Policy Pulse: BARMM Elections: From Bullet to Ballot; Rebels to Voters.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) demonstrates the proper procedure for feeding ballots into the vote-counting machine during a media orientation on the Bangsamoro electoral process, July 3, 2026, at Privato Hotel, Shaw Boulevard, Metro Manila. Photograph by Benyamen Cabuntalan, Bangsamoro Information Office (BIO), in Bangsamoro Information Office, “Bangsamoro Ready to Make History at First Parliament Vote,” BARMM Official Website, September 9, 2026, https://bangsamoro.gov.ph/news/latest-news/bangsamoro-ready-to-make-history-at-first-parliament-vote/.

by: Atty. Jamar Kulayan
Commissioner for National Amnesty Commission

The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro rests on the proposition that a peaceful and developed Bangsamoro can be better achieved when the grievances that drove them to violence are pursued and addressed through democratic legal processes rather than armed struggle. While the Bangsamoro Organic Law was ratified on the promise of total reformation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. And, the BARMM government enjoyed the people’s support on the ideals of moral government.

The peace process marked a historic political transition for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—from challenging the State through armed resistance to participating in governance within the constitutional and democratic order, and from functioning as a revolutionary movement to engaging in formal electoral politics. Such a transformation necessarily extends beyond the organization itself. It also entails a corresponding transition among its leaders, commanders, members, and supporters: from exercising authority within a revolutionary structure to embracing democratic political leadership, and from participating in an armed movement to exercising the rights and responsibilities of citizens and voters.

The transition was deliberately undertaken in stages. First, the MILF was given a central role in leading the Bangsamoro transition government under a mandate created by national lawl while its combatants undergo the decommissioning process. Ultimately, however, political authority must derive not from the peace agreement, revolutionary history, or appointment by the national government, but from the consent of the governed expressed through free elections.

That is why this coming First Bangsamoro Parliamentary Elections is just, if not more important as the signing of the CAB. It is no longer a ratification of the BOL; rather, it is the ratification of the MILF’s right to continue leading the regional government. The authority to govern should now rest on the foundation of free consent expressed through the ballots.

The success of the Bangsamoro peace process depends upon the MILF succeeding in three transitions. The first is an institutional transition from presidential toward a parliamentary system of regional government. The second is organizational transition from revolutionary movement into a genuine political party. And, the third is the personal transition of its commanders, combatants and members.

The MILF led Bangsamoro Parliament have succeeded in reorganising the bureaucracy and ushering the shift to parliamentary system of government. Comparatively less attention appears to have been devoted to the second: transforming the culture and practices of a revolutionary organization into those of a competitive democratic political party. The least visible—and potentially the most consequential—is the third.

The MILF has already created, not just one, but at least two political parties, possibly three. And, so is the MNLF. These organizations however are yet to fully adopt the democratic culture: a free competition of political platforms in the marketplace of ideas.

For a revolutionary movement accustomed to solidarity and obedience, they have yet to accept opposing views and dissent. A commander accustomed to obedience is yet to learn how to persuade, how to form alliances and reached consensus. While some of their leaders begun to don on the political robe, many still proudly wears their guerrilla uniform. Even their party logo still bear their rebel insignias. They all have yet to learn the most difficult democratic principle of all: having fought for the Bangsamoro does not confer a permanent entitlement to govern it.

The even greater and most important challenge is the transition of combatants and members from a rebel to a voter. Their decommissioning and the formality of registering as a voter are merely a reacquisition of the right to vote, but to vote responsibly and intelligently is another thing. From a militant who blindly follows order, they must now become discerning and wise voters who can differentiate substance from noise, empty promises from realistic commitments. The era of complete obedience to the rebel movement should have ended the organization formally agreed to participate in the democratic process.

Unfortunately, the rebel organized political parties have adopted what is the most convenient and familiar in communities were poverty, illiteracy, patronage, political dependency, nepotism and limited democratic participation remain deeply entrenched: money politics and compelled politics.

Money politics reduces the stature of election from an expression of people’s will to a commercial transaction. Compelled politics presents agreater danger, it extinguishes that will and enslaves the electorate. Both are anathema to democracy.

The prohibitions against vote-buying, electoral violence, and the sale and consumption of liquor during the election period share a common purpose: to protect the voter’s free and sober judgment. Just as alcohol may cloud the mind, money and intimidation may impair the electorate’s ability to choose freely. Liquor consumption is expressly haram, while vote-buying and violence are inherently haram. Although some may attempt to justify the latter as necessary to achieve a desired objective, political expediency should not and cannot legitimize conduct that undermines the electorate’s freedom and the democratic process.

In the truest sense of democracy, the right to govern is gain primarily by winning the public approval of the party’s political platform. The right to lead is obtain from the free and uncorrupted expression of the will of the majority. Decent leadership is the willingness to navigate the labyrinth of compromise and build genuine consensus. Moral governance is avoiding a wisp of corruption, nepotism and ostentatious display of accumulated wealth.

For this reason, the coming election represents something larger than a contest among political parties. It is a test of whether the political culture of the Bangsamoro can move from command to consent, from patronage to programs, from money to ideas, and from revolutionary legitimacy to democratic legitimacy.

The first Bangsamoro Parliamentary Elections should be more than a transfer of power; they must affirm a new political covenant founded on persuasion rather than command, programs rather than patronage, and public service rather than entitlement. Only then can the Bangsamoro fulfill the promise of lasting peace, genuine self-governance, and moral government.