Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines*

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While patronage is found in a wide range of political systems, it has a differential impact on the territorial character of polities and on their overall quality of governance. James Scott speaks of the capacity of patronage to act as “political cement,” 1 and Robert Putnam observes that late-nineteenth-century patronage practices in Italy rendered “political channels... more important than administrative channels” in linking local interests to the capital. 2 Through a comparison of three Asian polities with well-developed systems of patronage politics, this chapter examines the degree to which patronage structures provide this critical “political cement” between the national and local levels. While patronage is ubiquitous, its mere presence does not mean that central-local relations are necessarily defined more by “political channels” than “administrative channels.” The relative importance of patronage as a territorial glue, I argue, relates to the nature of the broader institutional context.

The key elements of this context include both linkages between national bureaucracies (commonly but not necessarily Ministries of the Interior or Home Affairs) and local government units, and linkages that can be provided by coherent and well-institutionalized national political parties. The first goal of this chapter is to examine how variations in institutional context help us to understand the territorial impact of patronage flows. In strong institutional contexts, where agencies of the national bureaucracy are effective in extending central authority throughout the territory and political parties are coherent and well institutionalized, patronage flows are relatively less important in linking local interests to the capital. In weak institutional contexts, where agencies of the national bureaucracy are less effective in extending central authority throughout the territory and political parties are less coherent and well institutionalized, patronage flows may act as basic “political cement” in binding the policy together on a territorial basis. In the latter situation, one can speak of a “patronage-based state.” A second goal is to put forward a proposition relating to the key criteria determining the character of patronage flows: the weaker the institutional context, the greater the allocation of patronage through direct personalistic ties (and vice versa). My

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third goal, closely related, is to overcome some longstanding conceptual confusion between
the terms “patronage” and “clientelism.” After untangling these overlapping yet distinct
concepts, I differentiate between impersonal patronage flows and personalistic patronage
flows; the latter, I explain, should be termed “clientelistic patronage.”

These issues are examined through a broad-brushed analysis of patronage structures in
Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines. There is a strong basis for comparison among these
three countries. In terms of formal territorial structure, all three are unitary states. Ethno-
linguistic differentiation within the three countries is relatively low (in the case of Japan
and Thailand) or relatively weakly politicized (in the case of the Philippines). Regional
differentiation has salience in all three cases, but it is most contentious in Thailand and
the Philippines, where there have been major secessionist conflicts in the southern
provinces of both countries. In addition, all three countries are well known for high levels
of patronage flows and “money politics” and figure prominently in literatures on patronage
and clientelism. Yet while patronage is widespread in all three cases, it exists in very distinct
institutional contexts. The 2 x 2 matrix in table 8.1 seeks to capture major differences among
the three countries in the institutional context of patronage flows linking capital and
countryside, beginning with the presumption that there are three major types of linkages
between national and subnational units of government: an effective bureaucratic apparatus,
coherent and well-institutionalized political parties, and patronage flows.

To sharpen the contrast, I am examining the nature of patronage structures in the
three democratic settings circa the early and mid-1990s. Japan very clearly combines a
strong national bureaucracy and strong political parties—from the creation of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955 until the 1994 electoral reform and the relative demise of

Table 8.1. Institutional contexts of patronage flows linking capital and countryside

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National bureaucracy linkages with local governments (via Ministries of Interior/Home Affairs or other agencies)</th>
<th>relatively stronger</th>
<th>relatively weaker</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatively stronger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatively weaker</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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VOLUMES XVI AND XVII (2017)
the LDP. Thailand falls in the “strong-weak” quadrant, combining a strong and powerful Ministry of the Interior able to trace its influence back to the late nineteenth century with the emergence of notoriously weak political parties in recent decades. My focus is on the period after the fall of a military government in May 1992 and prior to the 1997 Thai Constitution and the subsequent 2001 ascension to power of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party—a new type of political formation far more cohesive than nearly all previous Thai political parties. And in the Philippines, regardless of which period of post-1986 democracy one focuses on, there is a weak national bureaucracy combined with weak political parties. Drawing on the argument seated above, the weak institutional context in the Philippines makes patronage flows especially important for linking capital and countryside. Among the three cases, it is the only one that can be classified as a “patronage-based state.”

**Patronage and Clientelism: Untangling Overlapping but Distinct Concepts**

The conceptual foundations of this analysis lie at the intersection of two key bodies of literature: (1) state formation and central-local relations, to be discussed in the following three sections in relation to the cases of Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines; and (2) patronage and clientelism, the primary focus of this section. Patronage and clientelism are sometimes created as synonymous, hence the need to begin with clear definitions that highlight their distinctiveness.

Patronage is a *material resource*, disbursed for particularistic benefit for political purposes and commonly (but not always) derived from public sources. A foundational definition can be found deep in the footnotes of Martin Shefter’s seminal work, *Political Parties and the State*: “Patronage... involves the exchange of public benefits for political support or party advantage” and is given out by politicians to “individual voters, campaign workers, or contributors.” It is a benefit that is “divisible” (i.e., particularistic) rather than “collective” (i.e., programmatic) in nature. This definition should be amended to reflect the fact that politicians can give huge quantities of patronage to other politicians, for example, pork-barrel funds provided to national legislators and local politicians. Clientelism, on the other hand, describes a *personalistic relationship of power*. Persons of higher social status (patrons) are linked to those of lower social status (clients) in face-to-face ties of reciprocity that can vary in content and purpose across time. As James Scott explains, “There is an imbalance in exchange between the two partners which expresses and reflects the disparity in their relative wealth, power, and status.”

Kitschelt and Wilkinson are among those who use the terms *patronage* and *clientelism* interchangeably, favoring the use of the term clientelism. This is defined as “a form of direct, contingent exchange” that is “between electoral constituencies ... and politicians ... in democratic systems” and “focused on particular classes of goods.” My definition resurrects what they see as an older definition of clientelism, namely “a durable, face-to-face, hierarchical and thus asymmetrical relation between patrons and clients supported by a normative framework.” Based on my usage of the terms, one can further note that patronage, as an adjective, modifies resources and flows, whereas clientelistic, as an adjective, modifies linkages and ties. Untangling the definitions of patronage and clientelism, I argue, allows us to achieve greater analytical precision. Not all patronage involves clientelism, because
some patronage flows are impersonal and others are personal. And not all clientelism involves patronage, because the exchange of goods and services (as described by Scott) may or may not involve the “exchange of public benefits” (as described by Shefter). Indeed, the classic clientelistic tie, between landlords and tenants, exists largely outside the state.

Table 8.2. A heuristic continuum of programmatic and particularistic politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Meso-particularistic</th>
<th>Micro-particularistic</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>Universalistic categories</td>
<td>Specific intermediate-level targets, as in sectors/districts/cities shading into villages and neighborhoods</td>
<td>Individuals and households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Character</strong></td>
<td>Impersonal policies</td>
<td>Impersonal patronage</td>
<td>Personalistic/clientelistic patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>National healthcare system, revenue sharing based on uniform models, environmental protection, etc.</td>
<td>Targeted infrastructure/skewed apportionment of districts/agricultural subsidies/U.S.-style pork barrel (via legislation) shading into Philippine-style pork barrel (via grants to legislators)</td>
<td>Spoils system, personal networks of candidates, buying of individual votes, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key actors and relationships</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucrats, parties, politicians, interest groups, citizens</td>
<td>Bureaucrats, parties, politicians, interest groups, citizens</td>
<td>Revolves around various patron-client (or boss-retinue) ties: oligarchs and officials, oligarchs and politicians, politicians and officials, politicians of higher and lower levels, politicians and constituents, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of benefits</strong></td>
<td>General public revenue</td>
<td>Mostly general revenue</td>
<td>A combination of general public revenue as well as private and quasi-public sources, including legislator-controlled pork barrel, casual employee payroll, personal wealth of the politician and his/her supporters, kickbacks on public infrastructure projects, profits from illicit or semi-illicit activities</td>
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With patronage thus defined as a material resource derived from public sources and disbursed for particularistic benefit, and clientelism defined as a personalistic relationship of power, we can differentiate between two major types of patronage: impersonal and clientelistic. Going one step further, comparative reflection on this distinction suggests the need to rethink the usual dichotomy of government outputs, namely, that which is programmatic and policy-based versus that which is particularistic and oriented to patronage. Given that some patronage is impersonal and some is clientelistic, it is useful to expand the usual programmatic vs. particularistic dichotomy into a broader continuum of (1) programmatic; (2) meso-particularistic, involving patronage disbursed on an impersonal basis; and (3) micro-particularistic, involving clientelistic (i.e., personalistic) patronage. These distinctions are summarized in table 8.2.

With these conceptual foundations in place, we can examine the three countries in comparative perspective—beginning with Japan, where patronage politics are played out in the most highly institutionalized context.

**Japan: Strong Bureaucracy, Strong Ruling Party**

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the new regime consolidated its hold over the realm by establishing a prefectural system—the state-of-the-art means of administrative centralization associated with the Napoleonic reforms instituted earlier in the century in France. Within each prefect, a single official had a wide range of responsibilities, including public order (aided by control of the police), tax assessment, infrastructure, census, land registration, and so forth. As W.G. Beasley explains, these officials “effectively … replaced feudal lords” and were subordinate to a Home Ministry established in 1873. “They thus became part of a bureaucracy which depended on national, not local, connections.”

As important as this legacy of centralization is to understanding the modern Japanese state, the Home Ministry itself experienced a major interruption in its influence after the country’s defeat in the Pacific War. Tainted by its major role in the political repression of the 1930s and 1940s, and perceived to be obstructing attempts to empower local governments and provide for the election of governors and mayors, the ministry was abolished by the American occupation government in 1947, and the police force was soon thereafter decentralized.

In the end, however, such efforts to undercut the power of the national bureaucracy did not endure far beyond the end of the American occupation in 1952. Portions of the old Home Ministry were brought back together that same year, and a new Home Ministry was put in place in 1960. Amid a broader “recentralization of power” in the 1950s, the Americans’ decentralization of police was reversed and there was even some consideration (albeit unsuccessful) of abolishing the direct election of governors.

As conservative forces amalgamated in the creation of the LDP in 1955, patronage flows were critical to the party’s electoral successes and an important element of ties between the national and the local levels. As Abe et al. explain, local governments “had always lacked the political—and especially the financially independent—basis of real autonomy.” Within this context of fiscal centralization, local candidates sought to convince the voters that they had a clear “pipeline to the center” capable of attracting state projects and subsidies to their localities. As Chalmers Johnson characterizes the overall system, “what counts is whether...
[a local politician] gets results in pressuring the central government to send some resources to the region." As part of this logic, Fukui and Fukai explain, “Candidates in elections at all levels routinely swear to help their constituents get more attention and help from Tokyo—to bring pork from the national treasury. Diet members ... are constantly visited at their Tokyo offices by delegations of politicians from back home, and spend a great deal of time trying to arrange appointments for them with bureaucrats in key ministries and agencies.”

In essence, intermediation between the central and local levels came primarily through an intertwined system of central agencies and the LDP. The Ministry of Finance played a particularly important role in allocating central government subsidies to local governments, some of the most important of which (especially in an era of major infrastructural spending) were through the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Communications. Local problems or demands were typically filtered through local LDP units up to “particular LDP Diet members and taken by them to the appropriate sections of various ministries and agencies in Tokyo.”

The exemplar of postwar patronage politics was Tanaka Kakuei, who served as prime minister in the early 1970s. Between 1972 and 1985, writes Chalmers Johnson, Tanaka “either totally dominated the Japanese political world or was the primary opponent of the political leader in power.” Tanaka understood “that money was indeed the mother's milk of politics and that whoever controlled the largest amounts of it in the political system, controlled the system. Everybody needed money—for the reelection campaigns, for his faction, for entertaining and cultivating the bureaucrats who made the vital decisions—and everybody needed more of it than was allowed under the various laws that controlled political funds.” During this period, as well, there was an apparent shift in the relative power of the bureaucracy and the LDP, as “it was Tanaka who first showed [party policy specialists] how to bring the bureaucracy to heel.”

The foundation of Tanaka’s influence was at the local level, in his home prefecture of Niigata, where he formed a personal support organization, or köenkai, that became “the model for all Diet members’ local organizations.” These organizations thrived within the single nontransferrable vote (SNTV) electoral system, whose multimember districts fostered fierce intra-party competition. As Matthew Carlson explains:

With many politicians facing both intraparty and interparty competition, they devised candidate-centered campaign strategies, such as the use of... köenkai. Politicians offered a variety of constituency services to the members of their köenkai; these supporters typically returned the favor at election time by providing a stable base of votes. Politicians incurred high financial costs to operate and maintain their koenkai, which contributed to a system where nearly four times more money per capita was spent on politics than in Germany, the United States, or the United Kingdom. . . . With scant emphasis on policy and issue debates in election campaigns, politicians maintained köenkai by spending exorbitant amounts of time and money holding regular meetings with supporters, attending funerals and weddings, and organizing karaoke parties, golf tournaments, and bus trips to hot spring resorts.
Aside from merely voting, as Ethan Scheiner further explains, köenkai members helped to campaign and expand campaign networks. Politicians enjoying the greatest clout with the national government were able to build the largest köenkai at the local level and thus enhance their chances of reelection.

Patronage was thus the dominant vehicle for the differentiation of candidates, and there was a large amount of money greasing a political system that linked national bureaucrats and LDP legislators in Tokyo with local (mainly LDP-affiliated) politicians around the country. Quite clearly, patronage flows in Japan took place within the context of strong institutions—both the bureaucracy and the ruling party. Fukui and Fukai’s highly textured study of “pork barrel politics” in two Japanese prefectures, based on research conducted in 1994, explains that general account funds provided by the national government to localities were distributed in two categories: (1) roughly two-thirds via a revenue-sharing scheme distributed by ‘very rigid ‘objective’ rules’; and (2) roughly one-third via a public works fund that is anything but objective. Decisions on the distribution of the latter, they note, “are subject to the subjective judgments of bureaucrats in the various ministries with jurisdiction over the particular types of projects involved and, therefore, amenable to interventions by politicians and special interest groups capable of influencing those bureaucrats. This category of funds is the primary target of lobbying activities by local governments and allied Diet members.” Other very large sources of government resources, aside from general account funds, were allocated in a similar way.

The process of lobbying took place to a large extent within LDP party networks, which reached from local governments to the prefectures and then to the national level. Personalistic ties, called keiretsu, commonly linked national legislators to local politicians. In exchange for the support they obtain from their national legislative patrons, local politicians were expected to deliver the vote at election time. Contention over the allocation of central government funds was largely an intraparty matter, and LDP members of the Diet served as the critical intermediary between local constituents and national bureaucrats. “It is ... widely believed, though not documented, that voters know without being told which Diet members from their district deliver the most pork from Tokyo.” Another important element of intermediation between national and local actors was performed by “middle-level ministry officials who are temporarily assigned to local government offices on routine two- or three-year tours of duty.”

As further evidence of the institutionalized context of patronage flows in Japan, the LDP played a central role in managing intraparty competition among its members of the Diet. As Rosenbluth and Theis explain, the party put “same-district co-partisans” on different parliamentary committees and thus “[enforced] a functional division ... by means of nonoverlapping policy specialization.” Intraparty competition at election time was managed through the imposition of campaign rules favorable to the LDP.

It was proposed at the outset that the stronger the institutional context, the less patronage will be allocated through direct personalistic ties. To use the terms introduced in my description of the framework above, one would thus expect to see in the Japanese context of
the early 1990s a substantial level of “meso-particularism” relative to “micro-particularism.” We shall see that this was indeed the case, but by no means is micro-particularism unimportant. The kōenkai are an obvious example, enabling politicians to seek the personal support of voters. While there may have been very little direct vote buying in the Japanese system, cash gifts were common at weddings and funerals and “copious amounts of money” were disbursed at election time to mobilize support.36 Also highly personalistic are the networks of the keiretsu, which nurtured enduring connections between Diet members in Tokyo and politicians at the prefectural and local levels.

The terms “clientelism” and “particularistic” are common in the literature on Japanese politics, and are in many cases entirely appropriate. Based on my definitions, however, much patronage in the Japanese context is in fact not clientelistic and not especially particularistic. This leads me into an analysis of meso-particularism, which on the continuum above lies between programmatic outputs (targeted at universalistic categories) and micro-particularism (targeted at individuals, households, and firms). Indeed, it is striking how much of the literature on Japanese patronage describes flows that are targeted at quite large categories of voters. Ethan Scheiner, drawing on Herbert Kitschelt’s work, defines clientelism as “benefits that are awarded to people who supported the party and withheld from those who are found, on the basis of some kind of monitoring, not to have supported it.”37 Through monitoring, parties are able to “keep the provision of benefits very specific and tightly targeted.” In terms of empirical examples, however, it becomes clear that the beneficiaries fall into categories that are not very specific or strict: farmers, small business persons, regions, and an entire industry (construction).

Scheiner acknowledges that “the discretionary provisions of benefits are often not targeted as tightly as is necessary to ensure that the correct group is receiving them” and that “some practices and relationships ... walk a fine line between universalistic and clientelistic arrangements.”38 Gregory Noble’s 2010 analysis of the Japanese political economy convincingly argues a broad shift from particularistic to programmatic politics (and critiques Scheiner’s use of the term clientelism). The examples of past particularism, however, are in fact not very particular: “programs and agencies for farmers, small business owners, and construction companies.”39 Further examples of meso-particularistic public benefits in Japan involve the very substantial political and economic advantages granted to the broad rural population, including not only agricultural protectionism but also the malapportionment of legislative districts in their favor.40

In sum, very substantial elements of both meso-particularism and micro-particularism exist side-by-side within a highly elaborate system of Japanese “money politics.”41 As is to be expected in a strongly institutionalized context, patronage flows are often not clientelistic and often not very particularistic.

**Thailand: Strong Bureaucracy, Weak Parties**

In consolidating his dynastic rule in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, King Chulalongkorn of Thailand worked to centralize the realm by using the same strategy of prefectoralism earlier employed in Meiji Japan. As part of an effort to avoid formal colonization, the Thai monarch was in fact emulating the dominant form of administration...
found in colonial systems throughout the world. His half-brother, Prince Damrong, set up the Interior Ministry in 1893 and proceeded to strengthen central authority through the creation of prefects that were headed up by resident commissioners sent out from Bangkok. The power of entrenched families was challenged in many localities, and revenue collection was greatly enhanced. As Baker and Pasuk explain, “a new centralized pyramid of bureaucratic administration ... [replaced] the local lords.”

The Interior Ministry constituted a vital bulwark of the new Thai state, and to this day it continues to be among the government’s most powerful ministries.

After the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, civilian and military bureaucrats in Bangkok were the backbone of a policy that experienced repeated coup attempts. Authoritarian military regimes were rarely interrupted by civilian rule over the subsequent half-century, and the term “bureaucratic polity” was coined to describe a system that seemed to give little scope for the emergence of countervailing social forces. The Ministry of the Interior was a key institution in safeguarding the power of the Bangkok-based bureaucratic and military elite, and local power was highly circumscribed. In addition to appointing provincial governors and controlling “all aspects” of provincial administration, district administration, and community development, the Ministry of the Interior also managed the election process. “Until the 1970s,” explains Arghiros, various “government parties” that were in fact formed by the bureaucracy “could rely on the control of the Ministry of the Interior to win elections and the government party directed local state representatives to mobilize rural voters on its behalf.” Provincial governors could dismiss elected officials within their provinces and had oversight as well over the field offices of central ministries.

As Cold War aid and foreign investment began to pour into Thailand in the 1960s and early 1970s, the economy began a period of sustained growth that shook the very foundations of the bureaucratic polity. New social forces emerged in Bangkok and the provinces, contributing to the fall of the military regime in 1973 and an unprecedented level of democratic freedom as well as student and lower-class mobilization. Such freedoms were brutally restricted after 1976, but in the process of reimposing authoritarian rule the military itself came to rely on patterns of social mobilization (of right-wing forces and fearful middle classes) not previously necessary in the heyday of the bureaucratic polity. A new constitution, drawn up in 1978, reintroduced semi-democratic institutions able to balance the enduring power of the bureaucratic elite with that of an increasingly assertive Bangkok business class. Even though its powers as a part-elected and part-appointed body were limited in many respects, Parliament’s very ability to remain in place for such a relatively long period of time (at least by Thai standards, and specifically up until the next military coup in 1991) enabled it to grow in stature.

By virtue of being head of a parliamentary faction, one could take control of those ministries (e.g., Public Works or Communications) that had been given over to the politicians.
as a trough for patronage. At the beginning of the 1980s, Bangkok business interests dominated the major political parties and enjoyed the spoils that came with their newly obtained control of the patronage-oriented ministries. By mid-decade, Bangkok business was increasingly displaced, in the parties and in the Parliament, by the rise of provincial notables. Since the Vietnam War boom of the 1960s, business interests had prospered throughout the provinces and built up strong bases of local socioeconomic power. As Pasuk and Baker explain, election to the Parliament enabled them “to crown their local leadership, to build contacts in Bangkok, and to tap the government’s central funds both for personal gain and for developing their constituencies. Their goal was a seat in the Cabinet or at least access to Cabinet authority.” As the post of MP thus acquired “solid market value,” the patterns of vote buying for which Thailand has achieved such notoriety became well-established (in contrast to earlier decades, when elections were somnolent affairs and vote buying quite rare). With over three-quarters of seats representing provincial areas, it was only a matter of time before the top political positions in the kingdom would come under the control of the so-called rural godfathers (whom Anderson describes as “mafioso-like politician capitalists who, by the use of violence, political connections, and control of local markets and rackets, become feared political bosses”).

The rise of provincial politicians constituted a major shift in power away from Bangkok, and by 1990 provincial businesspersons constituted almost half of the cabinet. As Anderson explains, it is through Parliament that they were given “the opportunity to short-circuit the Ministry of the Interior's powerful, territorially based hierarchy, and to make themselves felt, on their own terms, in the metropolitan home base of the bureaucracy itself.” Out of the new power arrangements came new networks of influence as those provincial capitalists who formerly operated within the constraints of the bureaucratic polity developed their own connections at all levels of the state—and were able to use these new connections to their political and economic advantage. Budget expenditures were spread around the country more broadly, and a slush fund for MPs ballooned in size after the advent of civilian rule in 1988. The exemplar of the sleazy provincial politician, Banharn Silpaarcha (also known as “Mr. ATM” for his mastery of money politics), became prime minister in 1995-1996.

Thai political parties were weak and heavily factionalized, centered around “senior patrons” competing to gain a cabinet post. Parties commonly enjoyed strength in particular regions and were unable to claim truly national bases. In the post-election jockeying among multiple parties, the ultimate goal of an ambitious politician was to use control of a faction (commonly from four to seven MP's) as a stepping stone to control of a ministry, which could in turn be used “to recoup election expenses, establish war chests for future elections, and distribute favors to supporters.” A multi-member district electoral system promoted substantial intraparty competition at the local level, and—not unlike Japan—members of the same party distinguished themselves from each other by virtue...
of their capacity to distribute patronage resources. Unlike Japan, however, there was no longstanding ruling party with either the stature or the coherence necessary for effective management of intraparty competition among its patronage-oriented politicians. Also quite unlike Japan, coercive techniques were not uncommon and vote buying was rampant. The “key to electoral victory” was the mobilization of hua khanaen, “vote canvassers” who worked for individual candidates in mobilizing voters by directly purchasing votes (sometimes of entire villages), dispensing patronage, and engaging in intimidation. Unlike Japan, coercive techniques were not uncommon and vote buying was rampant. The “key to electoral victory” was the mobilization of hua khanaen, “vote canvassers” who worked for individual candidates in mobilizing voters by directly purchasing votes (sometimes of entire villages), dispensing patronage, and engaging in intimidation. Networks of hua khanaen extended from regional and provincial levels down to “every village and every neighborhood,” and the most effective canvassers were “those involved in crime and corruption.”

Amid major power shifts from bureaucrats to politician-capitalists, and Bangkok to the provinces, the Ministry of the Interior faced a much more complex terrain of power in the countryside. Its influence over provincial administrations, however, remained (and remains even today) very substantial in nearly all the ways described. As appointed officials, the provincial governors danced to the tune of the Interior Ministry, and it is the Ministry that controlled all staffing at the provincial level. There was an elected provincial-level council, whose major role is to approve and allocate infrastructural development budgets. As this became a lucrative trough of patronage for those in the construction industry, the provincial legislatures came to be known as “contractors’ councils.” Strategically located between national and local politics, the provincial councilors also became the primary vote canvassers for national politicians, “mobilizing the lower-level networks on their behalf.” As important as the councils were in political terms, they can be viewed as a mere “playground” for local politicians. The councilors seemed to have extremely little influence on the administration of the province, and the vast bulk of the provincial budget was beyond their reach. In other words, even after the rise of provincial politician-capitalists, the Ministry of the Interior continued to dominate nearly all aspects of provincial administration.

This can perhaps be seen as a reflection of the dualistic nature of the institutional context of patronage flows in Thailand. The territorial bureaucracy first put in place by King Chulalongkorn and Prince Damrong in 1893 continued to have enormous power in the early 1990s, the period examined in this chapter. The political parties that emerged in the latter decades of the twentieth century, by contrast, were weak and factionalized. Far more important than parties in the allocation of patronage were individual politician-capitalists, now linked in an extensive set of quite informal and non-institutionalized networks stretching from the national level through the provincial level and down to every locality. The role of the newly empowered provincial MPs, Baker and Pasuk explain, “attached the provinces politically to the centre more tightly than decades of administrative plans.” The old administrative grid, however, has by no means disappeared. In Thailand’s well-elaborated and well-financed system of “money politics,” patronage flows within the larger context of a strong territorial bureaucracy and weak parties. While patronage serves as an important new “glue” for the polity—or at least for the emerging political-economic elite building myriad new “extrabureaucratic networks”—it co-exists with a much longer-standing bureaucratic network that first united the realm one hundred years ago.

As proposed at the outset of this paper, it is expected that stronger institutional contexts are associated with less personalistic allocation of patronage. What of intermediate cases,
such as Thailand, with a strong bureaucracy and weak parties? The answer to this question would require careful empirical work, but it is worth noting that scholars have long been confounded by the Thai polity’s combination of quite substantial institutionalization with quite substantial personalism. There are indeed examples of both micro-particularistic and a meso-particularistic patronage, i.e., that which is clientelistic versus that which is relatively more impersonal. The former category includes patronage flows from prominent politicians downward to the members of their faction, the purpose of which is to secure or safeguard a coveted position in the cabinet and its accompanying control of a ministry. A second prominent example is the networks of hua khanaen, or vote canvassers, with clientelist ties stretching from the regional and provincial levels downward to individual voters in villages and neighborhoods.

As for patterns of meso-particularism, one clear example is the capacity of an individual MP to support infrastructural pork-barrel projects of benefit to an entire electoral constituency (with Banharn Silpa-archa once again the prime example). Despite obvious parallels between Banharn and Tanaka, one must nonetheless note a marked contrast between Thailand and Japan, where a well-institutionalized ruling party devised multiple ways of nurturing and maintaining key constituencies. In the absence of any such party in Thailand (at least until Thakin’s Thai Rak Thai in first years of the new century), one finds the best examples of relatively more impersonal patronage coming forth from the institution of the monarchy. After 1957, as King Bhumibol sought to reestablish a strong position for the royal family after a quarter-century of relative political marginalization, he projected himself as “the paternal, activist king of a childlike, quiescent peasantry.” His efforts were actively supported both by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who was not of the generation that ended the absolute monarchy in 1932, as well as by the United States. As the Communist Party of Thailand gained strength in the 1960s and 1970s, counterinsurgency goals figured even more prominently. His rural projects elicited the support not only of military regimes at home and the U.S. overseas but also of the increasingly prominent business class. While this was not a patronage oriented to gaining votes, it did have clear political purposes and outcomes.

In sum, Thai-style “money politics” existed in the early 1990s within a moderately institutionalized environment: strong bureaucratic involvement in central-local intermediation but a decidedly weak role for political parties (which remained highly unstable, faction-ridden, and lacking in coherence). There are high levels of patronage in both Thailand and Japan, and one finds well-developed networks linking both national and local politicians as well as local campaign organizations and voters. With the presence of a strong ruling party in Japan, however, one finds much more coherent use of meso-particularistic patronage—targeted not at individuals but at broader social categories, with the purpose of capturing and maintaining long-term support for the party as a whole. In addition, Japan’s LDP was much more effective
than any Thai party in its ability to referee intra-party competition over patronage resources at the local level.

**The Philippines: Weak Bureaucracy, Weak Parties**

Unlike Japan and Thailand, the Philippines has never relied upon a prefectoral strategy of territorial organization and never had an Interior Ministry of substantial bureaucratic continuity, authority, or coherence. This can be traced to the origins of the modern Philippine state, in an American regime of the early twentieth century that was quite distinctive in the annals of colonialism. The key formative period was under the leadership of William Howard Taft, who between 1900 and 1913 (first as Philippine governor-general, then as U.S. secretary of war, and later as president) played a central role in constructing a new polity—building on the residual architecture of the previous Spanish colonial state and responding to a major revolutionary challenge from supporters of Philippine independence. Four policies, in particular, helped to nurture the territorial dispersal of power throughout the archipelago as well as strong patronage ties linking the national and local levels.71

First, Taft and other architects of American colonial rule arrived in the Philippines with a clear desire to promote as much local autonomy as possible (central intervention in local affairs “is foreign to American practice,” declared one early report72). With fond reference to New England, Taft proclaimed “town government” to be “the practical way of building up a general government.”73 This involved the systematic organization of municipal elections (restricted to a small elite electorate) in 1901, and the election of provincial governors (by municipal officials) in 1902. In promoting local arenas of political endeavor, American colonials were motivated both out of expediency (seeking to undercut elite support for the guerrilla struggle for Philippine independence) and ideals (replicating the spirit of local self-rule practiced at home). In essence, Taft’s so-called policy of attraction involved providing greatly expanded opportunities for political power to elites who had already developed a strong economic base throughout major regions of the Philippines in the latter decades of the Spanish era. One thus finds a major contrast not only between the Americans and other contemporaneous colonial powers, but also between the Americans and the policies taken by late-nineteenth-century Japan and Thailand in their successful efforts to avoid colonialism. While other regimes were commonly employing the very effective technique of prefectoralism to enhance central control and subdue provincial rivals, American colonials were inclined to promote local politics and local politicians.

Second, the American colonial system also differed from its counterparts in giving far more attention to elections and the creation of representative institutions than to the creation of a modern bureaucratic apparatus. As Anderson explains, “Unlike all the other modern colonial regimes in twentieth-century Southeast Taft’s so-called policy of attraction involved providing greatly expanded opportunities for political power to elites who had already developed a strong economic base throughout major regions of the Philippines in the latter decades of the Spanish era.
Asia, which operated through huge, autocratic, white-run bureaucracies, the American authorities in Manila... created only a minimal civil service, and quickly turned over most of its component positions to the natives. Taft’s policy of “political tutelage” involved ever-greater opportunities for Philippine elites to seek electoral office—first at the municipal and provincial levels, as noted above, and later in the National Assembly and Senate (formed in 1907 and 1916, respectively). Taft did not neglect the goal of constructing a reliable civil service, but for reasons of historical timing the effort failed. Because representative institutions in the Philippines emerged before the creation of strong bureaucratic institutions, it was easy for patronage-hungry politicos to overwhelm the nascent administrative agencies of the colonial state.

While other colonial powers generally set up strong interior (or home affairs) ministries, with the clear goal of promoting administrative control of the territory, the U.S. colonials in the Philippines had only a weak Executive Bureau with little institutional continuity over time. It was more successful in instituting formalistic reporting and approval requirements than in implementing effective supervision.

Third, Taft actively promoted the rise of provincial politicians, with the explicit goal of strengthening American colonials’ “hold on the entire archipelago.” The two leading provincial governors to emerge, Sergio Osmeña of Cebu and Manuel Quezon of Tayabas, had been quick to see that it was possible to combine a provincial base with access to national power. They were the major figures in the newly formed Nacionalista Party, a purportedly pro-independence party that was to dominate Philippine politics for much of the next four decades. Along with the other provincial elites-turned-national politicos who were elected to the National Assembly in 1907, they very deftly responded to the new opportunities created by American colonials and achieved a level of political authority capable of obstructing the goals of the U.S. governor-general.

The interaction of elites in the new political institutions in Manila led to the emergence of what Anderson calls a “solid, visible ‘national oligarchy.’”

Fourth, political party formation is not a normal activity for most colonial masters, but in the Philippines Taft considered it an important element of his larger project of “political education.” Not surprisingly, these political parties had many similarities to the patronage-based party system from which Taft, the highly successful Ohio politician, had emerged. At times, the promotion of patronage was a very conscious policy. More important, however, was how the creation of legislative institutions created a logic for patronage at a point when bureaucratic structures had barely had a chance to consolidate their strength. Unlike political parties in most of the colonial world, which were excluded from the corridors of power as they pressed for the goal of national independence, the Nacionalista Party (NP) enjoyed ready access to patronage resources and increasing influence over appointments within the bureaucracy. The patronage basis of Philippine political parties, which can be traced to the early American period and endures through the present, reinforces the territorial dispersal of power throughout the archipelago. As in other settings where democratic structures are infused with a strong element of patronage, there are many informal avenues for the promotion of local interests and the diminution of central supervisory structure. Most proximately, in the late-nineteenth-century U.S. political system that had shaped Taft, patronage-based parties promoted the “broad dispersion of particularistic benefits downward to the localities.”
In sum, four policies of the Taft era led to a pronounced dispersal of power throughout the archipelago combined with strong patronage linkages between national and local levels: the promotion of local autonomy; greater attention to elections and legislative institutions than to the creation of a modern bureaucratic apparatus; the nurturing of provincial politicians; and the emergence of patronage-based political parties. Together, they contributed to a process I have termed patronage-based state formation. Defined more formally, this type of state formation (1) occurs within settings that lack strong political institutions, notably effective bureaucracies and/or well-institutionalized political parties; (2) devolves important elements of state administrative functions to local power holders throughout the country; and (3) displays high levels of interconnectedness among the different territorial layers of government via a patronage system that has its apex in the national capital. The devolution of administrative functions that comes forth from patronage-based state formation has an important analogue in the revenue sphere, specifically in the system of tax farming found in many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonial and colonial-era states, including the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya, and Siam. Just as tax farming involved the subcontracting out of the revenue functions of the state (to private merchants who served as collectors of tax throughout the realm), patronage-based state formation involves a subcontracting out of the administrative functions of the state.

Systems of patronage can be very effective in binding a country together, providing the “political cement” described by James Scott at the outset of this analysis and orienting elites in different regions to look to the center for resources. In the Philippines, this is best exemplified at the sociocultural margins of the polity, in the Muslim Mindanao region. Abinales traces the late colonial “transformation of Muslim datus from Malay men of prowess into provincial politicians,” eventually becoming “Muslim counterparts to the northern caciques.” At the same time, the dominance of patronage necessarily involves major compromises in the quality of governance. To return to the analogy of revenue farming, local politicians resemble private merchants in that they are acting both on behalf of the state and on behalf of their own political (and financial) interests. Some exhibit devotion to public goals, but others find private goals more compelling. In his analysis of state-society relations in Mindanao in the early post-independence years, Abinales explains that “the parameters of governance are negotiated and determined.” Local strong men “exemplified the administrative capability of this political fusion by their respective roles as strongmen and state actors, here defending their local turf, there executing imperatives of state on their constituencies.” The quality of democracy suffers as well in a patronage-dominated system, as competition centers primarily around the disbursement of pork and patronage, and voters rarely have any clear choice between contending programmatic or ideological perspectives.
Once in place, the patronage-based state in the Philippines has proven difficult to dislodge—despite certain historical junctures at which this might have occurred. As he enjoyed largely uncontested executive authority and effectively one-party rule within the Philippine Commonwealth after 1935, President Manuel L. Quezon was more interested in centralizing control over patronage resources than in building more effective institutions of central government supervision. There was an impulse toward administrative centralization during the Japanese Occupation of 1942–1945 when a Ministry of Home Affairs was put into place, but these efforts did not get off the ground amid multiple challenges to Japanese control over the archipelago. When democratic structures were reestablished after the war, the dominance of the Nacionalista Party under the Commonwealth was replaced with a two-party system in which patronage resources were dispersed in a far more decentralized manner. While “loose firearms” had already been considered a problem in the colonial period, the country became awash in guns during the Japanese Occupation—with many now in the hands of the “new men” that had emerged in the course of a highly decentralized guerrilla struggle. Compared to the immediate prewar years, politicians in the provinces were in a much stronger position relative to those at the center.

Due in large part to its distinctive American colonial heritage, the Philippines in the initial decades after independence displayed a complex web of central-local ties in which Manila could seem to be at once overlord and lorded over. Certain aspects of central-local relations were highly centralized: even the most trifling of administrative decisions had to be approved in Manila, and many local and provincial authorities chafed at restrictions on their autonomy. At the same time, Manila displayed weak capacity for sustained supervision of provincial and local officials—indeed, central supervision of local governments was almost entirely ad hoc, oriented to punishing political opponents while providing political allies with effective autonomy. Both local police and the national Philippine Constabulary were highly politicized, frequently deployed in electoral battles on behalf of the local politicians who controlled them. The heightened postwar prevalence of firearms fostered “warlord” armies that were especially active at election time.

National politicians commonly relied heavily on local power (and the brokering of arrangements with local bosses and their private armies) in order to succeed in electoral contests. Local leaders delivered blocs of votes in exchange for benefits from allies in Manila, while “national” politics were often dominated by the need of congresspersons to consolidate local bailiwicks (through such means as rampant pork-barrel spending). The two national parties—the Nacionalistas and the Liberals—were virtually indistinguishable, and it was not uncommon for politicians to switch parties in search of more favorable access to patronage resources. Carl Landé, in his landmark study of Philippine politics in the 1960s, explained how local political factions enjoyed “considerable bargaining power in their dealings with the national parties” through their ability to deliver blocs of votes. National politicians, however, were able to balance this system by virtue of “the great quantity of...
material rewards at their disposal,” with the result being the “functional interdependence of local, provincial, and national leaders,” albeit “unstable” and constantly shifting throughout the electoral cycle.\textsuperscript{86}

With his declaration of martial law, in 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos shifted the balance dramatically in favor of his own power and at the expense of local politicians. It was not until 1978 that the regime replaced the closed Congress of pre-martial-law days with an Interim National Assembly. In preparation for the 1978 elections, the Marcos regime launched its own ruling party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement, or KBL). The rhetoric of a “new society” and the emergence of new faces notwithstanding, the old informal patronage politics of the pre-martial-law years remained the fundamental basis of the KBL.\textsuperscript{87} Throughout much of the country, politicians flocked to the KBL for the benefits that it could dispense. Local officials, who could be replaced at will by the regime, were particularly anxious to join the ruling party. (The head of the KBL, not coincidentally, was simultaneously the Minister of Local Governments.) Three major cronies of Marcos became regional party chairmen, tasked with ensuring KBL victory and at the same time given the opportunity to achieve political dominance over other power holders in their respective regions of the country. The patronage dispensed by this political machine was an important bulwark for the regime, complementing its elaboration of hollow democratic structures and extensive use of coercion.

Since the fall of Marcos in 1986, many patterns of pre-martial-law Philippine politics have returned. The reopening of Congress marked the return of democratic institutions after nearly 15 years of highly repressive and crony-infested authoritarianism. At the same time, however, it has given many old provincial dynasties new opportunities to reassert their influence over national politics. In 1991, a highly respected election commissioner estimated that enough illegal weapons had been smuggled into the country over the previous five years to supply two additional national armies.\textsuperscript{88} As in the pre-martial-law era, political parties have remained weak and poorly institutionalized, seeking to build a national base through ever-shifting and commonly ad hoc alliances with patronage-hungry politicians throughout the archipelago. Political scientist Nathan Quimpo provides perhaps the best description of contemporary Philippine political parties: “convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, resurrected, regurgitated, reconstituted, renamed, repackaged, recycled, or flushed down the toilet anytime.”\textsuperscript{89}

The often beleaguered administration of Corazon Aquino showed itself to be highly accommodating to local power in the provinces (including many “warlord” figures associated with the previous regime) and very responsive as well to long-standing sentiment in favor of providing more authority to municipal and provincial bodies. In part out of a strong reaction against previous authoritarian excesses, the 1987 Constitution promised greater degrees of autonomy to local governments and “a just share . . . [of ] national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.” This created the mandate for the most
innovative political reform of the Aquino years, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, an ambitious decentralization initiative gave greater authority and resources to a range of local politicians—some of whom had a genuine agenda of democratic reform (commonly in alliance with civil society organizations), and some of whom sought merely to further entrench their control of local authoritarian enclaves.90

The most important provision of the LGC required the central government to provide local units with automatic and greatly increased allotments of internal revenue. The stated goal was to reduce the central government’s discretionary power over local governments, and the outcome was a more than quadrupling of transfers (in real terms) between 1991 and 1997.91 In political terms, this quite obviously strengthened the position of local politicians vis-à-vis congresspersons. While some may claim that the Code has promoted local autonomy and “radically transformed the very nature of the Philippine political-administrative system,”92 it can be viewed more cynically as a mere re-slicing of the patronage pie in favor of governors, city mayors, town mayors, and barangay (barrio) captains.93

This shift was viewed as a major threat by many congresspersons, particularly if the governors and mayors in their districts were major political rivals. Not to be outdone, congresspersons have enjoyed lavish pork-barrel allocations through programs given such names as “Congressional Initiative Allocation” and “Countrywide Development Fund.” Unlike the U.S. pork-barrel system, in which pork is appropriated through national legislation, pork-barrel resources in the Philippines are highly discretionary grants directly controlled by national legislators, that is, legislator slush funds. The dispersal of these funds in the House of Representatives is mediated through the president and the speaker of the House, giving each legislator a particular incentive to be allied with the president. In the wake of every presidential election, not surprisingly, one can observe a flood of party-switchers moving toward the president’s coalition—thus guaranteeing each president a majority in the lower house. The 24 members of the Senate also enjoy large quantities of pork, but hold more independent stature by virtue of their election from a single nationwide district.

Another reform under President Aquino was the reorganization of the Marcos-era Ministry of Local Governments into a Department of the Interior and Local Governments. As in earlier years, however, this agency has continued to play a key role in forging local political alliances for whoever occupied the presidential palace. There is also continuity in how supervision of local government units remains a highly politicized process: those allied with the Palace can anticipate special favors, while those out of favor are not uncommonly given harsh treatment.

Returning to the framework developed at the outset of this analysis, it was proposed that a weak institutional context is associated with a greater degree of allocation of patronage through direct personalistic ties. In the Philippine context, therefore, one would thus expect to see a substantial level of “micro-particularism” relative to “meso-particularism.” The latter is not absent, however, and can be found in pork-barrel projects that benefit a large group of constituents (such as an entire congressional district). A second example would be regional development programs, likely funded by a foreign donor and often with counterinsurgency goals, seeking to improve infrastructure across a much more extensive territory. All too often, however, even these larger projects can be partly hijacked by local politicians able to skim off percentages (via kickbacks and bribes) for themselves and their allies.
Examples of micro-particularism are too plentiful to fully enumerate and are best conceptualized as a pyramid of personal ties that extend from the Presidential Palace down to the barangay (barrio) level—with enormous competition for resources at every level. Through its significant discretion in budgetary matters, the Office of the President disburses funds not only to legislators but also to local politicians. As economist Emmanuel de Dios explains, the “assured revenue transfers” of the Local Government Code “have not weaned local politics away from the imperative of securing additional resources through typical networks of patronage and vertical transactions with the centre. The patronage relationship remains intact.” Pork-barrel projects of congresspersons can range from larger-scale projects, as mentioned above, to micro-level projects benefiting particular neighborhoods (e.g., the ubiquitous basketball courts found throughout the archipelago, each backboard labeled with the name of the politician who financed it). On a purely personalistic level of exchange, one can note political positions that are a prominent element of local government, sponsorship of weddings, funerals and baptisms, and vote buying.

In sum, the Philippines exhibits not only high levels of patronage but a flow of patronage resources within a very weakly institutionalized environment: ineffective supervisory structures in the national bureaucracy and largely incoherent political parties that are dominated by the agendas of individual politicians. Based on cursory observation, one can note that substantial elements of patronage are allocated on the basis of clientelistic ties (what I am terming “micro-particularism”). A large degree of authority and power is farmed out to local politicians, who deliver up the votes in exchange for patronage resources from the center. They commonly enjoy substantial autonomy, albeit within an ever-shifting and unstable bargaining relationship with higher levels of the political system, and those who can accumulate control over substantial coercive and economic resources are able to build substantial and often enduring local authoritarian enclaves.

**Linking Capital and Countryside**

As stated at the outset, the goal of this analysis is to examine the degree to which patronage structures provide a critical “political cement” between national and local actors and levels. Through analysis of three cases—Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines—I have argued, first, that patronage serves an especially important “political cement” or territorial glue in a weakly institutionalized political environment. While Japan has high degrees of patronage, these resource flows were mediated from the center to localities amid strong political institutions: central government bureaucracies with a deep reach throughout the territory, thoroughly intertwined with a powerful and longstanding ruling party, the LDP. Thailand is the intermediate case, with the Interior Ministry playing a dominant role in overseeing local government but very weak and unstable political parties often unable to claim a national base of support. In the Philippines, patronage flows within a particularly weak institutional environment and thus constitutes a critical glue for the polity as a whole. The national bureaucracy that oversees local government has little supervisory capacity, and
is most effective in forging ad hoc ties with local politicians on behalf of the presidential palace. Political parties are generally national in scope but notoriously weak in terms of their programmatic and institutional coherence. Of the three cases, only the Philippines can be classified as a patronage-based state.

Second, I have proposed that the weaker the institutional context, the greater the allocation of patronage through direct, personalistic ties (and vice versa). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide concrete empirical evidence of the relative importance of these two types of patronage flow in each of the three cases, cursory examination based to a large extent on a broad-brushed analysis of secondary sources demonstrates that relatively more impersonal patronage and relatively more personalistic patronage clearly exist in all three cases. It also suggests that impersonal patronage is of most importance in Japan and personalistic patronage is strongest in the Philippines. Thailand is an intermediate case, with high levels of personalistic patronage seemingly balanced at least in part by impersonal patronage benefiting entire electoral constituencies.

Third, I have asserted the virtues of distinguishing between patronage and clientelism. Patronage is a *material resource* disbursed for particularistic benefit for political purposes and commonly (but not always) derived from public sources, whereas clientelism is a *personalistic relationship of power*. By untangling the two concepts, it is possible to give more nuance to the usual dichotomy of programmatic and particularistic. This is highlighted in the continuum above, which shades from programmatic and universal on the left through an intermediate category of “meso-particularism” (involving patronage disbursed on an impersonal basis) to “micro-particularism” (involving clientelistic or personalistic patronage) on the right. In other words, some types of particularism are more particular than others; and some types of patronage are personalistic, while others are not. By giving attention to the larger context in which patronage flows occur and more clearly distinguishing among types of patronage, we can better understand the differential impact of patronage on the territorial character of polities and on their overall quality of governance.

**Acknowledgments**

The author is grateful to Frank Fukuyama, Larry Diamond, Diego Abente Brun, Marc Plattner, and others who provided valuable comments on this analysis when it was first presented at the NED-Grupo FARO conference in Quito in November 2010. The author has also benefited from additional comments provided while presenting this work to seminars at the University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies in January 2011, the Griffith University Centre for Governance and Public Policy in May 2011, and the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University in August 2011. His colleagues in the Southeast Asia “money politics” project, Edward Aspinall, Allen Hicken, and Meredith Weiss, have provided much-valued encouragement, as has Donald Emmerson. Thanks also to Erik Kuhonta for his inputs on the Thailand section and to Thuy Pham and Allison Ley for their research assistance.
Notes


3. One important difference in governmental structure, with implications for territorial politics to be explained below, is that Japan and Thailand have parliamentary systems and the Philippines has a presidential system.

4. These involve a diffuse secessionist movement arising within the Muslim Malay minority in southern Thailand and two major secessionist movements arising in recent decades among the diverse Muslim ethnic groups of the southern Philippines. See Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics,” *Policy Studies* 24 (East-West Center, Washington, DC, 2006). Other regional differences are also politicized in all three countries, specifically where there is a sense of marginalization within the larger polity: Okinawa in Japan, the Northeast of Thailand, and the Cordillera region in the northern Luzon mountain range of the Philippines.


6. In addition, workshop consultation with fellow scholars of Southeast Asian politics has highlighted the degree to which patronage resources are derived not just from “public benefits” but also from private and quasi-public sources—whether it be the personal wealth of the politician and his/her supporters, earnings from kickbacks on public infrastructure projects, or profits from illicit or semi-illicit activities (e.g., gambling syndicates, prostitution rings, and drug running, etc.). This is highlighted further in table 8.2.


10. Differentiation can also be found in basic dictionary definitions. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines patronage as “support or encouragement given by a patron.” Neither clientelism nor clientelistic is in the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, but client is defined as “One who is under the protection or patronage of another, a dependant.”


22. Ibid., 11, 26.

23. Ibid., 4.

24. Within this system, used from 1947 to 1993, “voters were allowed to cast a single vote for a candidate in a multimember district; each multimember district typically returned three to five members to the Lower House. These votes could not be transferred to a party or to another candidate” (Carlson 2007, 4). As Rosenbluth and Thies further explain, the multimember districts force “majority-seeking parties . . . to field multiple candidates in direct competition with one another” and “[shift] electoral competition away from programmatic appeals to personal loyalty.” The LDP, by virtue of its ability to “milk [business interests] for campaign financing, was the hands-down favorite to dominate such a system” (Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, *Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010], 176).


28. While local politics in many municipalities were ostensibly nonpartisan, explains Allinson, “most local politicians, in some communities as many as 80%, were LDP supporters. They shared the party’s goals, and they achieved them by supporting LDP Diet members” (1997: 95). Gary D. Allinson, *Japan’s Postwar History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).


30. Ibid., 274–75.

31. Electoral *keiretsu* (line) are essentially patron-client pyramids with a Diet member at the apex and prefectural and local officials below. “Many local politicians are former aides to Diet members,” explain Fukui and Fukai, and it is also notable that “politicians elected from the same [prefectoral] district don’t belong to the same Diet member’s *keiretsu*” (280–81, quotes at 281).


33. Ibid., 277; see also 276–81.


36. Ibid., 56; see also Scheiner, *Democracy without Competition in Japan*, 73.


38. Ibid., 15 and 71; see also 15–16, 70–73.


41. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, of course, to demonstrate the relative importance of these two types of patronage flow. The goal here is to establish a conceptual framework, drawing on secondary sources. Other scholars may wish to establish means of measurement based on in-depth use of primary sources.


45. Ibid., 226–27.


48. After eight years of “semi-democracy,” from 1980 to 1988, the country transitioned to civilian rule in 1988. This was ended by a coup in 1991, but the resulting military regime was removed after a Bangkok-based uprising in May 1992.


at 461). Both sources note that these types of budget expenditures were prohibited by the 1997 constitution.


63. While the councils had been elective since the 1950s, their role expanded after they were put in charge of a lucrative provincial development fund in the 1980s. See Katherine A. Bowie, “Vote Buying and Village Outrage in an Election in Northern Thailand: Recent Legal Reforms in Historical Context,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 2 (2008): 469–511, at 488.


67. Albeit quite imperfectly, of course, as demonstrated most dramatically by secessionist pressures in the Muslim South and deep resentments in a marginalized Northeast. In comparative perspective, however, Bangkok has had substantial success in extending its authority throughout the realm. As Arghiros asserts, “The Thai state is extremely strong and has effective reach into all provinces and districts, no matter how far they are from Bangkok” (*Democracy, Development and Decentralization*, 21). The term “extrabureaucratic networks” comes from Bowie, “Vote Buying,” 488.

68. See Nishizaki, “The Moral Origin of Thailand’s Provincial Strongman.”


70. Ibid., 175–80, 183–83.


75. See Shefter (1994), who explains that the historical timing of the creation of modern bureaucracies and the emergence of mass political participation is of critical importance in determining the relative strengths of a “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” versus a “constituency for patronage.”


78. See Shefter (1994), who explains that the historical timing of the creation of modern bureaucracies and the emergence of mass political participation is of critical importance in determining the relative strengths of a “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” versus a “constituency for patronage.”


83. Abinales, Making Mindanao, 184.


86. Ibid., 79, 82.

87. Indeed, “KBL” has evolved into a popular moniker for the overall system of patronage, recast as an abbreviation for three events that are commonly frequented by vote-seeking politicians: Kasal (wedding), Binyag (baptism), Libing (funeral).


gain power over a central ministry through the successful formation of a party faction. In the Philippines, there is relatively more focus on building up a local political bailiwick and cultivating allies at the level of the congressional district—quite commonly by trying to install one’s own relatives in key local gubernatorial and mayoral positions. With the bailiwick as a foundational source of power, there is thus relatively more inclination to promote decentralization rather than grab posts in the central government. To the extent that a congressperson faces major rivals in the congressional district, however, s/he is likely to view decentralization as a threat rather than an opportunity.


