northern

Philippines (the Ilocos region) who initially migrated to the sugar and pineapple plantations of Hawaii.⁴ Later, during the 1920s and 1930s, the movement shifted a bit toward the mainland United States, in particular to its farm belt, and spread farther to include even the fish canneries in Alaska. Initially intending to work abroad only on a short-term basis, the option to return among these Filipino migrants became slimmer through their years of stay in the US.⁵ Eventually, what had started out as an intended short-term stay was inevitably transformed into a significant form of permanent migrant settlement.

By the beginning of World War II, there was a sizeable Filipino community in the continental United States characterized mainly by their employment in the non-technical, low wage and low productivity agricultural work sector. The fascinating feel and flavor of that period is most evident in the hard and often desperate struggles of Filipino workers to establish labor unions (and to some extent, their identities as Americans) in the so-called land of their dreams. Their struggles are best captured in Carlos Bulosan's *America is in the Heart*.

After the Second World War, many Filipinos, especially the veterans, sought US citizenship and eventually settled there. It was also during the immediate post-WWII period up to the early 1970s that (a) family members of earlier migrants and (b) professional workers from the Philippines began to migrate abroad.⁶ The destinations of Filipino professional migrants also diversified somewhat to include parts of Europe and North America (e.g., Canada) as well as Australia. Throughout this period, however, the US remained a major destination for permanent Filipino immigrants.

The 1970s saw a shift in the migratory phenomenon from permanent out-migration (emigration) to temporary labor or contractual migration. The migration pattern had, in effect, come full circle relative to its beginnings at the turn of the 20th century. Initially called the OCWs or overseas contract workers, labor out-migrants from the Philippines during this time went mainly to the Gulf countries – their numbers increasing from some 36,000 in 1975 to almost 700,000 by 1991. This kind of migration persisted aside from the regular permanent emigration that took place.

But while there continued to be a substantial increase in the flow of these OFWs to the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf region, by the second half of the 1980s, however, the trend had begun to show significant decline. Since 1984, the rate of labor deployments to West Asia or the Middle East, and particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had become erratic and eventually declined even as the actual number of deployments increased over the same period.

In turn during this period, there was an appreciable increase in demand for foreign labor in a number of newly industrialized economies (NIEs) within the Asia-Pacific region. Correspondingly, there was an increase in the migration flow towards other so-called alternative labor markets (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore) within the Asia-Pacific region itself. The Asian market share of total processed and deployed workers rose steadily and significantly from only 1.29 percent in 1983 to 16.48 percent by 1984, rising to almost 25 percent by 1989 and 1990. At the turn of the 21st century, the labor migration flows are much more diverse and intense with Filipinos working in over 120 areas worldwide, their jobs affecting countless others in the Philippines economically, socially and politically. This is so despite the most serious regional financial crisis to hit Asia that started in 1997.

Between 1915 and 1974, Philippine labor out-migration was generally managed by way of the provisions of Philippine Act 2486 of 1915. Among other things, the Act required recruitment entities to pay a tax amounting to P500 (around US\$250 at the time since the exchange rate remained at US\$1.00 to PP2.00 during the Commonwealth Period) annually to the provincial authorities where they operated (i.e., recruited and contracted workers for foreign jobs) as well as a license fee of P6,000 (about US\$3,000 at the time) to the national government. Indeed, the principal aim of the Act was for government to benefit from the lucrative employment of Filipinos in Hawaii, Alaska and elsewhere.⁷ The same Act, however, also contained a number of work-related provisions and amendments. It prohibited the recruitment of minors less than 15 years of age while those aged 18 were required to show parental consent.⁸ The Act did not allow the recruitment of ethno-religious (non-Christian) groups for exhibition purposes. It obliged recruiters to make sure the workers they recruited were provided return passage upon completion of their contracts or who proved to be unfit to continue work due to physical incapacity.⁹

The Governance of Contemporary Labor Out-Migration in the Philippines

By the early 1970s, the Philippines was increasingly confronted with numerous problems and challenges pertaining to its manner of economic and political governance. Some of the more notable of these challenges were the rising unemployment and underemployment and the ballooning foreign debt. Such adverse circumstances were compounded by the problems posed by the growing Communist insurgency at the time as well as the burgeoning Muslim secessionist movement. The Marcos administration, therefore, was in desperate need of a development approach that had immediate social and economic appeal. That approach took the form of a labor export policy.

Due to numerous factors, the domestic labor market seemed unable to cope with the growing number of persons entering the workforce each year. By the middle of the 1970s, a convergence occurred between the internal situation and the external environment. As a result of increased revenues from oil exports by West Asia or the Middle East in the aftermath of the oil crisis, large infrastructure development projects were initiated by the governments in the region. However, these countries that benefited from the oil boom were seriously lacking in required human resources and technology. Consequently, there emerged a large demand for imported labor in these countries to work on infrastructure projects. This situation eventually created and fueled the growing and continuing demand for foreign workers.

Marcos and Labor Export

As a result of the rapid expansion of the overseas labor market beginning in the middle of the 1970s and given the country's pressing domestic situation, authorities in the Philippines earnestly pursued a policy to promote the large-scale overseas deployment of the country's highly qualified but underutilized labor force. The arrival at the decision to engage in the active export of labor was partly driven by a public perception that "greener pastures" were forthcoming abroad and mainly by a technocratic system of governance. Numerous Filipinos have always considered other possible destinations as an alternative to staying in the Philippines. One

major option has always been the United States. By the latter half of the 1970s, the West Asian region became another likely alternative, particularly for those intending to work abroad temporarily. Moreover, under Marcos, the policy approach, discourse and crafting process were basically dictated by the authoritarian politico-administrative system.¹⁰ The convergence at the domestic level was also clearcut. There was a large (and growing) section of the population discontented with the local situation and a government that wanted to dissipate this discontent by projecting a possible alternative, i.e., overseas employment.

The policy to formally export the country's labor resources began with the ratification of the Philippine Labor Code of 1974 by virtue of Presidential Decree 442 and the creation of appropriate mechanisms and institutions to facilitate overseas employment.¹¹ The Philippines under Marcos initially attempted a corporate style strategy of exporting Filipino labor similar to what the Koreans did, while at the same time encouraging private sector participation. In fact, part of the original intent of the Code contained provisions that "almost blocked out participation of the private sector by mandating the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB) and the National Seamen Board (NSB) responsible for market development, recruitment and placement, and securing the best possible terms for Filipino workers".¹²

Aquino and the Democratic Process

Despite the accession to power of a new political administration under Corazon Aquino, the policy to encourage labor out-migration continued. Moreover, much of the systems and programs concerning overseas employment management initiated and maintained during the Marcos administration (e.g., the POEA and the Welfare Fund) were retained except for a few minor alterations in practice. Along with the continued and heightened deployments came a rise in reported cases of abuse of migrants, especially women.

One significant change in the conduct of the overseas employment program is in the decision-making process that now allowed for a more inclusive participation through the greater involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other representatives of migrants. Consultative meetings became a key feature of

the Aquino administration. Under Marcos, there was great reliance on the expertise of technocrats. With Aquino, there was a greater reliance on legislators and the opening up of the democratic space to civil society groups through popular consultations. The processes of decision-making now became open to basic sectors, including the migrants themselves.

Capitalizing on the “people power” principle of the Aquino administration, civil society groups became more critical of government.¹³ Not surprisingly, there was also greater emphasis on welfare protection and promotion, especially in the context of the increasing number of women migrants abroad.

Additionally, however, the Aquino administration also sought to further streamline the administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms that were responding to the phenomenon of overseas employment. During the time of Marcos and even up to the early years of the Aquino administration, there were “rivalries” and “turfing” problems among the many agencies of the government involved in managing overseas employment (e.g., between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Labor, specifically).¹⁴ There existed unclear lines of command among agencies responding to crisis situations. Each agency had its own “turf” to protect in order to justify its existence. In other cases, legislators intervened in favor of particular interests contrary to the welfare of the migrant workers.¹⁵ These eventually led to significant levels of ineffectiveness in responding to the needs of Filipino migrants abroad. The adverse effects of these rivalries became most evident during the Gulf War of 1991 when a lot of finger-pointing occurred as to which agency would be ultimately responsible for repatriating and looking after the safety of Filipino migrants in the area at the time.¹⁶

The 1986 Philippine Development Plan stressed the need to address the country’s serious problems of employment generation, poverty alleviation, the promotion of equity and social justice and the attainment of sustainable economic growth. According to then-Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor, the Aquino Administration’s policy on labor promotion could be summed up as follows: (1) the adoption of a pro-worker and pro-underprivileged orientation; (2) the expanded and decisive role of government in addressing the unemployment problem; (3) the shift to deregulation and developmental approaches in labor standards setting and

enforcement; (4) the adoption of legislation removing the remaining repressive features of existing laws and strengthening the position of workers in both the private and public sectors; (5) the adoption of innovative, non-adversarial and voluntary labor relations approaches; (6) the strengthening of tripartism and enhancement of workers' participation in policy decision-making; (7) the forging of a viable Industrial Peace Accord and the encouragement of initiatives towards social compacts; and (8) the decentralization and devolution of government functions for more effective, efficient and responsive service delivery systems.

Ramos and Managing Migration

The same overseas employment policy and program that persisted from Marcos to Aquino continued under the Ramos administration. While it echoed earlier statements by previous administrations to continue overseas employment and to maxi-

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mize the employment opportunities from such outflows, it also sought to ensure the dignity and well-being of the migrants and their families within the context of transnational migration and globalization. However, the Ramos administration was softened by numerous high profile cases of distressed and tragic migrants (e.g., Maricris Sioson, Flor Contemplacion and Sarah Balabagan) to the point that it could no longer repeat the Marcos administration's call for labor export. There now

was a greater official acceptance of overseas employment as a phenomenon rather than as an ad hoc response to persistent economic difficulties.

In its place, a more humane form of migration management came into existence. In contrast to the previous policy of labor export, a new approach emerged – that of managing overseas employment.¹⁷ Additionally, the Ramos administration elevated Philippine labor out-migration concerns to the international level such as to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The Ramos administration also sought to include labor migration in the agenda of the APEC summit in Osaka in 1995.¹⁸ The

administration suffered a setback in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis that gripped the region. Ironically, overseas employment appeared to be a way for workers to cope with the adverse effects of the crisis.¹⁹

Overseas Employment and the Mandate of the Department of Labor

Historically, the main agency of government mandated to pursue the overseas employment option is the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree 442 or the revised Philippine Labor Code, several public management institutions were created under the then-Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) collectively tasked to develop, promote, regulate and implement a comprehensive overseas employment program. These were the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB) and the National Seamen Board (NSB).[See Figure 1]


The BES was primarily responsible for the development and implementation of a national and comprehensive employment program including the export of Filipino labor to overseas job destinations. Its essential intent was to formulate and lead in the establishment of an integrated national job plan for the government. A major aspect of that mandate meant the establishment and maintenance of:

... a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, and to secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment for Filipino contract workers...²⁰

The OEDB is principally responsible for directly pursuing the country's emerging overseas employment agenda. It was established "to undertake, in cooperation with relevant entities and agencies, a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers in excess of domestic needs and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment." The Board also acted as the Secretariat for the Board of Trustees of the Welfare Training Fund for Overseas Workers which eventually became the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA).

FIGURE 1

Organizational Structure and Linkages on the Management of
Labor Out-Migration From the Philippines (1974-1982)



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Meanwhile, the NSB was created for the purpose of developing and maintaining “a comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas.”²¹ In addition to these three Bureaus, the MOLE was also tasked to perform a foreign service function particularly to provide protection to Filipino workers abroad through the labor attachés or labor reporting officers.

During the 1970s, the OEDB was headed by the Labor Secretary (as Chairman), the Undersecretary of Labor (as Vice-Chairman), and a representative each from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of National Defense (DND), the Central Bank, the Department of Education Culture and Sports, the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC), the Bureau of Employment Services, a workers organization, an employers organization and the Executive Director of the OEDB (as Members). The NSB meanwhile was composed of the Labor Secretary and Undersecretary (as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively), the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard and a representative each from the DFA, DECS, the Central Bank, the Maritime Industry Authority, the BES, a national shipping association and the Executive Director of the NSB (as Members).²²

Pre-POEA Functional Differences

The differentiation of functions between the various agencies established as a result of PD 442 was such that the BES was accountable for coming up with the employment development (both local and overseas) master plan for the country; the OEDB was the principal government agency engaged in actual and active recruitment and labor market promotion and development involving the land-based sector; and the NSB was concerned with the development of the sea-based labor market. Additionally, the labor attache was responsible for providing relevant data on labor market prospects overseas as well as in providing immediate welfare (mainly legal) assistance to Filipino workers overseas and in authenticating their documents.

Aside from the labor attaches posted in foreign missions, the government at the time created the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers by virtue of Letter of Instruction Number 537 issued in May 1977. The mandate of this Fund is

to provide for the welfare and skills development needs of Filipino migrant workers and their families and dependents.


The task of the BES is in ensuring regulations (e.g., the employment contracts,²³ issuance as well as cancellation of licenses to private recruitment entities including their investigation²⁴ and the determination of allowable service fees charged by employment agencies²⁵) as well as the formulation of a corporate export program for government in the hiring of Filipino workers for overseas contracts.²⁶ The OEDB is the principal government recruitment and placement agency for overseas employment and for developing employment and wage standards as well as the promotion and development of overseas labor market strategies and opportunities.²⁷ Meanwhile, the NSB is tasked to regulate and oversee the seafarers sector.²⁸ These institutional creations make up the concerted effort of government during this period to actively pursue the overseas employment program.

The Creation of the POEA

By 1982, the organizational structures that oversaw the country's implementation of the overseas employment program underwent a significant streamlining effort. By virtue of Executive Order 797, the Ministry underwent a major reorganization. The BES, OEDB and NSB were subsequently absorbed by the newly-created Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) [See Figure 2] which was specifically tasked to:

... formulate and undertake, in coordination where necessary with appropriate entities concerned, a systematic program for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements, and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen...²⁹

FIGURE 2
Organizational Structure and Linkages on the Management of
Labor Out-Migration From the Philippines (1982-1995)



The Administration effectively took on all the functions of the three previous and separate Bureaus from standards-setting and regulation to welfare protection as well as labor recruitment and deployment and even market development. In addition to the POEA, the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers was reorganized as a separate Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers (WELFUND); by 1987, through Executive Order Number 126, it became the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) whose function was primarily to ensure the social well-being of Filipino nationals working abroad, including their families and dependents in the Philippines.³⁰ The functions of the labor attaches were retained under the International Labor Affairs Service (ILAS).

Moreover, the overseas employment system maintained a working relationship with a number of government agencies and bureaus. The relationship was essentially dictated by the need to manage the overseas employment program and to streamline the operations of the different government entities so that they may better serve the aims of the program.


Labor Out-Migration Management Under RA 8042

Under RA 8042, organizational responsibility for the well-being of Filipino nationals abroad ultimately fell under different offices (Section 23). The office of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) through its home office or specific foreign posts assumes responsibility for protecting the rights of migrants. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) sees to it that labor and social welfare laws in receiving countries are fairly applied to all, including Filipino migrant workers. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) under DOLE regulates private sector participation through the licensing and registration of recruitment agencies and other employment entities. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is tasked to provide assistance to migrants.

Additionally, an Office of the Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers Affairs (OLAMWA) was created under the DFA to coordinate legal assistance services provided to disadvantaged Filipino migrants abroad. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) continues to be an attached agency to the DFA. Under the country-team approach (Section 27), however, the protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of Filipino migrant workers abroad is the highest priority of the Secretary of the DFA. All other government personnel posted abroad regardless of their mother agencies will act as one country-team under the ambassador (Section 28). Aside from the OLAMWA and CFO, an Overseas Filipino Resource Center is also to be established within the embassy in areas with large concentrations of migrants (Section 19).

In the actual management of the overseas employment program, the DOLE holds effective supervision over the POEA and OWWA. In addition to these offices, RA 8042 provides for the creation of a re-placement and monitoring center under the Department in coordination with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), the Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) and other government agencies. The function of the re-placement and monitoring center is essentially to develop programs that will provide a viable option for migrants upon their return.³¹ [See Figure 3]

FIGURE 3
Organizational Linkages on the Management of
Labor Out-Migration From the Philippines (1996-Present)



Continuities and Discontinuities in Overseas Employment Program and Policy

While there were differences in the conduct of the program on overseas employment from the time of Presidents Marcos to Ramos, there was a degree of consistency in the policy declaration and outlook or perspective as manifested in the following: protection of overseas Filipino workers, encouraging the participation of the private sector and discouraging the illegal or unauthorized recruitment and deployment of Filipino workers for overseas jobs.

Protection to Overseas Workers

One policy constant is the government declaration of protection to overseas workers. The enactment of Presidential Decree 442 otherwise known as the Revised Labor Code in 1975 showed that the declared policy of the State is “to protect every citizen desiring to work locally or overseas by securing for him the best

possible terms and conditions of employment”.³² Consequently, one of the principal functions of the then-Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB) (the predecessor of the POEA) was to “protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices”³³ as well as to “protect and enhance the interest, well-being and welfare of workers”.

In the early 1980s, the Marcos administration issued Executive Order 797 reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and creating the POEA and also stipulating the protection of workers. The pertinent implementing guidelines for the newly established POEA continued the basic provision on workers’ protection specific to “the need to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices” once again.³⁴ This exact same declaration was reiterated by President Aquino about five years later.³⁵ By virtue of RA 8042, the pertinent State declaration on overseas workers protection continues as follows:

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legislative services to Filipino migrant workers.³⁶

Private Sector Participation

Another constant (at least until the promulgation of RA 8042) is that of allowing (and even encouraging) the participation of the private sector in the conduct of the overseas employment program. In PD 442, the State is mandated to “rationalize the participation of the private sector in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, to serve national development objectives.”³⁷ Specific to private sector participation is the relevant provision on their role in the recruitment and placement of workers overseas stating that:

Pursuant to national development objectives and in order to harness and maximize the use of private sector resources and initiative in the development and implementation of a comprehensive employment program, the

private employment sector shall participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, under such guidelines, rules, and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of Labor.³⁸

Additionally, the government is tasked to encourage and to regulate private sector participation. Specifically, the implementing guidelines to EO 797 creating the POEA mandates the Administration to “establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers”.³⁹ For the Aquino administration, the POEA is mandated to “regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system”.⁴⁰ And for the Ramos administration, RA 8042 states that “the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agencies that employ them shall be encouraged.”⁴¹

Prohibition on Illegal Recruitment

In addition to encouraging the participation of the private business sector, however, there continue to be a number of qualifications for the participation of business entities. Only those duly acknowledged by relevant authorities are allowed to participate in the business of overseas employment. In all cases, there is the prohibition on the participation of travel and airline agencies in the business of recruitment and deployment of Filipino workers abroad including any other unlicensed or unauthorized business entity.⁴² The definition of what constitutes illegal recruitment is another constant provision in all the major policy declarations governing the overseas employment sector. Under RA 8042, illegal recruitment is defined as:

... any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers-and includes referring, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment abroad whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of PD 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines; Provided that any such non-licensee or non-holder

who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.⁴³

Some Variables and Discontinuities

In addition to the consistent policy declarations governing overseas employment, the policy shifts are expressed in the different enactments and enunciations from Marcos to Ramos.

The Perspective on Overseas Employment

As early as the mid-1970s, Marcos acknowledged the benefits that accrue from a government-mandated overseas employment program. In a speech commemorating the First (and only) National Congress on Overseas Employment held on 20 July 1982, Marcos acknowledged the critical importance of overseas employment to the national development effort when he said that:

We have provided jobs for our people not only in our new and expanding industries but also in the world labor market. Filipino talents and skills are becoming ubiquitous in many parts of the world. Returning Filipino workers have helped improve our skills and technological standards.⁴⁴

Strongly implied in this perspective is the notion that the overseas employment program is only a temporary government initiative to address the country's serious unemployment, skills and foreign exchange problems. There was also the recognition that the external labor market emerging at the time (i.e., the Middle East) was merely the result of the strong petro-incomes of these areas. Marcos acknowledged the importance of tapping into that significant income source as far as the Philippines was concerned when he stated that:

For us, overseas employment addresses two major problems: unemployment and the balance of payments position. If these problems are met or at

least partially resolved by contract migration, we also expect an increase in national savings and investment levels. In the long run, we also expect that overseas employment will contribute to the acquisition of skills essential to the development of the country's industrial base.⁴⁵

Moreover, under Marcos, the management of labor out-migration or labor export maximized its direct benefits in the form of employment creation, skills development and foreign exchange generation through inward remittances. In the beginning, the aim was to concentrate or centralize and simplify the process by encouraging overseas contracting arrangements similar to that of South Korea. This corporate export approach encouraged Filipino contracting companies to go overseas by granting them tax and other incentives.⁴⁶

At the end of the Marcos administration, however, overseas employment had become an institutionalized policy of the government. By the time of the Aquino administration, the policy perspective on overseas employment shifted towards one that did not exactly en-

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courage labor export but tacitly accepted it as a social reality. International labor migration was accepted by the post-Marcos policy-makers as a given worldwide phenomenon. This acceptance of the situation as a natural consequence of globalization also underscores the continuing importance of migration for many Filipinos. In 1992, then-Labor Secretary Confesor commented on the Aquino administration's policy concerning overseas employment.

... the (Aquino) administration has not encouraged and does not encourage the continued deployment of Filipino workers overseas. And yet, this cannot be stopped at the moment since to do so would be a clear violation of their human rights. Preventing the out-migration of workers has no room in this democracy. And, as long as the national economy cannot adequately create the number of jobs needed to gainfully employ the country's fast

expanding labor force, the overseas market will always be there as an attractive alternative. Even the risks of illegal recruitment will not render overseas employment any less attractive.⁴⁷

The Aquino government's basic policy outlook on overseas employment was that it should be treated as originally intended - as a temporary policy fix or measure. This policy approach by the post-Marcos administrations of both Aquino and Ramos was reflected in the continued implementation of the following government strategies, programs and structures: (a) the implementation of marketing approaches that entailed selective deployment of overseas contract workers (OCWs), both in terms of country of destination and skills category; (b) the launching of mass campaigns against illegal recruitment; (c) the formulation and refinement of guidelines governing contract processing, ensuring workers' insurance coverage and providing for contingencies; (d) giving attention to setting pre-qualification requirements and standards for promoters and for their accreditation; and (e) the conduct of continuing negotiations with the receiving governments for the better protection of Filipino workers.

Government Recruitment and Deployment

The policy goal and orientation at first (i.e., during the latter part of the 1970s) was to monopolize the deployment of Filipino workers to the point of undertaking a corporate labor contracting program.⁴⁸ However, circumstances necessitated a radical change in such a policy. Actual demand for foreign workers especially in the Gulf region far exceeded the country's deployment capacities.

During the Marcos administration, the government initially attempted to promulgate mechanisms that would institutionalize the deployment of workers on a government-to-government basis mainly through construction contracting arrangements. The government also tried early on to facilitate the documentation and deployment process by creating a one-stop documentation and processing center and labor assistance centers through Letters of Instruction Numbers 1217 and 1319 in early 1982 and 1983, respectively.

Under the Aquino administration, government instituted a selective deployment policy with restrictions on the overseas employment of certain categories of workers (e.g., under-aged workers, women as domestic helpers and entertainment workers, among others). Such occupations were identified to be more vulnerable and prone to abuse and exploitation compared to male migrants and professionals. These restrictions were applied to countries and areas such as those in the Gulf region and in other destinations in the Asia-Pacific that failed to provide for sufficient guarantees to women migrants.

Remittance Regulation

In December 1982, the Marcos administration promulgated Executive Order Number 857 which made it “mandatory for every Filipino contract worker abroad to remit regularly a portion of his foreign exchange earnings to his beneficiary in the Philippines through the Philippine banking system.”⁴⁹ As much as 70 to 80 percent of the overseas workers’ earnings had to be remitted through official channels. The Order also stipulated that “the passport [of the overseas worker] shall be renewable every year upon submission of usual requirements and presentation of documentary proof of compliance to the remittance requirement in the percentages provided for.”⁵⁰

The idea for EO 857 came when it was found that the majority of migrants remitted mainly through informal channels, adversely affecting the country’s balance of payments (BOP) accounts. The Order, however, was strongly opposed by migrant groups because it imposed sanctions on those migrants who refused to avail of these official channels. Opposition to EO 857 was based on the experience of many migrants wanting to remit their earnings back to the Philippines. Their experience with the banks during the early 1980s showed the banks to be more expensive and much slower compared to informal remittance channels.

Subsequently, these punitive sanctions were retracted by Executive Order 1021 which “encouraged” the contract workers to remit their earnings through official channels.⁵¹ Succeeding administrations adopted a more liberal policy towards the sending of remittances and have instead concentrated on improving bank services.

Regulating The Philippine Overseas Employment Program: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward

The management and regulation of labor out-migration continues to be a major arena for public policy action for the Philippine government. For Casco (1997), “managing means being able to objectively recognize and subsequently dominate our niche and comparative advantage and empowering from our weaknesses”.⁵² In the context of managing migration, “workers’ welfare is a non-negotiable condition... whether under a regulated or a deregulated environment”.⁵³

Private sector participation as job intermediaries takes several major forms. Job intermediaries “facilitate the migration process as they advertise job openings, select applicants, secure visas, arrange travel, get government approvals and optionally, arrange for remittance banking, insurance, and the like”.⁵⁴ Private employment intermediaries dominate the Philippine labor out-migration situation which are then supervised and regulated through the POEA. Mangahas (1988) describes three major types of job intermediaries:

Private Employment Agencies:

Private employment agencies recruit and place land-based workers for a fee. These agencies, popularly called recruiters, deal directly with workers and employers and are responsible for recruitment documentation, contracts processing, and mobilization... Promoters recruit, train, and manage performing artists and talents for short-term stints at foreign nightclubs, bars, and hotel lounges.

Private Recruitment Entities:

This group includes contractors, whether construction or service, who are direct employers of Filipino labor. They supply both labor and management expertise... employees of these companies are also covered by Philippine labor laws, including social security coverage... They are prohibited from charging fees, aside from minimal personal documentation expenses of workers.

Manning Agencies:

Manning agencies specialize in hiring seamen/women and crewing vessels plying international routes. Often, these agents are Philippine representatives of foreign shipping companies and are responsible for diverse services such as payrolling and insurance coverage... Manning agents are not allowed to charge placement fees from hired seamen/women. They are exempt from many land-based worker regulations, though are required to submit worker payrolls.⁵⁵

These are the most prominent forms of job placement and recruitment. Additionally, there are other forms and methods of job placement that are available in practice. Mangahas (1988) further describes these as follows:

Direct Hire or Self-Solicited:

Direct hiring is the recruitment and placement of Filipino workers by foreign employers through advertising, company employee referrals, or direct worker application... Workers who find jobs through referrals of foreign-based family members or friends are required to process their documents either through licensed employment agencies or through the government placement office. In the latter, they are processed as 'name hires'.

Government Placement Office

The POEA... has its own internal placement office. This office can recruit and place workers only for foreign government clients, though it is allowed to process the work documents of name hires... All charges for documentation and processing are passed on to the foreign government clients.⁵⁶

However, what needs to be stressed at this point is that it is important to examine the divergence and disparities between declared policy pronouncements as well as efforts to regulate and manage these many forms of job intermediation and their actual impacts and implementation. Abella (1995) argues that:

It is not possible to take declared policy objectives at their face value and from formal policy declarations. What objectives are actually pursued in earnest depend as much on labor market conditions as on labor laws.⁵⁷

At the same time, it must be pointed out that government policies are almost always “strongly influenced by business and bureaucratic groups at home that have much to gain from continuing and expanding [them]”.⁵⁸ In most cases, such policies have an adverse impact on workers’ welfare. And when it comes to workers’ welfare, the recruitment phase is an altogether crucial stage in the labor out-migration process. Skeldon (1989) contends that:

A critical policy area that touches upon the welfare of migrants is the system of recruitment. While there may be some argument for the deregulation of the business of sending workers overseas in order to give migrants more choice and to make the process more transparent, more important would be the introduction of effective monitoring of existing programs in order to prevent abuse, excessive fees and unscrupulous practices.⁵⁹

...government policies are almost always “strongly influenced by business and bureaucratic groups at home that have much to gain from continuing and expanding [them]”.

Each year, thousands of hopeful Filipinos are victimized by agencies that over-charge on recruitment and other documents and processing fees. In 1974, the maximum legal amount that could be charged a worker as processing and placement fee was P500. By 1983, through the MOLE Memorandum Circular (MC) Number 6, this ceiling was raised to P2,500. Two years later (1985), this placement fee was doubled to P5,000 by virtue of MC Number 5.

By the early 1990s, that legal ceiling had settled at P5,000, but it also required workers to pay their recruiters one month of their salary if employed in Taiwan or P15,000 for those going to Korea.⁶⁰ The fee was inclusive of all documentation and processing costs such as the passport and visa fees, among others.⁶¹

However, the formal policy directive did not always conform to the effective policy outcome. An undated POEA internal paper noted that “regulations on place-

ment fee (sic) have been more often than not violated and subjected to what is commonly known in the industry as 'paper compliance'".⁶² Actual placement fees charged to the worker were much higher than stipulated in the government directive. In 1987, the average actual placement fee was already P 8,000 while many paid as much as P15,000 and higher.⁶³ Market forces often dictate the price at which labor is to be deployed overseas. The higher the anticipated income, the higher is the placement fee. A 1996 survey of Filipinos in Taiwan found that almost 60 percent paid a placement fee ranging from P 60,000 to P 80,000 per worker, excluding airfare costs.⁶⁴

A thriving market has emerged, facilitating the often illicit movement of labor across national boundaries. Between 1980 to 1987, it was estimated that these so-called job intermediaries received no less than P14 billion in placement fees from Filipinos aspiring to work abroad as seen in Table 1 below.⁶⁵ Mangahas (1988) estimated this figure by multiplying the number of newly-hired migrant workers with the prevailing average placement fee for the year. This amount may even be an understatement since workers may apply more than once and because there are migrants who do not go through the formal administrative channels of the POEA. Indeed, the monitoring, coordination and regulation of private recruitment participation in labor out-migration is an extremely important aspect of public policy.

TABLE 1: Estimates of Recruitment Fees Paid to Intermediaries (1980-1987)

| Year | I Average Placement Fee | II Total New Hires | III Total Fees (I X II) |
|-------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1980 | 2,020 | 214,590 | 433,471,800 |
| 1981 | 1,821 | 266,243 | 484,828,503 |
| 1982 | 3,897 | 314,284 | 1,224,764,748 |
| 1983 | 5,658 | 291,197 | 1,647,592,626 |
| 1984 | 6,421 | 260,161 | 1,670,493,781 |
| 1985 | 13,002 | 232,391 | 3,021,547,782 |
| 1986 | 11,707 | 255,341 | 2,989,277,087 |
| 1987 | 9,381 | 314,250 | 2,947,979,250 |
| Total | | | 14,419,955,577 |

Source: Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," *Social Weather Stations* (October 1988), Table 5, p. 29.

Policy Measures to Regulate Private Recruitment

The Early Phase-Out Policy

At the very beginning of the overseas employment program in the early 1970s, there was already an institution tasked to regulate and even reduce the number of private recruitment participants. The Bureau of Employment Services (BES), created by virtue of PD 442 or the 1974 Labor Code, was tasked to supervise and regulate, through the granting of licenses, private employment agencies and intermediaries engaged in the selection, hiring, placement and deployment of Filipino workers for overseas jobs.

During the early years of implementation of the overseas employment program, government sought to limit and eventually phase out private sector participation or involvement in labor out-migration. This phase-out policy meant that private fee charging labor recruitment agencies were to be replaced by one government agency, the OEDB, at the time.

However, such a strategic approach at the outset was dictated more by economic cost-benefit analyses and economies of scale than by the need to protect and promote the welfare and rights of Filipino workers overseas. Proponents argued that:

By having one agency, the government can direct marketing efforts towards those parts of the market segment which offer optimum opportunities after they have been properly segmented, their needs identified, their trends projected, and other marketing factors influencing them properly evaluated. With the government's size and resources, it is in a better position to develop markets more systematically and to establish a monitoring system for identifying opportunities in the total market for labor.⁶⁶

In short, private agencies simply do not possess the wherewithal to develop strategic labor markets overseas; government stands a better chance of sustaining and expanding the country's labor market potentials. At the same time, when the private sector is allowed to increase or proliferate:

... occasions then can arise when private agencies become crowded in a particular market segment, unmindful and incapable of tapping other segments which offer less profits now, but provide more employment opportunities in the long run. Their individual sizes constrain them from developing other segments showing greater promise because of financial incapability. However, they can specialize on certain needs of particular markets, making them, in their unique way, individually efficient in their operations.⁶⁷

Given this administrative situation, the strategic policy at the time was to reduce the number of (or phase out altogether) private sector participants for economic cost-benefit reasons. The Labor Code at the time provided for the phase out of such private agencies over a four-year period beginning in 1975.⁶⁸

Reversal of the Early Phase-Out Policy

By the second half of the 1970s, however, the surge in the demand for migrant labor in the Gulf proved to be too much for government to handle by itself, causing a reversal of the policy. Mangahas (1989) observed that:

This growth in demand for Filipino contract workers could not be accommodated within the traditional avenues for recruitment. So despite the 1975 phase-out policy on private recruitment agencies, the size and extent of private job intermediation increased.⁶⁹

In October 1977, a "White Paper on the Phase-Out Policy" was written within the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to "evaluate certain tenets regarding the effects of government intervention in the employment of Filipino workers overseas".⁷⁰ More specifically, this referred to examining the viability of phasing out the private sector.

Such a White Paper may have been prompted by certain labor deployment trends that immediately became evident. In the beginning, the actual trend in the implementation of the private sector phase-out policy indicated adverse impacts and implications on the conduct of the government's overseas employment program. At the time, there was a decline in total overseas placements and critics were

quick to argue that this was the direct effect of the phase-out policy. They contended that the number of placements was positively proportional to the number of recruitment entities, indicating that government ought to encourage or allow the proliferation of private placement agencies if there was to be an increase in the number of overseas deployments. The White Paper showed that no such correlation existed and that other factors could account for the initial total decline in overseas placements for the years 1974 to 1976.⁷¹

The White Paper then proposed that government take advantage of its position and take on the challenge of protecting and promoting the rights and welfare of overseas Filipino workers which private agencies were not in a position to address. It argued that:

OEDB is still young, and its organization expectedly is not yet fully equipped with resources necessary to achieve the goals of the Philippine overseas placement program and to replace the private fee charging agencies (PFCAs) completely. [However]... through its present welfare services and the future expansion thereof, the OEDB assures maximum protection to an extent unrealizable by the private sector alone. Meantime [sic], it realizes the need for peaceful 'coexistence' among already existing private agencies under an atmosphere of close coordination and harmony geared towards a more systematic overseas placement scheme that can provide the total services due Filipino workers, including their protection.⁷²

The White Paper study recommended a new lease on the operations of these so-called private fee-charging agencies or PFCAs:

...on condition that said PFCAs be more strictly regulated, controlled, and supervised in order to direct their efforts to the nation's objective of systematically placing Filipino workers overseas. Temporarily, these PFCAs shall be made to coordinate properly with government placement agencies in an atmosphere of complementation where PFCAs can avail of services being rendered by OEDB like providing sufficient protection of [sic] workers' welfare. [And]... that all authority holders be completely phased out and that foreign employers be made to deal directly with the government or PFCAs in the duration of their existence.⁷³

Following the 1977 White Paper, Abella (1979) also took up the issue of limiting overseas labor recruitment to government entities. He took note of “the rise in violations against recruitment rules and regulations” the more the Ministry of Labor tried to enforce their licensing rules and standards. Abella (1979) argued:

... the more strictly the Ministry imposed its standards, the greater was the temptation to engage in recruitment practices which were considered illegal... the business became more lucrative the greater the spread between the ‘official’ or legal price and what the people were willing to pay for the commodity.⁷⁴

Abella (1979) likewise contended that the more appropriate policy response was to “bring as many recruitment transactions as possible into the open and within the reach of the law”.⁷⁵ He recommended a more liberal approach towards licensing private recruitment agencies rather than the nationalization of the overseas employment sector. As a result, instead of phasing out private sector participation in the early period, the operational or effective policy during this time allowed for the continued participation of private recruitment agencies. This was despite the concerns of economies of scale and the incapacity to protect and promote the social welfare concerns of Filipino workers once abroad raised against private recruitment entities.

The Later Response: An Attrition Policy

By the early 1980s, government again began to limit private sector participation by halting the issuance of new licenses to private recruiters. In January 1982, government instituted an attrition policy through Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1190. LOI 1190 was due more to the perception that the overseas employment sector had become “overcrowded” than to the strategic need for government to take over the private sector by that time. The intent, however, was more to enrich and manage private sector competition rather than to eliminate it. An early study on private recruitment notes that the overseas employment sector had become populated by too many under-achievers or under-raters from the private sector; there thus emerged

the need to trim “down... the number of participants in the program and thus minimize cutthroat competition”.⁷⁶ Moreover, as Mangahas (1989) observed, new forms of recruitment emerged. She noted that:

Service contracting started in the mid-1980s as a natural offshoot of the successful construction contractor policy and also, for some others, as a response to Letter of Instruction 1190 which banned the issuance of new private employment licenses. In order to participate in the booming overseas employment program, many entrepreneurs participated as service contractors, a category which remained open for new licensing.⁷⁷

As a result, an explicit attrition policy was rendered ineffective because of the emergence of other recruitment activities which were not covered by the directive. This ineffective attrition policy on private recruitment persisted until the second half of the 1980s. In March 1986, Memorandum Circular (MC) Number 1 was issued by the Department of Labor. MC 1 sought to further constrain the growth of the private sector and provided that no new applications for license or authority be received or processed by the POEA. However, other forms of job recruitment became evident during this period, effectively circumventing the spirit behind MC 1. Mangahas (1989) observed that:

New forms of job intermediation also emerged during this period. In contrast to fee-charging private employment agencies and manning agencies which recruit and place land-based and sea workers, respectively, construction contractors act as direct employers of Filipino workers for construction subcontracts in the foreign countries.... Service contractors also act as direct employers of Filipino labor for management and other sub-contracts in foreign countries.⁷⁸

Reversal of the Attrition Policy

Recognizing that private recruitment activities persisted despite prohibitions on the granting of new licenses, government gradually shifted gears. In 1987, DOLE Memorandum Circular (MC) Number 14 began the issuance of new licenses to

manning agencies as well as to service and construction contractors and instituted a minimum mobilization requirement of 200 workers per year per agency. Earlier, the minimum mobilization requirement was 400 workers per year per agency. The reduction in the minimum mobilization requirement for private agencies meant that they could continue to operate despite the difficulties they experienced in recruiting for overseas jobs. Essentially, such a condition meant that the market had become saturated by private entities. However, rather than eliminate under-achieving agencies, government chose to reduce the mobilization minimum to accommodate (and perhaps even increase) the number of private agencies operating at the time.

The reversal in the attrition policy of LOI 1190 was completed with Executive Order (EO) 450 issued in March 1991. EO 450 allowed the issuance of new licenses to private recruitment agencies but raised the minimum capitalization requirement from P150,000 as provided for in PD 442 to P1,000,000.

Other Turning Points in the Management of the Overseas Employment Program

During the early 1980s, the POEA initiated efforts to control and to manage the quality and quantity of Filipino entertainers going abroad initially through the Philippine Entertainment Certification Center (PECC) document or the so-called "blue card". The blue card would be given to entertainment workers who are able to pass a professional audition and which certified to the capabilities and profession of the holder. However, these cards were not tamper-proof. Eventually, rampant tampering of these blue cards led to their replacement. The POEA in the late 1980s then issued the Artist Accreditation Certificate (AAC).⁷⁹ During the latter half of the 1980s, the POEA sought to inhibit the flow of so-called vulnerable skills (e.g., domestic helpers and entertainers) in the context of increasing feminization and reports of abuse of women migrants abroad.⁸⁰

By 1995, from the outright export of labor, government shifted its policy emphasis to one of managing overseas employment. Indeed, Nieves Confesor's White Paper on Overseas Employment stated that "the challenge to Philippine policymaking today is not one of exporting the country's labor surplus; it is managing effectively

the natural process of labor migration — which will continue even if we **ban** the outflow of our workers” (emphasis not mine).⁸¹

The Performance of Private Recruitment Agencies

Almost since its inception, the private sector has dominated overseas employment particularly as regards recruitment and deployment. In 1982, 98 percent of the total number of land-based workers processed for overseas jobs were recruited by private employment agencies as seen in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2: Land-based Workers Processed by Type of Recruitment (1982-1995)

| Year | Agency Hired | Government Hired | Name Hired | Rehired | Total |
|------|--------------|---------------------|------------|---------|---------|
| 1982 | 245,078 | 5,037 | nd | nd | 250,115 |
| 1983 | 231,300 | 5,953 | nd | 143,010 | 380,263 |
| 1984 | 198,448 | 7,697 | nd | 164,920 | 371,065 |
| 1985 | 169,415 | 11,530 | nd | 156,809 | 337,754 |
| 1986 | 189,514 | 9,053 | nd | 159,120 | 357,687 |
| 1987 | 230,089 | 13,188 | nd | 182,604 | 425,881 |
| 1988 | 183,772 | 2,531 | 10,822 | 184,767 | 381,892 |
| 1989 | 169,736 | 4,181 | 13,002 | 221,055 | 407,974 |
| 1990 | 236,879 | 3,088 | 13,786 | 214,838 | 468,591 |
| 1991 | 314,824 | 4,514 | 16,186 | 218,952 | 554,476 |
| 1992 | 284,180 | 3,397 | 18,788 | 258,436 | 564,801 |
| 1993 | 252,857 | 2,524 | 15,498 | 276,567 | 547,446 |
| 1994 | 232,950 | 2,069 | 27,279 | 296,515 | 558,813 |
| 1995 | 128,825 | 2,102 | 34,826 | 269,603 | 435,356 |

Source: Overseas Employment Statistical Compendium 1982-1995, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

By 1988, although the number of workers recruited by private agencies dropped to about 48 percent of total deployments, this sector continued to maintain its dominance since they were the principal intermediaries of workers rehired for overseas jobs as seen in Figure 4.

At the same time, however, the number of name hired deployments increased from about three percent in 1988 to eight percent by 1995, indicating an increasing number of workers going through this direct recruitment route. (See Figures 4 and 5)

From 1988 to 1995, there was at least a 300 percent increase in the number of workers processed through the name hire system. As discussed above, workers going through this system were presumed to have worked on their employment contracts on their own without the intercession of DOLE-licensed agencies. Placements through licensed recruiters (and the POEA requirements attendant to it such as accreditation of principals and worker documentation) had, according to Casco (1997), “increasingly become expensive, time-consuming, and circumventive for the workers”⁸² hence the increased occurrence of name hiring. Name hiring

FIGURE 4
Land-based Recruitment by Type, in Percent (1988)





FIGURE 5
Land-based Recruitment by Type, in Percent (1995)



may also have indicated “that workers and employers have increasingly acquired knowledge in going about concluding an employment agreement at the least time and cost, through a referral system facilitated by workers still serving their contracts abroad or worker piracy on-site”.⁸³

Nevertheless, what is most evident in these illustrations is the trend in the reduced significance of government recruitment from one percent in 1988 to less than half a percent by 1995.

Private Recruitment Becomes a Losing Proposition?

During the late 1980s, DOLE released a study on the operations of private labor recruitment agencies engaged in overseas employment. Deployment is the *raison d’être* of private recruitment agencies and “its justification for its continued participation in the overseas employment program”.⁸⁴ That study described the situations in which such private sector operations persist. One is by way of the income that these agencies generate. The study noted that the income of such private agencies is derived mainly from the workers they deploy abroad, not from their foreign principals or employers. More specifically, the

Fees paid by workers represent 80 percent of total agency income while the remaining 20 percent comes from the employer / principal. Sometimes, 90 percent of agency income is taken from service charges against workers and employers / principals and 10 percent from other sources.⁸⁵

By this period (i.e., the late 1980s), the study observed that many of the private agencies had become “losing propositions” in that more and more of them deployed fewer and fewer workers abroad. For instance, as seen in Table 3 below, almost 40 percent of the total number of private recruitment and employment intermediaries operating in 1986 placed less than 50 workers abroad.

Indeed, in 1985, 346 agencies were unable to deploy a single worker.⁸⁶ The study further said that:

Most of the license / authority holders in the industry are becoming losing propositions with only a little over 100 or some 15 percent able to deploy more than 400 workers abroad. The other 10 percent sent between 200 or 400 workers abroad.⁸⁷

TABLE 3: PLACEMENTS BY AGENCY TYPE in Percent 1986

| Placement Level No. of Workers | Manning Agencies | Service Contractors | Private Agencies | Construction Contractors | Overall |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------|
| 0-50 | 32.3 | 47.4 | 34.3 | 62 | 38.3 |
| 51-100 | 19.9 | 16.0 | 11.4 | 9.2 | 13.7 |
| 101-200 | 14.0 | 18.0 | 16.2 | 4.6 | 14.9 |
| 201-300 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 11.8 | 5.7 | 9.8 |
| 301-400 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 6.6 | 4.6 | 5.9 |
| 401-500 | 5.9 | 1.0 | 4.6 | 1.4 | 4.1 |
| 501-800 | 5.5 | 2.0 | 7 | 5.7 | 5.9 |
| 801-1,000 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 1.1 | 3.5 |
| > 1,000 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 3.7 |

Source: Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations (October 1988), Table 4, p. 29.

Furthermore, the study anticipated many of the issues and concerns associated with the proliferation of private agencies, most notably the illegal exaction of placement fees from workers and other illegal recruitment activities. It observed that:

... if the business of recruitment and placement were to be the real source of income for POEA license holders [i.e., private recruitment entities], income for low deployment raters would come by way of (1) collecting more service fees from principals or employers. However, given the present situation, an agency cannot survive on this alone... [thus the reliance on] (2) overcharging of fees, and (3) illegal recruitment.⁸⁸

In 1977, the number of recruitment intermediaries licensed to operate was 71. By 1983, this had increased to more than 850 but dropped to only 54 in 1986 as indicated in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4: Number of Recruitment Intermediaries by Type Land-Based Only (1977-1986)

| Type of Agency | 1977 | 1978 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Private Agencies | 23 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 579 | 471 | 461 | 37 |
| Authority Holders | 22 | 20 | 162 | 16 | nd | nd | nd | nd | nd |
| Provisional Authority Holders | nd | nd | nd | 158 | 251 | nd | nd | nd | nd |
| Authority to Negotiate | nd | nd | nd | 137 | 208 | nd | nd | nd | nd |
| Construction Contractors | 26 | 88 | 150 | 266 | 234 | 231 | 208 | 163 | 7 |
| Service Contractors | nd | nd | nd | nd | 35 | 49 | 92 | 128 | 10 |
| TOTAL | 71 | 127 | 331 | 596 | 748 | 859 | 771 | 752 | 54 |

Source: Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," *Social Weather Stations* (October 1988), Table 2, p. 25.

Despite these developments, authorities continued to issue licenses for these private agencies to operate. As indicated in Table 5 below, the POEA granted numerous new licenses as well as renewed the licenses to operate of hundreds of recruitment intermediaries.

TABLE 5: Private Licenses Issues (1993-1998)

| Year | New | Renewals | Total |
|------|-----|----------|-------|
| 1993 | 134 | 695 | 829 |
| 1994 | 154 | 708 | 862 |
| 1995 | 124 | 410 | 534 |
| 1996 | 67 | 565 | 632 |
| 1997 | 68 | 374 | 442 |
| 1998 | 105 | 642 | 747 |

Source: *Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Annual Reports*.

Rise in Illegal Recruitment Concerns

Beginning in the 1980s until 1995, an increasing number of cases were reported to government. Not a few of these were eventually reported in the Philippine mass media as in the case of Flor Contemplacion. In 1985, the POEA handled almost 5,000 cases, about half of which were recruitment related, as seen in Table 6 below. By 1995, these cases numbered more than 10,000, with about 85 percent being employment-related.

TABLE 6: Number of Adjudication Cases Handled By Type (1985-1995)

| Year | Employment-Related | Recruitment-Related | Total |
|------|--------------------|---------------------|--------|
| 1985 | 2,427 | 2,516 | 4,943 |
| 1986 | 1,759 | 2,600 | 4,359 |
| 1987 | 1,811 | 2,180 | 3,991 |
| 1988 | 2,169 | 1,711 | 3,880 |
| 1989 | 2,149 | 1,090 | 3,239 |
| 1990 | 3,020 | 721 | 3,741 |
| 1991 | 2,564 | 1,137 | 3,701 |
| 1992 | 3,727 | 862 | 4,589 |
| 1993 | 6,140 | 1,390 | 7,530 |
| 1994 | 8,173 | 1,820 | 9,993 |
| 1995 | 8,476 | 1,835 | 10,311 |

Source: Overseas Employment Statistical Compendium 1982-1995, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)

While the figures above indicate a decline in the proportion of recruitment-related adjudication cases, they also indicate that there has not been much of a decline in the total number of such cases. In 1985, there were 2,516 recruitment cases; ten years later, a considerable number (1,835) of such cases had been reported.

Government efforts to confront the problem of rampant illegal recruitment and other illicit recruitment activities show checkered success. (See Table 7). In 1985, 132 establishments were closed for engaging in illegal recruitment activities and 141 persons arrested. No establishments were closed in 1995 and only 22 people arrested.

TABLE 7: Status of Illegal Recruitment Cases (1984-1995)

| Year | Cases Received | Victims Involved | Disposition Rate | Persons Arrested | Establishments Closed |
|-------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| 1984 | 1,250 | 1,089 | 91.7 | nd | nd |
| 1985 | 1,093 | 3,428 | 58.9 | 141 | 132 |
| 1986 | 946 | nd | 42.4 | nd | nd |
| 1987 | 948 | 1,514 | 54.7 | 34 | 55 |
| 1988 | 376 | 2,379 | 76.5 | 16 | 98 |
| 1989 | 1,017 | 2,222 | 87.6 | 64 | 41 |
| 1990 | 687 | 1,137 | 97.3 | 31 | 19 |
| 1991 | 689 | 1,366 | 84.4 | 30 | 7 |
| 1992 | 686 | 1,433 | 90.3 | 44 | 0 |
| 1993 | 693 | 1,852 | 88.7 | 69 | 0 |
| 1994 | 563 | 1,290 | 83.7 | 35 | 0 |
| 1995 | 333 | 850 | 89.8 | 22 | 0 |
| Total | 9,281 | 18,560 | 946 | 486 | 352 |
| Average | 773.4 | 1,687 | 78.8 | 49 | 35 |
| nd: No Data | | | | | |

Source: *Overseas Employment Statistical Compendium 1982-1995*, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

While such figures may attest to the overall success of the campaign against illegal recruitment, it can also be that worker-applicants victimized by dishonest labor brokers do not report their problems to the authorities. The number of victims involved in these illicit activities continues to be relatively high. And while the disposition rate shows an increasing trend, this is not matched by the number of persons arrested (as distinguished from the number of suspects actually convicted) and the number of establishments closed.

It is fairly easy to establish a private labor recruitment business in the Philippines. In 1979, Abella observed that “to operate a recruitment agency, all that one needs is a room, a few desks, a typewriter, and a telephone”.⁸⁹ Indeed, private intermediaries provide little value-added other than the information they dispense to hopeful applicants.

Concluding Statements

The management and regulation of the private sector is an essential aspect of public policy. Labor out-migration from the Philippines has historically been dominated by private recruitment agencies or labor intermediaries. These intermediaries earn millions of pesos annually from the recruitment fees that are charged to prospective migrant workers. Despite the existence of standards for recruitment fees, these intermediaries continue to charge above and beyond such regulated placement ceilings. Indeed, there is a great deal of “paper compliance” with many of the government regulations regarding recruitment and the participation of the private sector.

...“to operate a recruitment agency, all that one needs is a room, a few desks, a typewriter, and a telephone”

In sum, the paper illustrated how government shifted its policy emphasis from one that sought to eliminate private sector competition (in the hope of establishing a government monopoly in the overseas employment sector) towards one that encouraged private agency participation. It also showed that efforts to implement stricter rules on private sector licensing were eventually reversed, given their dominance of labor out-migration channels. Efforts to curb illegal recruitment activities have not met with much success either, given the almost effortless manner in which recruitment intermediaries are able to establish themselves as a business.

The movement of labor and peoples across borders is an intrinsic feature of global developments. The extent to which this phenomenon is managed and coordinated by national authorities continues to pose a serious challenge to any political administration. The first half of this paper showed that the historic social and political implications of overseas migration cannot be ignored or set aside. For a sending country like the Philippines, the impacts and significance of these human resources outflows are usually understood in the context of the generation of foreign exchange remittances through savings from income sent home by migrant workers worldwide and in the context of creating jobs for people beyond the non-monetary

contributions such as consumption and other durable goods sent by migrants to their families in the Philippines.

Altogether, certain trends and situations have been established in this brief review of the policy perspectives governing overseas employment from the Philippines. State authorities inevitably play a vital role in enhancing and sustaining labor migration. It can be gleaned from this strategic policy perspective that the program that began during the Marcos administration to extensively and systematically export the country's human resources was initially intended as a palliative or temporary measure to address the local economy's inability to provide jobs for workers. However, under succeeding administrations, the policy perspective shifted to one of tacit acceptance of overseas migration as a social reality and phenomenon.

At the start of the program during the mid-1970s, the management response was to monopolize the recruitment and deployment aspects of overseas employment. The idea then was to ensure that the country and the government would gain from the phenomenon to the fullest extent possible towards the achievement of national development goals. The Marcos administration quickly realized the futility of government regulation and abandoned the idea of a monopoly by 1978. It cannot be denied that the extent of private sector participation is and has always been substantial and that the government under Marcos understood the importance of cultivating the cooperation of the private sector in this regard. By the time of the Aquino administration, the goal became one of national recovery. The benefits of overseas employment once again became a crucial factor in the recovery process. Labor out-migration continued under government supervision. And with the advent of the Ramos administration, a new policy response became evident, one that embarked on a more active liberalization program concerning overseas employment through Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act. Such a policy initiative further institutionalized the role of the private sector in the phenomenon.

Notes

- 1 Dean Alegado, "The Labor Export Industry and Post-1986 Philippine Economic Development," *Pilipinas*, Issue Number 29 (Fall 1997), p. 20.
- 2 Manolo Abella and K. Lonnroth, "Orderly Migration of Workers and Incentives to Stay — Options for Emigration Countries," *International Migration Paper No. 5* (Geneva: ILO, 1995), p. 4.
- 3 See, for instance, Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration; Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); Maruja Asis, "The Overseas Employment Program Policy," in *Philippine Labor Migration; Impact and Policy*, Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni, eds. (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992); and the much earlier Catholic Institute for International Relations, *The Labor Trade: Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* (London: CIIR, 1987).
- 4 Prior to this period, however, Filipino craftsmen worked on board ships that plied the galleon trade from the 16th up to the early 19th centuries as cited by Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration; Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore and Manila: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Dela Salle University, 1998). Mention of the Hawaiian experience is made in *The Labour Trade; Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* by the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) (London: CIIR, 1987).
- 5 An indication of their transitory work intention lies in the fact that these migrants were generally recruited on the basis of a work contract. Initially, the Filipinos refused to sign these contracts, not being able to read nor write. However, through a combination of financial incentives and deception, the recruiters and plantation owners were able to bring in large numbers of Filipinos into Hawaii. For details, see *The Labour Trade; Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* by the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) (London: CIIR, 1987).
- 6 About half of the new Filipino migrants entering the US were professionals or relatives of earlier immigrants. See Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration; Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore and Manila: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Dela Salle University, 1998).
- 7 The full title of Act 2486 is "An Act Fixing a Tax Upon Every Person or Entity Engaged in Recruiting or Contracting Laborers." See Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration; Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore and Manila: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Dela Salle University, 1998).
- 8 Philippine Act 3957 of 1933 also regulated the activities of private recruitment entities. See Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration; Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore and Manila: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Dela Salle University, 1998).
- 9 For details, see *The Labour Trade; Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* by the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) (London: CIIR, 1987) and Maruja Asis, "The

- Overseas Employment Program Policy,” in Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni, *Philippine Labor Migration; Impact and Policy* (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992).
- 10 See Maruja Asis, “The Overseas Employment Program Policy,” in Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni, *Philippine Labor Migration; Impact and Policy* (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992).
- 11 For details on the emergence and development of Philippine labor migration policy, see *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 13 See Jorge Tigno, “Labor Recruitment Agencies and the Decision-Making Process in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); Open for Business,” in Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez, eds., *State-Civil Society Relations in Policy-Making* (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997), pp. 243-266.
- 14 See Jorge Tigno, “The Politics of International Labor Migration: Philippine Labor Foreign Policy Toward Saudi Arabia (1979-1989)”, unpublished MA Thesis (Political Science), University of the Philippines (March 1992).
- 15 Lynda Jumilla, “Domingo-Tamano Row Sizzles,” *The Sunday Times* (21 October 1990), p. 1.
- 16 For details, see Patricia Sto Tomas and Jorge Tigno, “Philippine Lessons From the Gulf Crisis: Anatomy of a Contingency Plan,” *Asian Migrant* Vol. 5, No. 2 (April-June 1992): 49-54.
- 17 Stella Go, “Towards the 21st Century: Whither Philippine Labor Migration?,” in Benjamin Cariño, ed., *Filipino Workers on the Move: Trends, Dilemmas, and Policy Options* (Quezon City: Philippine Social Science Center, 1998), p. 35.
- 18 Tigno, “Labor Recruitment Agencies and the Decision-Making Process in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)”, p. 257.
- 19 See Emmanuel de Dios, *The Economic Crisis and its Impact on Labor* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Policy Studies, 1999).
- 20 Number 2, Article 15, Title I, Chapter II, Book I, PD 442.
- 21 Article 20, Title I, Chapter II, Book I, PD 442.
- 22 Article 23, Title I, Chapter II, Book I, PD 442.
- 23 Section 12, Rule V, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 24 Section 23 Rule V and Sections 1 and 3, Rule VI, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 25 Section 27, Rule V, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 26 Section 2, Rule VII, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 27 Sections 2 and 3, Rule IX, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 28 Rule X, Book I, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- 29 Section 4, Executive Order 797: An Order Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment (1984).
- 30 As cited by Asis “The Overseas Employment Program Policy,” p. 73.

- 31 As of this writing, the author has yet to encounter information specific to the actual implementation of such a re-placement and monitoring function.
- 32 Article 1(b), Book One, Philippine Labor Code (1975).
- 33 Article 17, Title One, Philippine Labor Code (1975).
- 34 Section 4, Executive Order 797 "Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and for Other Purposes", (1 May 1982).
- 35 See Preamble to Executive Order 247 (24 July 1987).
- 36 Section 2(b), Republic Act 8042, "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" (7 June 1995).
- 37 Article 12(f), Book One, Philippine Labor Code (1975).
- 38 Article 25, Chapter II, Philippine Labor Code (1975).
- 39 Section 2(1) Article One, Ministry Order Relative to the Establishment and Organization of the POEA Series of June 1982.
- 40 Section 3(a) Executive Order 247 Reorganizing the POEA and for Other Purposes (24 July 1987).
- 41 Section 2, RA 8042 (7 June 1995). Manning agencies are duly licensed entities that recruit seafarers for vessels plying international waters and for related maritime activities.
- 42 See Articles 13(b) and 26, Philippine Labor Code (1975).
- 43 Section 6, RA 8042 (7 June 1995).
- 44 Catholic Institute for International Relations, *The Labor Trade; Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* (Manila and London: Kaibigan, NASSA, CIIR, 1987), p. 120.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 See Letter of Instruction 852 (1 May 1979) as cited by Ibid., p. 26.
- 47 See Nieves Confesor, "Labor and Employment," in Jose Abueva, Emerlinda Roman, eds., *The Aquino Administration: Record and Legacy (1986-1992)* (Diliman: U.P. Press, 1992).
- 48 See Asis, "The Overseas Employment Program Policy."
- 49 Section One, Executive Order 857 (12 December 1982).
- 50 Section Three, Executive Order 857 (12 December 1982).
- 51 See Executive Order 1021 (1 May 1985).
- 52 Ricardo Casco, editor, "A White Paper Managing International Labor Migration and the Framework for the Deregulation of the POEA," unpublished (1 October 1997), p. 4.
- 53 Ricardo Casco, editor, "A White Paper Managing International Labor Migration and the Framework for the Deregulation of the POEA," unpublished (1 October 1997), p. 9.
- 54 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations Paper (October 1988), p. 7.
- 55 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations Paper (October 1988), p. 7-8.

- 56 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations Paper (October 1988), p. 9-10.
- 57 Manolo Abella, "Policies and Institutions for the Orderly Movement of Labor Abroad," in *Orderly International Migration of Workers and Incentives to Stay – Options for Emigration Countries*, eds., Manolo Abella and K.J. Lonnroth (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1995), p. 4.
- 58 Manolo Abella, "Policies and Institutions for the Orderly Movement of Labor Abroad," in *Orderly International Migration of Workers and Incentives to Stay – Options for Emigration Countries*, eds., Manolo Abella and K.J. Lonnroth (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1995), p. 4.
- 59 Ronald Skeldon, "The Future of Labor Migration in Asia: Patterns, Issues, Policies," Mahidol University, Thailand (September 1998), <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mm21/Skeldon.html>.
- 60 Department Order Number 2 (1993).
- 61 Dean Alegado, "The Labor Export Industry and Post-1986 Philippine Economic Development," *Pilipinas*, Issue Number 29 (Fall 1997), p. 23.
- 62 "Towards an Equitable and Rational Placement Fee Policy," no author, no date.
- 63 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations Paper (October 1988), p. 12.
- 64 Migrants Standing Committee, Saint Christopher's Parish Pastoral Council, "A Survey on Placement Fees Paid by Taiwan-Bound OFWs to Philippine Agencies," unpublished (October-December 1996), p. 2.
- 65 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations Paper (October 1988), p. 12.
- 66 No Author, "White Paper on the Phase-Out Policy," unpublished paper (19 October 1977), p. 8.
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- 68 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Response to New Market Opportunities: The Case of the Overseas Employment Sector," Working Paper Series No. 89-11, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) (June 1989), p. 4.
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- 74 Manolo Abella, *Export of Filipino Manpower* (Manila: Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, 1979), p. 77.

- 75 Manolo Abella, *Export of Filipino Manpower* (Manila: Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, 1979), p. 79.
- 76 No Author, "The Deployment Record of Recruitment Agencies in 1985-1986, 1988: Implications for Policy," unpublished Policy Study Series Number 2, no date, p. 3.
- 77 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Response to New Market Opportunities: The Case of the Overseas Employment Sector," Working Paper Series No. 89-11, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) (June 1989), p. 7.
- 78 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, "Response to New Market Opportunities: The Case of the Overseas Employment Sector," Working Paper Series No. 89-11, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) (June 1989), pp. 4, 7.
- 79 Carmela Torres, "The New Overseas Employment Program: Effectively Managing the Labor Migration Process," *PIDS Development Research News*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 11; 1, 10-13
- 80 Carmela Torres, "The New Overseas Employment Program: Effectively Managing the Labor Migration Process," *PIDS Development Research News*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 11; 1, 10-13.
- 81 Department of Labor and Employment, *White Paper: The Overseas Employment Program* (Manila: DOLE, April 1995), p. 1.
- 82 Ricardo Casco, editor, "A White Paper Managing International Labor Migration and the Framework for the Deregulation of the POEA," unpublished (1 October 1997), p. 6, 7.
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- 88 No Author, "The Deployment Record of Recruitment Agencies in 1985-1986, 1988: Implications for Policy," unpublished Policy Study Series Number 2, no date, p. 10.
- 89 Manolo Abella, *Export of Filipino Manpower* (Manila: Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, 1979), p. 76.

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