



UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES  
CENTER FOR  
INTEGRATIVE AND  
DEVELOPMENT  
STUDIES

Proceedings

# THE KATIPUNAN DIALOGUE 2021

A Podcast Series on Politics  
and International Relations





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## FOREWORD

It is with great pride that we are publishing the proceedings of the Katipunan Dialogue Podcast 2021 Series, which was originally made available for streaming between July and August 2021. The Katipunan Podcast is a reimagining of the annual Katipunan Conference to meet the needs and restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Much like its prior incarnation, the Katipunan Podcast continues to be a platform for assessing the strategic environment of the Philippines through a dialogue between academic experts and practitioners. This year's topics have been about the transformations caused by the pandemic to the immediate regional environment of the country, and the responses both of the Philippine government and those of the global community. Ever since its inception in 2015, the Katipunan Conferences have seen the region in flux, with changes in power dynamics, continuities in economic prospects, and fluidity in the future role of multilateralism and regional institutions. This year's podcast episodes document the acceleration of these changes and the attempts of governments to adjust their policies to a new 'normal'.

When planning for this year's podcast episodes, significant, ongoing alterations to the geopolitical realities were accounted. The uncertainties imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent government responses to balance pandemic restrictions with economic openness have made it necessary for the organizers to rethink the actual conduct and scope of the episodes. The reconfigured structure of the Katipunan Conference into a six-part podcast series centered on subsequent discussions in an attempt to make each episode relevant given the temporal context, as it is impossible to discuss the current strategic environment without having to put it in the context of the impact of the pandemic. Yet, it is, more importantly, an affirmation of

the principal contention of the UP CIDS–SSP that strategic studies and strategic affairs have a connotation that is broader in scope for developing countries than the more traditional understanding that defines this scope in terms of the politico-military concerns of interstate relations.

The Katipunan Dialogue Podcast is organized annually by the Strategic Studies Program (SSP) of the University of the Philippines (UP) Center for Integrative and Development Studies (CIDS). For the past two years, the Philippine Office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) had very generously agreed to co-organize this event. That the Katipunan Podcast was held amid a pandemic was in no small way due to the unwavering support and participation of the KAS Philippines and the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies. For this, I would like to extend my thanks. I would also like to acknowledge that the webinar series would not have been possible without the hard work of the SSP staff, namely Maria Nikka U. Garriga and Marvin H. Bernardo.

The UP CIDS Strategic Studies Program remains committed to the building of a solid network of scholars and practitioners interested in the propagation of strategic studies as a field, and to sustained productive engagement with policymakers and other state-holders in the country's security and resilience.

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Convenor, Strategic Studies Program  
Center for Integrative and Development Studies  
University of the Philippines  
and  
Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*



## EPISODE 1

# Emerging Economic and Strategic Environment in Asia

### Guests:

**Tina S. Clemente, PhD**

*Professor, Asian Center*

*University of the Philippines Diliman*

**Rizal Sukma, PhD**

*Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies*

*Jakarta, Indonesia*

### Host:

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Professor, Department of Political Science*

*University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode focused on emerging trends in the economic and strategic environment in East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, specifically on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on these developments and its resulting challenges and opportunities for the region.

In the first part of the episode, the guests were asked about their views on the current strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific and the degree to which the pandemic has shaped relations among states in the region. Dr. Rizal Sukma cited a number of significant changes that have taken place as a result of COVID-19: the delay in what he referred to as the “mergers of the Indo-Pacific as the new center of gravity;”

the intensification of rivalries among great powers; and the greater dependence on China for economic recovery among regional states. For Professor Tina Clemente, another emerging trend in the region is the variations in the economic recovery of states:

The good news is that recovery is underway, right? However, it's very uneven. The Asia-Pacific region is quite large . . . and we see that recovery varies. For instance, in South Asia, the downturns are pretty bad. We know that [the] surge in India right now is really awful. It's forecasted to push [back] growth because it had a very, very sharp downturn.

In contrast, she cited the 2.9-percent growth in Vietnam, making it the best performing economy in Asia and even surpassing China in 2020. These variations in economic recovery, according to Clemente, suggest that the region may still be in a “wait-and-see mode” as the performance of economies will always be contingent on a confluence of factors. This includes the ability of governments to control the effect of the pandemic, where those that emphasize the importance of testing than controls on mobility fare better in terms of results than governments that implement the opposite. The ability of economies to restructure their industries is also crucial, especially for countries that rely on sectors that were hard-hit by COVID-19, such as tourism and other related industries. The onset of other crises as a result of natural disasters and political instability may also challenge the path to economic recovery for many states. She added:

I think at the center of these is the very big issue of inequality. We talk about inequality in many different dimensions as an explanation for the varying scenes we see across countries. But also, because of the pandemic, we see that those inequalities are further exacerbated. [I think] those things will matter [in terms of] how we make our forecast and how we produce our strategic outlook moving forward.

Sukma was asked to expound on his observation on the intensification of rivalries among great powers within the context

of the Indo-Pacific as the fulcrum or venue in which this situation is unfolding. He points to an instance of how vaccines, to a certain extent, have been used to leverage influence and improve the reputation of countries like China and the United States in the region:

I think we are aware of how the narrative is being framed regarding [vaccine diplomacy] as a new arena for competition. [It is not] helpful for many countries especially those from emerging or poor countries. But, unfortunately, being a realist, we have to really accept the fact their rivalry has accelerated [because of the] pandemic.

Will the growing tensions between the United States and China have an impact on the prospects for economic recovery in the region? According to Clemente, the trend toward adopting protectionist policies within the context of sanctions being implemented on both sides is a cause of concern for the ability of states to take advantage of trade. An observation about the varied experiences of economies in the region is the importance of trade in order to bounce back—especially considering the effect of COVID-19 on the services sector across the world. She likewise emphasized the need to diversify the current structure of industries and find new markets for exports in response to the adverse disruption caused by the pandemic to the global supply chain:

What makes it so challenging is that all these things need to be considered at the same time. . . The thing [about] crisis [is that] there's always a call for course correction. Economies that are able to adapt faster and more completely [also] perform better. . . So, I would see that crisis is really an opportunity.

One would expect that the crosscutting nature and effect of global issues like pandemics would lead to a greater emphasis on multilateral responses between states. Yet, much of what has transpired in the international community appears to suggest otherwise. How is the current rivalry between the United States and China impacting the prospects for multilateralism and cooperation in addressing the long-term strategic and economic effects of COVID-19 in the region?

Sukma said that as countries learn more about the disease, governments will eventually see the advantage of resorting to engagements using multilateral platforms. An example of this is the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2020, which he explained as a possible indication that states are seeing the benefit of promoting regional economic cooperation and integration to address the challenges posed by COVID-19. For Clemente, more attention from states should indeed be directed towards developing more cooperative frameworks between states to cope with the immediate, and any further anticipated, economic fallout from the pandemic. She also emphasized the need for an honest conversation on structural reforms as social inequalities, such as in health, education, and access to technologies, continue to worsen in many parts of the world.

Listen to the rest of the conversations in this episode through <https://anchor.fm/katipunan-podcast> or search The Katipunan Dialogue on Spotify and Google Podcasts.

## EPISODE 2

# Civil–Military Relations in Southeast Asia

### Guests:

**Aries A. Arugay, PhD**

*Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

**Evan Laksmana, PhD**

*Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies  
Jakarta, Indonesia*

### Host:

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode delved into the complex issues surrounding the state of democratic civilian control of the military, or a lack thereof, in Southeast Asia. One of the recent and noticeable trends in the region is the inclination of some leaders to rely heavily on the military and the security apparatus of the state. What does this suggest as far as the role of the military in domestic politics is concerned?

According to Professor Aries Arugay, the continuing salience of the military, particularly in transitioning societies, may be attributed to the role of coercion in governance and the historical legacies of former colonies in Asia. He explained:

A lot of Asian political regimes, particularly those that haven't fully consolidated their democracy, have turned

into the military. This has something to do with historical legacies in the early part of their post-colonial nation formation. [It] means that the military has been salient in the governance and the political histories of a lot of the society. Maybe the proper observation is [whether] the military really left the political sphere or has there been roles been just shifting in accordance with the dynamics between states and society as a nation.

The same observation was echoed by Dr. Evan Laksmana, who cited Indonesia as an example of how the military continues to have an informal yet influential role in domestic politics, despite its detachment in terms of assuming formal political roles. Even when addressing the challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, Laksmana said that the Indonesian government has relied heavily on the police and the military in executing its national pandemic response policies:

The problem with that approach at least in terms of the pandemic is that it has reduced the role of science and public health in managing the pandemic. . . . If you militarize public health, [where] you treat information as a secret [or] as an intelligence source that you don't want it to distribute [as it would] create panic or even be used by your enemies, [it] creates a lot of problems [particularly] in how Indonesia has dealt with the pandemic very much earlier on.

Indonesia also struggles from weak civilian institutions, which may also be a condition that has contributed to the continuing role of retired military officers in domestic politics—whether in terms of holding membership in political parties, running for local offices, or sitting in parliament, according to Laksmana.

In the case of the Philippines, Arugay explained that looking into how the Philippine military was created and how its performance during the early years of its establishment may shed light on the extent of military influence in Philippine politics. Unlike its counterparts like the Tentara Nasional Indonesia or the Tatmadaw in Myanmar, the Philippine military is actually a neocolonial army whose role has always

been influenced by its notion of being the protector of the state and its people. He added:

This messianic complex [is] something that it shares with a lot of Latin American military in the sense that it can pass judgment to the legitimacy of an existing civilian government. However, . . . [we see in] the current Duterte administration [that] the military can also provide additional political legitimacy to an existing populist government. So, this symbiotic relationship that we see [between] Duterte the populist leader and the military seems like the perfect combination.

Compared to the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who managed to “still [be] on top of things” despite having a lot of retired military officials under her own regime, the current administration seems to have given the military a free pass even on a lot of matters, like day-to-day governing and policy matters, among others. This has led to what he described as an “explosive cocktail” in which “the civil and military side are both contributing to democratic erosion in the Philippines:”

I think what is happening now is more dangerous than 10 years ago during the Arroyo administration because you have this double whammy. You have a popular autocratic president who relies on the military, but at the same time, the military is also hugely popular in terms of institutional trust ratings—the highest since public opinion was allowed to be conducted in the Philippines. [The military is] also taking advantage of this door that has been opened for them to finally accomplish what I would say [is] the victory that it has been looking for since it was established centuries ago.

The same indicators are also observable in the current political landscape in Indonesia, including the “backsliding in terms of civil society and anti-corruption” under the terms of President Joko Widodo—and this trend may still continue in the years to come. For

Laksmana, the ability of the Indonesian military to get strong political support from both the President and national political parties is a cause of concern because it affects the extent to which civilian oversight is observed in government. The weakening of parliament's role in implementing institutional parameters and a seemingly fractured civil society also add to the complexity of the civil-military situation in Indonesia.

These developments have serious implications where human rights protection and promotion are actually concerned. In the Philippines, Arugay raised the need to restart the security sector reform process, which he believes may be less difficult to do now than it was 15 years ago. He likewise noted that the Philippine military is "in no way a monolithic institution" and that there are some military officials who see the benefit in an armed force "that is above politics [and is] politically neutral" because "it enables them to perform their functions more effectively."

For Laksmana, a key reform that has to be made in this context for Indonesia is for the government to understand that defense transformation "is not just about more money, more guns." It should also focus on "institutional reforms in terms of doctrine, training, exercises, education, and particularly [on] personnel policies," which he described as "under institutionalized [given] the lack of meritocracy [and] the prevalence of patron-client relationships within personnel management and promotions."

Listen to the rest of the conversations in this episode through <https://anchor.fm/katipunan-podcast> or search The Katipunan Dialogue on Spotify and Google Podcasts.



## EPISODE 3

# Regional Crisis Management: Multilateralism

### Guests:

**Sarah Teo, PhD**

*Research Fellow and Coordinator, Regional Security Architecture Program  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore*

**RAdm. Rommel Jude Ong (Ret.)**

*Professor of Praxis, School of Government  
Ateneo de Manila University*

### Host:

**Jean Encinas Franco, PhD**

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode examined the challenges and prospects for multilateral engagements to address the various security issues facing Southeast Asia. The strategic competition between the United States and China continues to challenge centrality in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as member states refrain from choosing sides between both influential actors in the region. How do countries implement multilateral engagements amid major power rivalries?

Dr. Sarah Teo defined multilateralism as a “broad and inclusive” form of engagement that is often associated with ASEAN-related platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting-Plus (ADMM).

She pointed out two important functions of multilateralism in instances of heightened competition. One, it allows for dialogue and cooperation among competing actors, therefore providing “additional options [for communication] that can be quite useful as well.” Second, multilateral engagements ensure that smaller regional countries are not left out in the decision-making process.

In the case of the current United States-China competition, Teo said that what is taking place in the region is more exclusive multilateral or minilateral arrangements to prop up its own side in the rivalry. This includes the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative on the side of China; and new frameworks like the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue for the United States and its allies. She added:

But I think, at this stage, most regional states still see the value of broad and inclusive multilateralism. Ideally, this kind of large-scale multilateralism should continue to coexist alongside new smaller, more exclusive groupings. [It] also depends on when the member states continue to see the utility in such platforms 5 or 10 years down the road.

For Rear Admiral Rommel Ong, while the ADMM and the ARF serve as ideal starting points for dealing with the impact of the United States-China competition for Southeast Asia, tensions among ASEAN member states and their respective interests in engaging with major powers may also contribute to the overall dynamics in the region. He explained:

We have ADMM, we have ARF and the ADMM Plus and the ARF Plus which actually covers the [small] powers, middle powers and the great powers. But there’s still much room needed for those mechanisms to [make ASEAN] a relevant player in the region. ASEAN needs to do more to become relevant.

One of the discussion points in last year’s ARF was the call among member states to advance the Code of Conduct (COC) for the South

China Sea. However, negotiations continue to face many obstacles, largely because of competing interests while the region avoids being caught in the middle. Teo noted that while the COC may eventually be regarded as a “diplomatic achievement for ASEAN,” it is likely that the best outcome from the negotiations would be a document that is a “political statement [that is] nonbinding [and] without much legal force” similar to the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. She added:

I think it is important to keep in mind that the Code of Conduct is not really the be-all and all in of the issue because there are other related mechanisms as well, such as CUES [Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea] and various expert working groups in the ADMM Plus. All these also contribute indirectly or directly to keeping the South China Sea peaceful, so I think that’s something that should be kept in mind moving forward.

In relation to the discussion on relevance, will the emergence of other groupings like the QUAD affect ASEAN centrality as a framework that underpins the relationship of member states with major powers in the region? Teo described “centrality” relative to its geographic, institutional, and strategic dimensions, and said that there are early signs that suggest how the presence of the QUAD could highlight the “lack of strategic centrality in ASEAN.” Ong echoed the same sentiments and emphasized the need for the ASEAN as a bloc to be more proactive in stepping up its role as “the primary driving force” in the region.

Nevertheless, both Ong and Teo agreed that the prospects for future engagements in defense cooperation in the region are still promising. Ong shared that he is now in the second phase of a study on minilaterals as a model for addressing perennial security issues in Southeast Asia, which Teo also sees as an emerging mechanism among ASEAN member states moving forward. Regional countries may find mini or bilateral engagements more beneficial—compared to large-scale, multilateral ones—especially amidst the impact of the growing Sino-American rivalry for ASEAN.

Teo concluded that another trend in regional defense cooperation is how platforms like the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus will engage other countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, and France within the context of their growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, and how ASEAN is starting to enhance cooperation in other key emerging areas of concern like cyber security and responding to threats that are biological or chemical in nature.

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## EPISODE 4

# Realignment of Forces in the Indo-Pacific

### Guests:

**Rajeswari Rajagopalan, PhD**

*Director, Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology  
Observer Research Foundation, India*

**Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista (Ret.)**

*Former Chief of Staff  
Armed Forces of the Philippines*

### Host:

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode examined the evolving security situation in the Indo-Pacific by discussing the movements and build-up of security forces around the region. One of the most significant developments at the turn of the century is the rise of China and its growing assertiveness on security and strategic issues. The United States has identified the Chinese as a strategic competitor, which observers expect would have implications for security in the region.

For General Emmanuel Bautista, the Indo-Pacific has indeed become the epicenter of geopolitical competition, largely because of its strategic location. The spectrum is such that on one side, there is an “overwhelming power project capability” of the United States-led liberal order, and on the other, there is China as an economic and military powerhouse challenging the current world order. Bautista added that

while a number of flashpoints are starting to become more prominent in the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the QUAD and the involvement of European powers could balance China's growing assertiveness.

Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan noted that countries in the Indo-Pacific, including India, initially chose not to take sides between the United States and China in order to avoid being dragged into the competition between these two major powers. However, the increasing assertive posture, particularly in the South China Sea dispute, has resulted in a shift in how countries in the region are now recognizing the need to respond to China's behavior. She added:

It's not easy given that much of the region [is] dependent on China on trade and investment of economic front. But when it comes to security, political, [or] sovereignty-related issues, they don't see eye to eye with China. . . . The fact the ASEAN did [come] out [with] the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific clearly says a lot about the changing status orientation. Even India for instance . . . began to see the validity and usefulness of embracing the US and [its] allies. I think this has been the case for quite [a number of] years now at least [when] Xi Jin Ping [came] into power in China.

The question for many countries in the region is the extent of leadership on the part of the United States in this apparent coalition. What is the current perception of US power in the Indo-Pacific and its commitment to the security of the region, especially within the context of a rising China? According to Rajagopalan, there initially was apprehension during the transition from the administration of Donald Trump to that of Joe Biden, particularly about how the latter will approach its role in the Indo-Pacific and if he will continue with Trump's hardline policy against China. She explained:

I think those apprehensions have been somewhat put to rest. The initial skepticism was that traditionally, you have seen a democratic administration in the White House pursuing a much more accommodating approach towards

China. [With] Biden being a Vice President during the former Obama administration, there was a sense that he might carry forward to that particular approach. But I think it was a very different China that he was dealing with [then]. . . . Therefore, today, the Biden administration appears to be a lot more realistic about what China's powers really mean and how we need to respond [to] China's policy with a lot more determination and focus.

A closer look at the evolution of the United States' policy pronouncements suggests that perceptions about the major power's role in the region are changing, Bautista said. This is likely driven by a confluence of domestic, political, economic, and even strategic considerations. In the past, there was an impression that the United States adopted a "policy of strategic ambiguity [by] distancing itself from territorial disputes," such that it focused more on "broadening its allies" in Europe and in the Middle East in line with its War on Terror campaign. The rise of China, however, implied a shift in this strategy:

Now, Americans want [their government to take] a stronger position against China and they are blaming China for its economic loss, including unemployment and other issues [like] cyber threats, election interference, human rights [issues]. . . . [There are] also strategic considerations because China now wants to challenge the United States.

Bautista added that countries should not be contented with being just an observer of Washington's policy and commitment to the region by pursuing a more proactive approach in influencing its action, rather than waiting for the country to respond to developments in the Indo-Pacific.

Another emerging trend is the extent to which China has built up its military capacity and maritime reach to project its regional presence. How is this development affecting the dynamics among countries and their relationship with other influential actors in the region? India can be cited as an example of this. Rajagopalan described New Delhi as perhaps "the weakest link" in the QUAD because, for decades, it chose to "sit on the fence" on most important security, defense, and foreign

policy issues in the Indo-Pacific. Even taking part in the QUAD, which India has always thought to be an attempt to counter China's influence in the region, was something the country was "not comfortable" being a part of. However, the clash between China and India in May 2020 at the border in Eastern Ladakh changed all that. She explained:

The Galwan [Valley] conflict in 2020 was a big marker [for] India's approach as far as China is concerned. That [incident] made India realize the need to embrace the US, its allies, and other Indo-Pacific regional powers, whether it's Japan, Australia, or ASEAN countries. All of them have gained further significance. . . . You also have the QUAD Plus that has come about as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of vaccine diplomacy and economic recovery. I do believe that it has the potential to emerge as a grouping that would have a strategic relevance in the post-COVID-19 scenario.

While the emergence of the QUAD plus is expected to gain momentum, Bautista noted that minilaterals will also be another mechanism for engagement among countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially within the context of China's aggressive behavior and its intensifying rivalry with the United States. Another possibility that Bautista is hoping would emerge is for ASEAN "to find the motivation to play a bigger role than what it is doing now" to balance China.

Rajagopalan echoed the same observation, adding that building new partnerships and exploring different mechanisms to promote a more coordinated approach among countries in the region are crucial in responding to pressing security issues in the Indo-Pacific moving forward.

To learn more about the conversations in this episode, visit <https://anchor.fm/katipunan-podcast> or search The Katipunan Dialogue on Spotify and Google Podcasts.



## EPISODE 5

### Gender and Security

#### Guests:

**Jean S. Encinas-Franco, PhD**

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

**Maria Tanyag, PhD**

*Research Fellow and Lecturer, Department of International Relations  
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University*

#### Host:

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode assessed the intersectionality of gender and security, particularly on the challenges and prospects of security issues in Southeast Asia from a gender-inclusive and gender-aware policy lens. Analysis of security priorities—such as violent extremism, peace negotiations, and crisis management—requires a gender-sensitive approach, especially if within the context of developing a more inclusive security agenda.

Associate Professor Jean Encinas-Franco explained that discussions on the link between gender and security comprise how women can meaningfully participate in peace and security processes, institutions, and mechanisms beyond just being perceived as “peaceful negotiators.” “Women,” she said, “are not just civilians [but] they are also warriors, combatants, and leaders in peace processes.”

Dr. Maria Tanyag added that the perception of women as “peaceful negotiators” may be attributed to how society, in general, observes gender relations at home, in which family members have to come to expect women to manage the domestic work and needs of the household. She further explained:

It’s also not just the way in which labor and households, families, and communities are organized according to who does what and where. It’s also important to think about symbolic and cultural constructions of masculinities and femininities. Our expectations of what makes a good leader in times of crises . . . of the role of women in times of war . . . and of the role of civil society [are] also part of how we understand masculinity and femininities.

Another fundamental aspect in the discourse is how diversity in gender representation contributes to a more inclusive decision-making process in addressing various security and defense-related issues, Tanyag said. This particularly includes women’s participation in the peace process and apart from issues of welfare and health that have often been linked to what she described as “the gendered allocation of labor associated with women.”

According to Tanyag, constructions of masculinity and femininity in Southeast Asia are often contextualized and shaped by history. The case of the Philippines is an example of how kinship politics has allowed women to go into power on the one hand, yet also reinforces paternalist tendencies on the other:

That’s also the problem because I think that when we’re very much based on [these] familial and kinship relationships, there’s also a tendency to reinforce a strong male leader . . . at the higher levels of power, particularly [in] the security sector. There is still what I would argue a strong belief of the seductions of [a] very benevolent paternalist leader in times of crisis. Looking at our region, the Philippines in particular, we have had very deeply rooted cultural ideas about the strong man and how that infiltrates all areas of decision-making, especially in the security sector.

While there have been significant strides in the participation of women in the Philippine military, Franco cautioned against popularizing an image that feminizes the role of Filipino women in the military. An example of this is the Philippine Coast Guard’s Angels of the Sea, referring to female radio operators deployed in patrols over the West Philippine Sea to diffuse tension-filled encounters with foreign vessels. She likewise emphasized that gender representation should also take into account the concept of intersectionality:

For instance, when we talk about intersectionality, we’ve looked for many years to Aung San Suu Kyi and Cory Aquino, [who] were hailed as icons of democracy in Southeast Asia. Lately, [Suu Kyi] has been pilloried for her actions towards the Rohingya. The situation is very fluid. But, again, [inclusivity] depends on women’s position, their class, [and] their ethnicity. It’s not just putting women there but the types of women that can move for better outcomes for the peace process.

In terms of the Philippine peace process, Franco also cited the importance of including men’s participation in the process to fully grasp the extent of issues at the community level—especially in areas which strongly adhere to traditional beliefs and values.

Another perspective raised by Tanyag within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has to do with the role of women in health security, as the global healthcare workforce has been “largely feminized” because of how the sector is viewed in International Relations as a nontraditional security issue; while security in the traditional sense (e.g., militaries or territories) is often perceived to be male-dominated. She said:

It actually wasn’t a surprise that when the pandemic hit, you had a largely feminized or a female lead workforce responding to the crisis. . . . With existing gender divisions of labor, the bulk of caring is done by women. Whichever pandemic or country, evidence show[s] that women—because of their caregiving roles—have been on the

frontlines of responding to pandemic, whether formally or informally.

Franco added that even calling healthcare workers “frontliners” may suggest a gendered viewpoint because the pandemic is not a form of war. “Feminists,” she said, “are also very critical of looking at COVID as a war because it’s very gendered, especially if you call nurses “frontliners.” It means that they are basically a shield that will take a bullet for the citizens. It is unfortunate that they have been called as “frontliners,” but it’s also been normalized by the media.”

Both experts agree that more should be done in promoting a balanced and substantive representation of women in leadership roles across politics and in the security sector. This is especially crucial for the Philippines, due in large part to former President Rodrigo Duterte’s misogynist rhetoric, which Franco has observed to likely affect women’s participation in Philippine politics. Tanyag added that there should be more conversations about how misogyny and hypermasculinity could have impact on leadership, or a lack thereof, during times of global crises.

Listen to the rest of the conversations in this episode through <https://anchor.fm/katipunan-podcast> or search The Katipunan Dialogue on Spotify and Google Podcasts.

## EPISODE 6

### Energy Security

#### Guests:

**Jalton Taguibao, PhD**

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

**Karl Robert Jandoc, PhD**

*Associate Professor, School of Economics  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

#### Host:

**Herman Joseph Kraft**

*Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of the Philippines Diliman*

This episode delved into the challenges and prospects of securing energy resources for the Philippines. The recent trend in the discussions about energy security has gone beyond concerns about resource scarcity, revolving even more within the context of climate change. For a country that continues to rely on the importation of fossil fuels, what strategic policies should be considered and implemented in order to ensure a stable and sustainable supply of energy for the Philippines?

According to Associate Professor Karl Jandoc, the most present issue is the eventual depletion of the Malampaya gas field and the urgent need for alternative sources of energy. The Malampaya gas field (Service Contract 38) is currently the main source of natural gas for five power plants—Ilihan, San Lorenzo, Santa Rita, San Gabriel, and Abion—supplying over 20 percent of Luzon's power requirements.

Observers project that natural gas production in Malampaya could dry up by 2030. Jandoc added that there are also a number of gas sales in purchase agreements (GSPAs) that will expire as early as next year. He explained:

There is a very urgent need to conduct petroleum exploration activities, which will hopefully lead to significant discoveries of an alternative to the current Malampaya reservoir under SC 38. The government also has to decide on the extension of the GSPAs in Malampaya or execute new ones so that [a] steady supply of natural gas is ensured. Otherwise, you lose 20 percent of generated electricity from natural gas.

While importing liquefied natural gas may also be an alternative, Jandoc underscored that such an option will require “big-ticket infrastructure investments,” including terminals, storage facilities, and pipelines, all of which may be a challenge to establish immediately.

For Associate Professor Jalton Taguibao, energy security should also include diversifying its sources of energy to ensure stability, accessibility, and affordability for the sectors that consume energy. The Philippines faces a number of challenges in a number of policy areas. One of this pertains to research and development, which also ties to policies on technology transfer:

We use renewable energy technology or energy technologies—how much of these are proprietary; how much of these are imported; and how much of these are generated locally? If we abide by that desire to be self-reliant in producing energy, we have to be able to set up a very capable manufacturing scene for renewable energy technologies and even energy technologies in general. The problem is that our [energy] manufacturing sectors are still very thin, generally. Then, you have implications [on] transfer technology policy that is strategically required to be able to achieve that goal.

Another challenge is sustainability in production, or policies that promote energy efficiency amidst increasing consumption demand, and policies that address infrastructure requirements to ensure energy supply security. Addressing investments in infrastructure, Jandoc said, also requires an assessment of the direction the Philippines will take in addressing both its energy needs and environmental considerations:

Ultimately, what the future looks like are renewables. In terms of developing such infrastructures needed for renewables, I think the policies involved must be “coherent and correct” [such that] the transition towards renewables should not be “shrinking the economy.”

An example of policies that “shrink the economy” is the Philippines’ implementation of a feed-in tariff allowance to subsidize energy developers. Jandoc said that this contributed to higher electricity prices since the subsidies are shouldered by consumers with hardly any improvement in electricity generation from renewables; he added that the government should instead encourage systemic innovations that will improve the integration of renewables into the country’s energy mix.

Taguibao also emphasized the need to revisit and streamline initiatives on energy security at the national and local levels, especially considering the constraints that continue to impede the implementation of such policies:

You might have policies or the principles have [been] set. But at the implementation level, one of the major reasons for the delay in the implementation of the Renewable Energy Act was actually the approval of the IRRs [Implementing Rules and Regulations]. You have the Renewable Energy Act [but] only to be confronted by implementation constraints because the IRR for each aspect of the policy is unavailable. The average time for the passage of an IRR is about a year and a half to two [years]—if you are lucky [and] if there’s already a consensus among implementers.

In addition to addressing challenges in infrastructure and policy implementation, the Philippines also needs to diversify its energy sources in order to lessen its dependence on the importation of fossil fuels. The volatility in global supply and geopolitical dynamics are among the factors that contribute to the country's high electricity rates, which are considered one of the highest in the region.

Nevertheless, both experts concurred that diversifying the country's energy sources requires a careful balancing act between deciding the extent of diversification and what resources are needed in order to successfully transition from one energy source to another. "There is a difference between what is your energy source and what is the capacity of your energy source in producing energy," Taguibao explained.

Jandoc, who is currently working on a study on transitional resources of energy, added that identifying alternative indigenous sources will need coordination, investments, and foresight on the part of leaders as it is a multi-administration initiative. He added:

If you want to diversify away from coal and [from] more expensive and more polluting resources . . . then you must consider other sources of technologies like natural gas. Natural gas is less polluting than coal and that could aid in the transition towards renewables. . . . It's a careful balancing act towards the transition ports of renewables and you have to consider all these types of technologies when you go through that transition.

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